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Voorwoord
Dit proefschrift had ik alleen niet kunnen schrijven. Velen hebben, ieder op haar of zijn eigen 
wijze, bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming ervan. Het promoveren heeft mij vooral geduld 
gevraagd en geleerd. En dat geldt vast ook voor de mensen om mij heen. Een aantal personen 
wil ik in het bijzonder bedanken voor het zijn van metgezel tijdens dit promotieproces. 
Prof.dr. G.M.W.R. de Wert, beste Guido, dank voor de gelegenheid die je me bood dit 
onderzoek te doen en je onverminderde vertrouwen in het welslagen ervan. Het gemak 
waarmee jij orde kan scheppen in een warboel van gedachten is evenzeer te bewonderen 
als te benijden. Je kritische vragen dreven mij soms tot wanhoop, maar brachten net zo vaak 
ons denken verder. En dat is waar een promotor voor is. Ik vond het fijn dat er ook ruimte 
was voor niet-werkgesprekken en dat we samen en met anderen ‘zoals vanouds’ plezier 
konden hebben. 
Dr. W.J. Dondorp, beste Wybo, ogenschijnlijk onvermoeibaar heb jij versie na versie van alle 
hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift minutieus doorgenomen en voorzien van commentaar. Als 
jij je goedkeuring hebt gegeven weet ik zeker dat het goed is en dat stelt gerust. Dank dat ik 
nooit tevergeefs een beroep op je deed en dat ik van jouw grote expertise mocht profiteren. 
Je hebt niet alleen belangstelling voor ‘de zaak’ maar ook voor de mens daarachter. Met een 
goed gevoel herinner ik mij de keren dat we het werk even lieten voor wat het was en het 
overige wel en wee de revue lieten passeren.
Prof.dr. C.E.M. de Die-Smulders, beste Christine, dank voor je professionele en persoonlijke 
steun in de afgelopen jaren. Jouw jarenlange klinische ervaring en vakkennis hebben mijn 
onderzoek verrijkt. Het promotieproces viel mij soms zwaar, maar gelukkig kon ik altijd bij 
jou terecht. Met warme herinnering denk ik terug aan de keren dat ik bij jou en Jan thuis 
kwam om te eten en op te laden.
Prof.dr. J.J.M. van Lith, beste Jan, jouw grote ervaring en praktische inslag hebben ertoe 
bijgedragen dat ons academisch werk concreet genoeg werd om ook relevant voor de 
praktijk te zijn. Want dat is de plaats waar het uiteindelijk moet gebeuren. Dank voor het 
delen van je inzichten in de prettige en constructieve bijeenkomsten die we hadden. 
Dr. S.G.M. Frints, beste Suzanne, jij zette ons tijdig op het spoor van NIPT en de manier 
waarop jij wetenschap en praktijk weet te combineren heeft een meerwaarde voor mijn 
project betekend. Dank voor je bereidheid in alle fasen van het proces mee te denken en 
mee te werken.
Dr. M.V.E. Macville, beste Merryn, voor mensen zoals ik blijft het moeilijk te doorgronden 
wat er nou precies in laboratoria gebeurt. Dank dat je me keer op keer wilde uitleggen hoe 
het werkte en dat ik me op jou kon verlaten voor het op juistheid checken van de technische 
details. 
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Dr. A. Krumeich, beste Anja, dank voor je hulp bij de voorbereiding van het empirisch 
onderzoek en het verwerken van de data in een leesbaar artikel. 
Hoewel ik niet zo vaak in Maastricht was, hebben de collega’s van Metamedica mij altijd 
ontvangen als ‘een van ons’. Het contact op afstand was daarbij net zo belangrijk als de 
ontmoeting op UNS40. In het bijzonder wil ik hier noemen: dr. Sandra van der Dam, Anna 
Wolters M.Phil., dr. Jenny Slatman, dr. Albine Moser en Angelique Heijnen. Beste Angelique, 
we konden ons contact gewoon weer oppakken waar het 7 jaar geleden bij het IGE was 
gebleven. Dank voor je veelzijdige raad en daad tijdens mijn tijd bij Metamedica en bij de 
praktische zaken van het promoveren. 
En met weemoed noem ik hier onze veel te vroeg overleden collega dr. R.L.P. Berghmans.
Beste Ron, dank voor je goede kamergenoot- en kameraadschap. Wat zouden we ook voor 
de promotie veel voorpret hebben gehad met het doornemen van alle waarschijnlijke en 
meest onwaarschijnlijke scenario’s. Het deed me goed om samen met jou buiten de orde te 
denken en zo nieuwe ideeën en energie te krijgen.
Prof.dr. A.C.J.W. Janssens, beste Cecile, ik ken weinig wetenschappers die met zo veel 
passie en merkbaar plezier hun academische arbeid verrichten als jij. Het was voor ons 
beiden een verrassing toen we elkaar na 7 jaar weer tegenkwamen. Dit weerzien leidde tot 
een geslaagde samenwerking in het bestuur van de NACGG. Dank voor je adviezen en je 
inspiratie tijdens onze ‘napraat-etentjes’. 
Mijn trouwe ex-collega’s van de Raad van State, mr.dr. E.O.H.P. Florijn, mr.dr. G.J.M. Evers 
en mr.dr. J. Luijendijk. Beste Erik, Guido en Hanneke, jullie belangstelling en steun tijdens 
dit promotieproces had ik niet kunnen missen. Jullie maanden mij tot bedaren als ik te 
opstandig werd en bemoedigden mij als het nodig was. Hoe mijn pet ook stond, ik wist mij 
altijd welkom in jullie gezelschap. Onze avonden rond Plein - die soms begonnen met een 
diepe zucht maar meestal eindigden vol frisse moed - hebben veel voor mij betekend.
Lieve Frank, Quirine en Sietze, ondertussen was ik gelukkig met jullie, die mij het dierbaarst 
zijn. Ik hoop dat in de afgelopen jaren altijd duidelijk is geweest dat jullie voor mij 
onvergelijkbaar veel meer betekenen dan enig artikel of boek dat ik schreef. En samen gaan 
wij gewoon verder.
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1.1 Prenatal screening: traditional practice
Soon after the first report in 19661 on the possibility to karyotype the foetus in utero by 
using foetal cells obtained by amniocentesis, prenatal testing for the detection of foetal 
conditions in pregnancy found its way into clinical practice. From then on, prenatal screening 
as nowadays offered in most Western countries also gradually developed. Initially, screening 
was used as a public health tool, to reduce morbidity and mortality by preventing the birth of 
children with (severe) genetic disorders.2 Prenatal screening for Down’s syndrome and some 
other major aneuploidies was offered to pregnant women of advanced maternal age only 
(first ≥ 38 year, later ≥ 36 years in most countries), because they have an a	priori increased 
risk of having a child with aneuploidy. The methods used were amniocentesis (≥ 15-16 weeks 
of gestation) and, since the mid-1980s, also chorionic villus sampling (CVS; ≥ 10-11 week 
of gestation).3,4 At the time, these invasive methods were thought to entail an iatrogenic 
miscarriage risk of about 1,0% (more recent estimations are in the range of 0,3-0,5%).5  
Because of this risk and given the relatively high costs of the invasive techniques, the offer 
was limited to pregnant women of advanced maternal age for reasons of proportionality 
and cost-effectiveness. This policy was based on weighing the relative benefits (number of 
affected foetuses found) and risk of the procedure (iatrogenic miscarriage): the so-called 
detection/miscarriage ratio.6 
   
From the 1980s methods of risk-assessment for the most common trisomies (21, 18 and 13) 
were developed. These tests were based on maternal serum markers, and a decade later 
they were combined with first-trimester foetal nuchal translucency (NT-) measurement: 
together these are called the ‘combined screening test’.3 This development has led to a two-
step testing strategy: first, a risk-assessment test offered to (generally) all pregnant women 
-irrespective of age- and, second, invasive diagnostic testing to only those at increased risk 
(around > 1:200-250) for having a child with one of the trisomies. 
Conventional karyotyping, identifying major numerical or structural chromosomal 
abnormalities that are visible by microscope, has been the gold standard of prenatal 
diagnostic testing for the past four decades. This meant that whereas the initial screen was 
usually set to establish the risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13, the subsequent karyotyping 
provided insight into a wider range of possible defects, including sex-chromosomal 
abnormalities.
Besides the chromosomal abnormalities, testing for open neural tube defects (spina bifida 
and anencephaly) was performed in the second trimester, by means of measuring alpha-
fetoprotein (AFP) in maternal serum. In case of a high AFP level, which is associated with 
neural tube defects, subsequent diagnostic testing followed.3 From the 1990s onward, 
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a second trimester foetal ultrasound scan was increasingly being offered to all pregnant 
women to detect neural tube defects and other major congenital anomalies. 
The risk of testing (invasive procedures), the anxiety and burden caused by the test offer 
and the possible result of selective abortion were issues of discussion. However, the scope 
of prenatal screening and the techniques used were hardly debated, mainly due to a lack 
of alternatives. As a result, the testing techniques and the described scope remained rather 
constant for decades, and the screening strategy consisted of a limited set of standard test 
offers that pregnant women could either accept or decline. 
Recent technological developments have challenged the obviousness of these standards 
and are reason to question what test to offer, to whom and why.7-10 As I will show, these are 
not only practical issues, but they bear moral relevance as well. In this thesis, I will focus on 
three recent developments in prenatal screening, that give reason for ethical reflection on 
former and current prenatal screening strategies: 1) a narrowing of the scope of testing, 2) a 
broadening of the scope of testing, and 3) an increase in the number and a diversification of 
the purpose of prenatal tests. These developments will be described in Section 1.4.
1.2 The aim and scope of prenatal screening
From the beginning, prenatal screening policies were debated because the aim of offering 
testing for foetal abnormalities was questioned. Whereas other population screening 
programmes offer opportunity for primary prevention or treatment, in the prenatal context 
treatment is only rarely an option, although foetal therapy may become more frequent in 
the future.11,12 Moreover, the only ‘preventive measure’ in this context would be selective 
abortion. To portray selective abortion as a means of prevention is ethically (as well as legally 
and politically) problematic, because it may send the message that women ought to have an 
abortion if they are pregnant with an affected foetus and that people with particular disorders 
are not welcome in society.13 The preventive goal of prenatal screening was therefore 
increasingly criticised and was replaced by a so-called ‘autonomy view’14, that emphasised 
the personal character of reproductive choices. This focus on individual reproductive 
decision-making originated from the experience in clinical genetics and obstetric practice 
that the often unexpected birth of a handicapped child caused suffering and hardship to not 
only the child, but to the parents and often the family as well. Reproductive counselling of 
persons in families affected with severe genetic disabilities and disorders, running the risk of 
transmitting these to one’s offspring, was a recognised need and well established practice in 
clinical genetics. This practice contributed to reformulating the purpose of offering prenatal 
screening: to equip prospective parents with health-related information about their foetus 
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to offer opportunity for reproductive choice. Prospective parents were thus able to avoid, 
if wanted, the grief and suffering caused by the birth of a handicapped child.15 As a result, 
a transition “from chance to choice”16 could be achieved. To make clear that participation 
in screening was voluntary and aimed to allow pregnant women (and their partners) to 
make their own reproductive choices, the purpose of prenatal screening in Western policy 
documents was no longer worded in terms of prevention or health gain, but as giving those 
concerned worthwhile options from which to choose.6,17,18 This aim was briefly formulated 
as facilitating autonomous reproductive choice.
It was well recognized that prenatal screening also posed a burden on pregnant women. 
When confronted with the offer to test for foetal abnormalities, prospective parents are 
made aware of the possibility that their foetus might be affected with one of the disorders 
tested for. This knowledge in itself may raise uncertainty and anxiety. Moreover, the test 
offer imposes pregnant women with the responsibility to choose whether to be tested or 
not. In case of invasive testing, this also includes the decision whether they want to run the 
risk of an iatrogenic miscarriage. Those who choose to be tested and receive a reassuring 
test result, will eventually be relieved. However, if prospective parents are confronted with 
an adverse test result, they have to decide about continuing or terminating the pregnancy. 
To abort an initially wanted child is emotionally very burdening and stressful and may cause 
sorrow and grief over a longer period of time. This psychological and emotional impact of 
prenatal screening and its possible consequences, inspired the discussion whether offering 
prenatal testing could be seen as beneficial at all. Despite ongoing debate, the general 
opinion was and still is that prospective parents, being aware of the possible burdens, 
only themselves can decide what they are willing and able to handle and what suits their 
situation best. Therefore, emphasising the voluntary character of participating throughout 
the whole prenatal screening strategy is essential.
1.3 The justification of abortion and selective abortion
Because prenatal testing aims to detect foetal abnormalities in order to give prospective 
parents the opportunity to either terminate the pregnancy or prepare for a child with a 
serious disorder, a preliminary question is whether abortion, and more in particular selective 
abortion, can be justified at all. The answer to this question primarily depends on the moral 
status that is attributed to the foetus, and that determines whether foetal life has to be 
protected or not.19 If the embryo/foetus is considered a person right from the start (i.e. 
from the conception onwards), having the same moral status and rights as any other person 
(children, adults), then abortion has to be qualified as murder and is unjustifiable. This is the 
stance of the Roman Catholic Church and some other Christian communities. Others (some 
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Jewish and Islamic movements) differentiate between various stages in foetal development 
and often assign a major importance to the cerebral development of the foetus at 40 days 
(8 weeks of gestation). This moment is associated with ensoulment, and from that moment 
the status of the foetus is thought to equal that of a person.20 In most Western countries, the 
‘gradualist view’ is dominant. In this view, foetal development is also of major importance. 
The moral status of the embryo/foetus is seen as being initially relatively low but gradually 
increasing with its development. This means that abortion is never understood as a morally 
indifferent act, but that it is acknowledged that in certain situations abortion, all things 
considered, can be seen as a morally defensible act: the earlier in pregnancy, the easier to 
justify, until a certain point in foetal development. Legislation in many Western countries 
allows abortion until 20-24 weeks of gestation under certain conditions. 
Selective abortion is morally even more complex, because then prospective parents do not 
want to avoid having any child, but want to avoid having this	particular child. According 
to some commentators this selective character of abortion for foetal abnormalities means 
that the lives of people with the selected abnormality or disease are considered worth less 
than the lives of healthy people.13 This critique is known as the ‘disability rights critique’. 
Moreover, according to the ‘expressivist argument’ the prenatal test offer itself is seen as 
contributing to such discrimination, because it offers opportunity for selective abortion and 
sends the tacit message that the lives of ‘disabled’ persons are worth less than the lives of 
persons without disabilities.21 This critique does however not hold given the morally different 
status of, on the one hand, an embryo/foetus and, on the other hand, a person. To accept 
that prospective parents may terminate a pregnancy because of a foetal abnormality is not 
the same as saying that the lives of persons with that abnormality are less worth living -or 
worse- should be terminated. Prenatal screening and selective abortion are in themselves 
not discriminatory acts. Whether they have a discriminatory effect very much depends on 
how the screening strategy is actually presented, how the possibility of selective abortion is 
portrayed, and on whether society is willing to take care of its disabled fellow citizens. 
I therefore share the dominant view that both abortion and selective abortion can be 
justified under certain conditions. Offering prospective parents the opportunity to gather 
information about their foetus in order to enable them to make an autonomous choice with 
regard to either continuing or terminating the pregnancy in case of a foetal abnormality, is 
not discriminatory nor morally objectionable in itself. The conditions for and the scope of 
such a prenatal test offer will, however, be the major subjects discussed in this thesis. 
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1.4 Recent developments in prenatal screening
In this section three recent developments in prenatal screening will be described. I will also 
shortly point out what ethical issues do arise due to these changes in prenatal screening 
practice.
1.4.1	 Narrow	testing
The availability of new molecular techniques has led to the option of faster and cheaper 
diagnostic testing aimed at selected	 chromosome regions (e.g. comprising the most 
common chromosome defects). These so-called rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) tests 
have been introduced in a few West-European countries, including the Netherlands, as 
a replacement for or as an additional to conventional karyotyping offered to women at 
increased risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13. In some countries women are offered a choice 
between RAD and karyotyping.22 The possibility to offer a RAD test targeted at trisomies 
21, 18 and 13 (and mostly chromosomes X and Y as well) instead of karyotyping, allows for 
earlier definite test results and avoids unexpected and unclear findings. At the same time, 
RAD reduces the range of possible outcomes that women may consider relevant for their 
reproductive decision-making. This raises the question what the aim of offering opportunity 
for autonomous reproductive choice actually means: offering choice with regard to a narrow 
range of conditions only, or for a broader scope of abnormalities too? This question also 
comes up in a totally different context. In the last few years the development of non-invasive 
prenatal testing (NIPT)1* has expanded and NIPT is about to be introduced in prenatal 
screening strategies. NIPT techniques enable testing on cell-free foetal DNA/RNA circulating 
in the blood of pregnant women. This can be done quite early in pregnancy (≥ 7 weeks of 
gestation) and the procedure is easy and safe to perform. 
The application of NIPT as a second-tier screening test in the testing cascade for trisomies 21, 
18 and 13 is pending.23 This means that NIPT will serve as a (very reliable) second screening 
test between the combined screening test and follow-up invasive diagnostic testing. By that, 
the number of invasive procedures can be drastically reduced. Expectations are that one-
step diagnostic NIPT will eventually replace current two-step testing, namely the combined 
screening test and invasive diagnostic testing. Either way, if NIPT is offered for trisomies 21, 
18 and 13 only, this implies a limitation in the diagnostic scope and reproductive choice 
when compared to the traditional offer of conventional karyotyping. Unless additional 
testing is offered - I’ll come to that in Section 1.4.3. 
1* In the chapters 3, 4, and 6 the abbreviation NIPD (non-invasive prenatal diagnosis) is used, because these 
chapters consist of papers that were written and published some time ago. Recently, however, the terminology has 
internationally changed into NIPT (non-invasive prenatal testing). To be in keeping with this international usage, I 
also use this latter term in this chapter and in Chapter 9.
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1.4.2	 Broad	testing
An opposite development to that of narrowing the scope of testing, is the introduction of 
broad, genome-wide diagnostic tests performed on foetal material obtained by amniocentesis 
and CVS. Microarray-based techniques allow for detecting a much wider range of foetal 
defects than can be revealed by conventional karyotyping, and are increasingly applied if 
foetal abnormalities are found by ultrasound scans throughout the pregnancy. Suggestions 
to offer microarrays for more indications, such as an increased risk for the trisomies or to all 
pregnant women without a specific indication, can also be found in the literature.24
Another ongoing development is the ever advancing nature of foetal ultrasound scans, 
including NT-measurement. This enables identifying not only major abnormalities such 
as spina bifida and anencephaly, but also ‘markers’ for all kinds of other, possibly milder, 
abnormalities. The scope ranges from congenital heart defects to all kinds of structural 
defects and genetic syndromes. Currently, abnormal ultrasound findings are usually followed 
by an offer for invasive microarray testing. Whereas broader testing allows for the detection 
of more clinically relevant abnormalities, it also increases the amount of unclear and 
possibly unwanted findings that are difficult to handle in the prenatal situation. Moreover, 
how can adequate informed consent for either the ultrasound scans or the broad diagnostic 
tests be reached? It is impossible to inform prospective parents beforehand about all the 
findings possibly generated and if tried, this can easily result in information overload. What 
does offering reproductive choice in such a context actually mean? And to what range does 
or should prenatal screening actually extend in the first place? If, eventually, a genome-wide 
NIPT may be feasible too25,26 this will make risky invasive procedures redundant and then all 
these questions will become even more urgent. This is not to say that prenatal screening 
for foetal disorders should be extended to include testing for more conditions, but if they 
will be included, the question arises: who is to decide about that and on what grounds?7,9,10 
1.4.3	 Increased	number	of	testing
In Section 1.4.1 I touched upon the issue of additional testing after a narrow test has been 
offered. This not only relates to the case of RAD, but also applies to a (future) narrow, 
one-step NIPT. The current combined screening test not only indicates the risk for having 
a child with trisomy 21, 18 or 13. NT-measurement, although initially offered to increase 
the accuracy of the risk-assessment for these trisomies, has in practice developed into a 
test that also indicates other abnormalities. An increased NT ≥ 3.5 mm in itself is reason to 
offer follow-up diagnostic testing by microarray. If NIPT for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 would 
substitute the combined screening test, this would result in a loss of findings identified by 
NT-measurement and follow-up diagnostic testing. Unless, of course, NT-measurement 
would be offered additionally. However, complementary tests would complicate the testing 
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trajectory and come down to a fragmentation and increase in the number of tests offered to 
pregnant women. What does this extended number and extended period of testing mean 
for prospective parents in terms of emotional, psychological and cognitive burdens? And 
what range has to be covered exactly by additional tests? 
Another tendency is that one and the same test or test moment will be used for testing 
both pregnancy-related problems that can be treated and foetal abnormalities. How to 
deal with tests that have such a two-fold scope and aim? Testing for reason of pregnancy 
management may require a more directive attitude of professionals, whereas testing for 
untreatable foetal abnormalities explicitly does not. It should be ensured that the offer of 
prenatal tests with these different aims meets, respectively, the conditions of adequate 
clinical care and the requirements of the normative framework for prenatal screening. Can 
these different aims and conditions clearly be separated in the test offer, and if not, what 
conclusions should be drawn? 
All in all, the scope of prenatal screening becomes increasingly indistinct, because the 
various techniques allow both a narrowing and a broadening of the traditional scope, and 
because an increase in the number of prenatal tests becomes apparent. This development 
may ultimately challenge the very aim of prenatal screening: is reproductive autonomy 
promoted by offering more options or is meaningful choice impracticable when offering 
more and heterogeneous tests?
1.5 Objectives of this study
These three developments in the prenatal screening strategies present a challenge for the 
‘reproductive autonomy’ account of the aim of prenatal screening. Until recently autonomous 
choice in prenatal screening meant being given the opportunity to autonomously decide 
about whether or not to accept a standard offer of prenatal screening. Only in the margin of 
this there has been some debate about whether the possibility of ‘unexpected’ findings as a 
result of karyotyping would require the accommodation of a ‘right not to know’.6,27,28 Every 
account of what to test for in prenatal screening either implicitly or explicitly presupposes 
an answer as to why such screening is being offered in the first place. Without explicitly 
addressing this ‘why’, a reasoned debate about the pros and cons of wider or more limited 
testing will therefore be impossible.
The main objective of this thesis is to map out the moral landscape of prenatal screening, 
more specifically to identify and systematically evaluate the moral pros and cons of the main 
developments in current prenatal screening strategies. This evaluation will be performed in 
Chapter 1
18
relation to two normative accounts of the aim of prenatal screening, namely prevention and 
reproductive autonomy. 
The secondary goal of this thesis is to explore whether the notion of autonomous 
reproductive choice, as meant in the dominant moral framework for prenatal screening, can 
be given the wider interpretation of offering pregnant women the opportunity to individually 
decide about what conditions to test for or not. This is called the concept of 'individualised 
choice'.22,29 And if the scope of prenatal screening would become more individualised, what 
-if any- lines should be drawn from a moral point of view? 
With this analysis, I hope to contribute to developing an adequate normative framework for 
ethical guidance and policy making regarding prenatal screening. 
1.6 Method
This study combines theoretical and empirical methods, namely ethical analysis of relevant 
literature and empirical research. 
The ethical method used is the so-called wide reflective equilibrium, which searches for 
coherence between different sets of beliefs, intuitions, general ethical principles, judgements, 
and practical experience, arrived at by processes of deliberation.30,31 This method best fits 
the complexity of the issues involved and has a proven value for the normative analysis 
of bioethical problems. The term ‘reflective equilibrium’ (RE) has been introduced by John 
Rawls in his book ‘A Theory of Justice’.32 In his view, justification is a reflective process in 
which moral beliefs, ethical principles and theoretical rules are considered in order to make 
them as coherent as possible.33 
In the context of applied ethics, RE is used as a method to relate two opposite accounts of 
moral reasoning.33 On the one hand, a model that holds that justified moral judgements can 
be reached through a deductive method of reasoning according to general principles and 
rules. However, these rules and principles are often unable to solve an ethical problem as 
it arises in daily practice, because they are mostly too abstract to come to one particular 
conclusion and to determine what should be done and not be done. The other model, 
based on casuistry and analogy in actual moral decision-making, uses an inductive method 
of reasoning. This model holds that general norms can be derived from analysing social 
practice and paradigmatic cases and by comparison of cases, and that these norms can 
then again be used for other individual cases. However, interpretations, analogies and moral 
decisions in practice may conflict and by that make justification impossible to reach.33 RE 
combines elements of both accounts, by using moral intuitions, actual practice, and relevant 
ethical principles to come to moral judgements. The wide RE also includes background 
theories, such as a theory of the person, specific thinking formats or concepts, in order 
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to reach “coherence among the widest set of moral and non-moral beliefs by revising and 
refining them at all levels.” 30
The search for a justifiable moral practice can be described as an iterative process between 
theory and practice. In this thesis, concepts as they appear in theories regarding population 
screening and public health/public health genetics were considered explicitly.16,34,35 
Furthermore, the ethical values as articulated in the basic principles of health-care ethics 
were of major importance in our ethical assessment. These include the principles of 
respect for persons, of beneficence and non-maleficence, and of justice. Experiences with 
prenatal testing in the daily practice of clinical genetics and obstetrics were included by 
explicitly including professionals in these fields and pregnant women in the actual process 
of deliberation. The empirical part of in this study has a qualitative character. Opinions, 
views and preferences of stakeholders, more in particular professionals involved in prenatal 
screening and potential users of this screening (pregnant women and parents), were 
generated in various focus groups. The results of this qualitative research are reported in 
Chapter 7, and are also integrated in the ethical analysis as it appears in the other chapters 
of this thesis. 
1.7 Outline of this thesis
This thesis consists of seven articles that have been published, and a general discussion. 
The discussion in this thesis is based on the developments in the field of prenatal screening 
until 1 May 2013. Furthermore, since the articles have been published in various journals 
requiring the spelling to be in either British or American English, the spelling throughout this 
thesis is not always consistent.
Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 address the ethical implications of three different developments 
in prenatal screening, namely the introduction of RAD, NIPT and microarray-based testing 
techniques. 
In Chapter 2 the ethical pros and cons of a narrow diagnostic test (RAD) versus conventional 
karyotyping are addressed. Do the advantages of RAD (fast, targeted and cheap) clearly 
outweigh the disadvantages of conventional karyotyping (slower and generating unclear 
findings)? Or is the broader yield of karyotyping preferable? This also depends on what one 
thinks prenatal screening is or should be about: a test for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 only? Or 
should prenatal testing offer the opportunity for testing for a wider range of abnormalities? 
There is no agreement amongst professionals and prospective parents in this regard. The 
question then is what option would best accord with the overall aim to give opportunity for 
autonomous reproductive choice. 
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Chapter 3 explores the ethical implications of NIPT in prenatal screening strategies. Will 
the fact that NIPT can be performed easily, early and safely, lead to an uninformed and 
thoughtless uptake and to normalisation of testing and abortion? Or do these challenges 
appear, if at all, only if NIPT is used for identifying a much broader range of abnormalities? 
The possible ethical relevance of the timing of testing for the possible selective abortion, 
will also be considered. 
Chapter 4 also deals with NIPT and discusses what the introduction of NIPT for trisomies 21, 
18 and 13 means for the screening strategy as a whole. A decision has to be made whether 
complementary (invasive) tests will be offered, to avoid a loss of information as compared 
with current practice. But what does the accumulation of tests mean for the requirements 
of informed consent and proportionality? 
In Chapter 5, genomic microarray analysis will be discussed. This technique is increasingly 
being applied as a prenatal diagnostic tool, but as yet no clear guidelines exist when 
microarrays should be applied prenatally, and whether a targeted or genome-wide array 
has to be favoured. Given the aim of prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities, to facilitate 
autonomous reproductive choice, the question arises what a ‘suitable test’ actually means, 
and how adequate information about the heterogeneous findings possibly generated by 
microarrays can be provided to pregnant women in the context of informed consent. Other 
genome-wide testing techniques, like whole genome/exome sequencing and analysis, may 
in the future be used prenatally as well. These techniques do not only generate information 
about congenital disorders, but may also reveal that the future child will have a high risk 
of developing a late(r)-onset disease. Are there reasons to limit the scope beforehand, for 
example to protect future children’s right not to know? Suggestions of how to tackle this 
problem are provided. 
Chapter 6 gives an overview of all the developments discussed in this thesis and shows 
how these together raise important ethical questions concerning meaningful reproductive 
choice, the autonomy rights of future children, equity of access and the proportionality of 
testing. A main challenge is to decide about the range of conditions for which testing should 
be offered and the reasons to do so.
Chapter 7 presents the results of the qualitative research. How do professionals and 
prospective parents evaluate various test options and what would they prefer? Four different 
test options are discussed: a standard test offer of RAD, karyotyping and microarrays, and 
the option of individualised choice. It appears that respondents greatly differ in how they 
assess the pros and cons and the feasibility of the different test options in practice. Does 
this mean that a single standard test offer is inadequate and that more differentiation is 
needed? 
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Prenatal screening is not the only area where ethical issues regarding informed consent in 
genetic testing come up. Chapter 8 shows that similar problems arise in other areas where 
genetic tests are being used, specifically in neonatal screening and direct-to-consumer 
testing. It will become clear that the ways to address the ethical issues need to be attuned 
to the different contexts. 
The final Chapter 9 gives an overview of the normative framework for prenatal screening 
and shows how the various developments affect and challenge this framework. Should 
this lead to a change in the normative framework or in prenatal screening practice? Some 
general conclusions and suggestions are provided. 
1.8 Screening and diagnosis: some clarifications 
Before moving on to the ethical discussion, I will clarify how the notions of screening and 
diagnosis are used in this thesis 
First, in the normative and regulatory discourse it is customary to use the term ‘screening’ 
for any systematic and unsolicited test offer, initiated by a public health service or 
professional, that aims at the systematic early detection or exclusion of (a risk for) a specific 
condition, regardless of the type of test being offered. The distinguishing feature is its 
unsolicited character: the test is provided to (a specific group of) persons -in this context 
pregnant women- who do not yet have any symptoms of illness nor another reason to seek 
medical help for the condition in question. In that regard, it is fundamentally different from 
(diagnostic) testing based on a specific indication.36 In medical discourse, the term screening 
is mainly used for qualifying the character of the test itself. As such, it refers to a test for risk-
assessment and differs from a diagnostic test that allows to make a definitive diagnosis and 
that explains the health problems or clarifies abnormal screening test results. In this thesis, 
the term screening is primarily used in the first sense.
Second, I conceive prenatal screening as referring to the whole of the testing trajectory 
offered to pregnant women, including both risk-assessment (screening) and follow-up testing 
(diagnosis). This view is not self-evident. Despite fairly standard methods of risk-assessment, 
practice and opinions differ regarding what kind of follow-up testing is and should be offered 
to pregnant women at increased risk for either aneuploidies or abnormalities indicated 
by results of foetal ultrasound scans. The procedure of the first step (risk-assessment) is 
generally regulated, for example in the Dutch Draaiboek Prenatale Screening37, but national 
policy-documents do not always record how the subsequent diagnostic test should be 
performed. Apparently, there is a different approach to the first and second step in the 
testing strategy, in the sense that the first tends to be uniformly regulated, whereas the 
interpretation of the latter tends to be left to professionals’ own discretion. Thus, individual 
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professionals and centres may, and actually do, differ in what diagnostic procedure they 
offer to pregnant women. If the requirement of equal access, that applies to all screening 
strategies, also refers to the quality of testing38, differences in the (national) provision of test 
offers to women having an identical indication, are problematic. Beyond this consideration, 
I advance three reasons to conceive follow-up testing as part of the screening strategy. 
First, the ultimate decision to terminate or continue a pregnancy cannot be based on a risk-
assessment alone: in that regard the aim to provide reproductive options and to guarantee 
a valid and reliable test instrument in this scenario is only met with the current two-step 
procedure - until, of course, a one-step diagnostic NIPT-test becomes available. Second, 
the diagnostic test is consequential to the indication ‘increased risk’ that results from the 
first-step screening-test: pregnant women would not be confronted with a subsequent 
diagnostic offer without being screened first. In this regard, the two tests are inextricably 
related. Third, participation in screening should be based on information about not only the 
initial decision regarding risk-assessment, but also about other decisions that possibly have 
to be made in the successive trajectory.6 If one does consider, as I do, both test phases to 
be an intrinsic part of the screening strategy, this means that the aim and requirements of 
prenatal screening do apply to both the initial and the follow-up testing phase. 
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Abstract
No consensus exists whether women at increased risk for trisomy 21, 18 and 13 should 
be offered stand-alone rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) or karyotyping. In this paper, 
the ethical implications of a fast, relatively cheap and targeted RAD are examined. The 
advantages of RAD seem less robust than its proponents suggest. Fast test results only give 
a short-term psychological benefit. The cost advantage of RAD is apparent, but must be 
weighed against consequences like missed abnormalities, which are evaluated differently 
by professionals and pregnant women. Since pre-test information about RAD will have to 
include telling women about karyotyping as a possible alternative, the advantage of RAD 
in terms of the quantity of information that needs to be given may also be smaller than 
suggested. We conclude that none of the supposed arguments in favour of RAD is decisive 
in itself. Whether the case for RAD may still be regarded as convincing when taking these 
arguments together seems to depend on one’s implicit view of what prenatal screening is 
about. Are we basically dealing with a test for trisomy 21 and a few conditions more? Or are 
there good grounds for also testing for the wider range of abnormalities that karyotyping 
can detect? As professionals and pregnant women may have different views about this, we 
suggest that the best approach is to offer women a choice between RAD and karyotyping. This 
approach is most in line with the general aim of prenatal screening: providing opportunities 
for autonomous reproductive choice.
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2.1 Introduction
Prenatal screening strategies for chromosomal abnormalities consist of two steps.1,2 First, a 
risk assessment for the most common trisomies (21 and generally also 18 and 13) is carried 
out. This is based on a combination of maternal serum testing and foetal nuchal translucency 
measurement.3 Second, a diagnostic test is offered to women found to be at an increased 
risk of having a child with one of those trisomies. The diagnosis (usually karyotyping) is 
performed on foetal material obtained through either chorionic villus sampling (CVS; at 11-
14 weeks’ gestation) or amniocentesis (at 15-18 weeks’ gestation). These are invasive tests 
that hold a small but significant risk (0.3-1.0%) of iatrogenic miscarriage.4,5 Karyotyping has 
been the gold standard for prenatal diagnostic testing for nearly half a century. It has a 
high reliability in diagnosing numeric chromosome aberrations, as well as (major) structural 
abnormalities. These include unbalanced translocations, balanced translocations (familial 
and de novo), mosaicism, supernumerary chromosomes, triploidy, and sex chromosome 
abnormalities. Down’s syndrome (trisomy 21) is the most common aneuploidy causing 
intellectual and developmental disability.6 Other chromosomal abnormalities are less 
frequent and highly variable. Some of those are lethal (eg, trisomy 13 and trisomy 18), 
others are asymptomatic, relatively mild (eg, XXY (Klinefelter’s syndrome), XXX, XYY), or are 
of uncertain clinical significance.7,8
Karyotyping is a labour intensive and thus a rather expensive technique, which takes an 
average time of 14 days before the test results can be reported. As karyotyping reveals 
all chromosomal abnormalities that can be microscopically detected, it may lead to other 
findings than the aneuploidies targeted in prenatal screening. Among those ‘incidental’ (or 
with a misnomer: ‘unexpected’) findings, there can be severe but also mild abnormalities or 
abnormalities of which the impact on the health of the child is unsure.7,9-11 The development 
of techniques for rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) allows cheaper and rapid diagnosis of 
some selected chromosomal anomalies. A ‘narrow’ RAD targets the chromosomes 21,18 
and 13, whereas a ‘broad’ RAD also includes the sex chromosomes. This development has 
led to an increased discussion as to whether a full karyotype is always indicated. RAD has 
already been introduced in several countries, but the question whether and if so, how, 
RAD should be offered is still under debate.7,8,11-14 Four prenatal diagnostic test options 
for women at increased risk can be distinguished: karyotyping as stand-alone; RAD with 
subsequent karyotyping;15,16 offering women a choice between RAD and karyotyping14,17,18 
and a stand-alone RAD. Because a stand-alone RAD has been recommended by the UK 
National Screening Committee and several individual commentators,11,19,20 the discussion 
in this paper focuses on this approach. We will do so by exploring the main arguments in 
favour of RAD as stand-alone that can be found in the literature: (a) RAD detects the most 
important abnormalities; (b) RAD enables fast test results and reduces anxiety; (c) RAD is 
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cheaper than karyotyping; (d) the limited scope of RAD simplifies pre-test counselling and 
enables adequate informed consent; (e) RAD produces only clear test results and eases 
post-test counselling and decision-making; and (f) RAD guarantees a consistent scope of 
testing throughout the screening strategy. Although these arguments may appear to be 
only ‘technical’, they actually are morally charged arguments as well. Therefore, an ethical 
reflection is needed. The insights gained will be of use to professionals and policymakers in 
deciding what prenatal diagnostic test offer is to be preferred in the screening context.
2.2 Normative framework for prenatal screening
To clarify the perspective of our reflection, we first briefly address the normative framework 
for prenatal screening. This framework is based on the four central principles of health-care 
ethics. 
First, the principle of respect for autonomy not only requires that the woman concerned 
should give her adequate informed consent for screening but is also at the basis of the 
classical account of the aim of prenatal screening. There is a strong consensus, at least in 
Western countries, that prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities should have the purpose 
of facilitating autonomous reproductive choice for pregnant women and their partners.20,21 
The alternative aim of maximising the prevention of the birth of children with congenital 
abnormalities is regarded as morally problematic for two reasons. It not only sends the 
implied message that persons with the relevant handicaps are not welcome in society, but it 
may also lead to pressure upon pregnant women to undergo screening and decide to abort 
in the case of a foetal abnormality. That would run counter to the principle of autonomy.
Second, the twin principles of beneficence and non-maleficence require that the benefits 
to pregnant women from participating should clearly outweigh the disadvantages that all 
screening programmes do have. Finally, the principle of justice requires equity of access 
and cost-effective use of financial means, especially when programmes are collectively or 
publicly funded.4,22,23
2.3. Arguments in favour of RAD as stand-alone: an evaluation
2.3.1.	 RAD	detects	the	most	important	abnormalities
The debate about RAD and karyotyping is very much about the scope of prenatal testing. 
Although both diagnostic tests are offered as a follow-up to screening for a fairly limited 
set of abnormalities, RAD leads to narrowing the range of possible findings as compared 
with karyotyping. In the debate about this, karyotyping is often presented as the obvious 
reference point, meaning that the onus of justification rests with those arguing in favour of 
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more limited testing.24 The incidence of clinically relevant abnormalities missed by RAD is 
estimated to be 1:1000-1:1659, whereas missed abnormalities of mild or uncertain clinical 
significance are more frequent.7,14,19 Proponents of RAD estimate these residual risks to be 
of limited relevance.25,26 This is however not obvious, because both the quantity and quality 
(or seriousness) of chromosomal abnormalities missed by RAD can be evaluated differently. 
A difference in appreciation already manifests itself in the decision to offer either a ‘broad’ 
or a ‘narrow’ RAD, which respectively identifies or misses the X and Y chromosomes. The 
clinical significance of sex chromosomal abnormalities is not always clear and may vary 
from a relatively mild to an asymptomatic phenotype. An example is XYY, which has been 
associated with intellectual and behavioural problems but does often not actually lead to 
any problems at all. To avoid complex pre-test counselling about the possible outcome of 
findings of limited or uncertain clinical significance and to spare women difficult decisions 
based on such findings, some professionals want to avoid detecting sex chromosomal 
abnormalities. Others find it important not to miss them, just to offer parents maximum 
information and maximum autonomy.27
Both a broad and a narrow RAD miss clinically relevant and unclear autosomal abnormalities 
that karyotyping does identify. A recent study including 24 prenatal experts suggests that 
professionals largely prefer to detect abnormalities with severe consequences and would 
rather not detect chromosomal abnormalities without clinical consequences.28 Dissensus 
exists with regard to abnormalities with mild or uncertain outcomes. Interestingly, neither 
RAD nor karyotyping corresponds with these wishes of professionals, because RAD covers 
only some of the more severe abnormalities, while karyotyping also detects abnormalities 
without clinical consequences.28 Proponents of RAD seem to value the fact that it misses 
abnormalities as ‘acceptable, in view of their limited or uncertain clinical relevance’,25 
whereas proponents of karyotyping favour access to these findings because they have 
potential (ranging from uncertain to major) clinical significance.7 Pregnant women 
themselves have different attitudes towards these findings as well. This is shown by their 
preference for either RAD or karyotyping12,14,29 and by the different reproductive choices 
they make in case of test results with uncertain clinical significance: most decide to continue 
with the pregnancy, but some decide for abortion.7 Different views have been found in the 
general public and between countries as well.30,31 In short, no consensus exists about the 
relevance of the abnormalities missed by RAD. A preference for a narrow RAD, a broad RAD, 
or karyotyping reflects various views on what delineation of the scope of diagnostic testing 
is most in line with facilitating autonomous reproductive choice as the aim of prenatal 
screening.
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2.3.2	 Fast	test	results
A second reason to prefer RAD is that it generates test results within 1-4 days. This is 
considerably faster than karyotyping, which takes ≥14 days in Europe, although results can 
be ready as early as from 7 days in the United States.8 This reduced waiting time for RAD is 
clearly advantageous, if it diminishes anxiety for women.19,31,32 Still, three qualifying remarks 
need to be made.
First, the striking contrast between the speed of karyotyping in the United States and 
Europe in itself bears moral relevance. The difference between fast (7 days) and slow (21 
days) karyotyping is 2 weeks. This substantial difference raises the question whether RAD 
is the only way to shorten the lengthy waiting period that is indeed hard to justify in view 
of maternal anxiety, the time left for decision making, and the emotional burden of (later) 
termination of the pregnancy. Furthermore, the difference between fast karyotyping (7 
days) and a slow RAD (4 days) is only 3 days, which diminishes the advantage of reduced 
maternal anxiety that a choice for RAD would entail. The absence of a substantial extra 
waiting time for more comprehensive information may also motivate women to choose a 
broad test instead of a narrow test.29
Second, in the face of the existing rather large difference in reporting time between 
karyotyping and RAD, the consequences of a fast or slow test result should be accounted for. 
Waiting for test results of karyotyping can place a significant emotional burden on women 
and their partners,26,31 but studies also suggest that RAD has no overall psychological benefit 
compared with karyotyping despite reduced anxiety and stress in the short term.33,34 
Moreover, a recent study, including 103 pregnant women considering amniocentesis, 
suggests that anxiety and length of waiting time have some effect on women’s preferences, 
but that the clinical consequences of detected abnormalities appear to have the greatest 
influence on the test that these women would choose.12
Third, part of the clinically relevant abnormalities missed by RAD will be found by the routine 
ultrasound scan that most pregnant women undergo in the second trimester.35,36 If so, test 
results will be delayed by 2-10 weeks, compared with, respectively, a late amniocentesis and 
an early CVS. This leaves little time for the emotionally burdening decision about continuing 
or terminating the pregnancy, as abortion is legally prohibited after 20-24 weeks of gestation 
in many countries. In case of adverse findings that could have been detected earlier, it will 
be difficult for professionals to explain that they chose a rapid but limited test for the sake 
of the woman’s well-being. Restricting and postponing autonomous choice for this reason is 
clearly paternalistic. Besides, there is an inconsistency in saying that findings not detected 
by RAD are of limited value while at the same time presenting the later ultrasound scan as a 
safety net where at least part of the missed abnormalities will still be found.
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To conclude, the ability to produce test results within only a few days counts in favour of 
RAD, but this advantage is not unchallenged and does not seem to provide a decisive reason 
to offer a stand-alone RAD.
2.3.3	 Financial	costs
In the third place, RAD is favoured because it is relatively cheap to perform. Expenses per 
trisomy 21 case detected (‘detection/cost’ ratio) are less for RAD when compared with 
karyotyping.31,37 Furthermore, a recent study suggests that both short- and long-term costs, 
including incremental cost for a live-born child having a chromosomal abnormality missed 
by a broad RAD, are lower for a stand-alone RAD than for standard karyotyping.12 According 
to the same study, allowing women a choice between karyotyping and RAD reduces costs 
compared with standard karyotyping. If confirmed in further research, these data would 
seem to suggest that, from a purely economic perspective, a stand-alone RAD is the preferred 
diagnostic test. Of course, financial considerations are relevant in the ethical assessment 
of what test to offer. It is a requirement of distributive justice that publicly or collectively 
funded programmes for prenatal screening should be cost-effective. But that does not 
amount to saying that the least costly option is always the best choice. Even though it should 
be acknowledged that budgetary constraints may in practice limit the range of alternative 
tests available, the challenge is indeed to offer the test that best serves the aim of prenatal 
screening, while being proportional in the sense that the costs involved can be justified from 
a health-care economic point of view.
2.3.4	 Pre-test	counselling:	informed	consent
Proponents of RAD assert that the limited amount of abnormalities targeted by RAD ensures 
that prospective parents can be better informed about the test and that adequate informed 
consent can be obtained more easily. To inform prospective parents about karyotyping is 
more complicated, because this test may also generate a much wider range of findings, 
including abnormalities of which the clinical significance is limited or unclear.11,38 A real 
concern is indeed that an offer of karyotyping is not always preceded by adequate counselling 
and informed consent and may therefore lead to outcomes that are ‘unexpected’. Not, of 
course, for the professional, but for the woman and her partner who were not informed 
beforehand about the possibility of such outcomes. RAD would avoid this. Still, ‘easy’ pre-
test counselling for RAD may be challenged by two factors.
First, a narrow RAD includes the chromosomes 21, 18 and 13, and a broad RAD the 
chromosomes X and Y as well. This means that proper counselling and informed consent for 
RAD can still not be limited to Down’s syndrome, but will also have to include the differences 
between trisomies 21, 18 and 13 and the sex chromosomal abnormalities. In order to enable 
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deliberate choices based on sufficient and relevant information and consistent with the 
decision maker’s values,39 pre-test counselling requires an adequate amount of information, 
adjusted to the patient’s knowledge and capabilities.40 In the context of RAD, a distinction 
can be made between three categories of abnormalities: (1) lethal conditions (trisomies 18 
and 13); (2) serious conditions implying lifelong intensive (medical) aid (Down’s syndrome); 
and (3) conditions implying hardly any infirmities (most sex chromosomal abnormalities). 
A narrow RAD may detect abnormalities of categories (1) and (2), whereas a broad RAD 
will also find category (3) abnormalities. Karyotyping can detect the same categories of 
abnormalities, but will also lead to (4) abnormal findings of which the clinical implications 
are unknown. Given this overlap in types of abnormalities possibly detected by RAD and 
karyotyping, the pre-test counselling advantage of RAD may be limited, at least where a 
broad RAD is concerned.
Second, it is reasonable to assume that at least some pregnant women are well acquainted 
with karyotyping, which has for decades been the accepted diagnostic test. To prevent that 
women agree to a test on the basis of false assumptions, information about the more limited 
scope of RAD as compared with karyotyping should be available. An important aspect of 
women’s decision making that will also have to be addressed is their views about whether 
the narrow focus of RAD provides sufficient justification for undergoing risky invasive 
testing.41,42 Because RAD thus requires more extensive counselling than generally accounted 
for by its proponents, the pre-test counselling advantage of RAD compared with karytoyping 
may be less than is often assumed.
The different views on RAD suggest an underlying controversy on the interpretation of 
reproductive autonomy and on how pregnant women’s autonomy could best be served. 
Should the emphasis be on optimising and easing the process of decision making for them, 
or on maximising the amount of information and reproductive options that they will be 
provided with? With regard to decision making, a pro-RAD assumption would be that 
information related to karyotyping is too complicated. However, research among pregnant 
women has shown that they differ in their preference for either a limited or more extensive 
amount of information.38,43 The challenge will be to adapt the information accordingly, while 
ensuring it is not too much but yet enough information to facilitate adequate informed 
consent. To restrain information and to limit choices, based on evaluations by professionals, 
may indeed make counselling more easy, but these evaluations do not necessarily correspond 
with those of future parents themselves.
From a moral point of view, the question is which approach is most in line with the principles 
underlying the normative framework. On the one hand, it can be argued that restricting the 
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scope of diagnostic testing violates the principle of respect for autonomy and falls short of 
the requirement of beneficence. On the other hand, respect for autonomy need not mean 
that pregnant women should be provided with as much information about the foetus as 
possible, as that might have the adverse effect of undermining rather than furthering their 
ability of making autonomous choices and perhaps even lead to harming the women in 
question. Indeed, more choice is not necessarily better than less. But the question here is 
about restricting the scope of testing prior to any evidence that women would otherwise 
be burdened with information that they cannot handle. Pregnant women are found to have 
different information needs regarding the health of the foetus and also tend to evaluate the 
features of RAD differently.12,14 It is therefore not evident that the balance of benefits and 
burdens is more favourable in case of a stand-alone RAD as compared with karyotyping.
2.3.5	 Post-test	counselling:	burden	of	choice	and	anxiety
Another contended advantage is that by avoiding findings of limited and unclear clinical 
significance, RAD does not confront prospective parents with difficult and unwanted 
reproductive choices.25,38 Some professionals are especially uneasy about reporting unclear 
or mild abnormalities, because of the dilemmas stemming from it.7 Where test results are 
ambivalent or uncertain, prospective parents will have to decide whether to terminate a 
wanted pregnancy while the chances of having a healthy child are quite large, or to continue 
the pregnancy with the implication of continued worries even until after the child’s birth, 
through its childhood or further. Therefore, some conclude that generating these findings is 
not always in the best interest of the woman or the couple.11,44
However, pregnant women also show interest in findings with clinically mild consequences 
and in practice some choose to terminate a pregnancy in case of unclear or mild findings, 
as they cannot accept the uncertainty of the clinical outcome.7,12 Although the possibility 
of an ‘unnecessary abortion’ is a burdening prospect for both professionals and pregnant 
women, the potential benefit of information about the foetus possibly being affected should 
be accounted for as well. Clearly, decisions regarding testing and termination of pregnancy 
should explicitly be left to pregnant women’s own views and values in order to respect their 
autonomous reproductive decision making.
The argument that RAD avoids difficult decisions with regard to terminating or continuing 
the pregnancy, does not apply to a broad RAD, which also includes X and Y. To target these 
abnormalities undermines this purpose and supposed advantage of RAD, because most of 
the sex chromosomal abnormalities are associated with a relatively mild or asymptomatic 
phenotype, thus being exactly the findings that RAD intends to avoid.
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2.3.6	 The	logic	of	the	prenatal	screening	strategy
In prenatal screening strategies, a positive risk assessment for trisomy 21 (18 and 13) 
generally functions as the ‘gateway’ to subsequent diagnostic testing. Because RAD 
targets these same abnormalities, the screening strategy itself remains consistent in scope 
throughout its subsequent steps. For this reason, RAD is argued to be the most adequate 
diagnostic test: test what you screen for. However, to really avoid any breach in this ‘logic 
of the screening strategy’, RAD should only target those abnormalities for which screening 
is offered in the first place. If pregnant women are offered prenatal screening for trisomies 
21, 18 and 13, the thrust of the argument would be that subsequent testing should not 
also include X and Y.13 Or, for that matter, RAD should only include trisomy 21 if women are 
offered screening for Down’s syndrome only.
An as yet overlooked consequence of standard karyotyping is that it implies unequal access 
to diagnostic testing. Pregnant women at an increased risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 are 
given the possibility of having the foetus tested for a range of other abnormalities as well, 
whereas testing for those ‘further’ abnormalities is unavailable for other pregnant women.
Are we to conclude that in order to end this inequality, justice requires a choice between 
either offering a narrow RAD to the increased risk group, or offering karyotyping to all 
pregnant women (as is the case in the United States)?16 Not necessarily. Although the 
inequality in access may be unfortunate, it is not unfair. Both RAD and karyotyping are 
performed on foetal material obtained by risky invasive procedures, although this may 
change within the years to come as soon as non-invasive prenatal diagnostic techniques 
become widely available.45,46
Until then the miscarriage risk adhered to current invasive procedures has to be reckoned 
with, which raises the issue of proportionality. Central to this assessment is the detection/
miscarriage ratio. Since women in the group with an increased risk for the few conditions 
screened for will already be offered invasive testing for RAD, this ratio will become more 
favourable for them if karyotyping is performed. This ratio will a	priori be less favourable 
for pregnant women without an increased risk for those conditions. Furthermore, the 
principles of non-maleficence and respect for autonomy are at stake when women are 
denied the possibility of getting additional information from foetal material obtained 
through a procedure with a miscarriage risk.13,47 For this reason, some argue in favour of 
further expanding the range of abnormalities to be included in diagnostic testing offered 
to those having CVS or amniocentesis in the context of prenatal screening, for example, by 
including relatively common heritable diseases like cystic fibrosis and hemoglobinopathies.11 
However, the problem of unequal access will make itself even more clearly felt when such a 
broader test is offered only to those with a positive test for a limited number of chromosomal 
abnormalities.
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Although unequal access to the ‘surplus’ findings of karyotyping may not be a decisive 
reason to offer a stand-alone RAD, it does constitute a moral reason to reconsider current 
access to karyotyping.
2.4 Conclusion
There is no consensus whether women at increased risk for trisomy 21 (18 and 13) should 
be offered RAD or karyotyping. RAD has some advantageous features: it is fast, relatively 
cheap, and produces clear test results. Assessment of these aspects, however, shows that 
the advantages ascribed to RAD are not conclusive. Fast test results have a short term but 
not an overall psychological benefit over later results. Therefore, the time gain is of minor 
importance when weighing a fast but limited test (RAD) against a slower but more extensive 
test (karyotyping). The relevance of abnormalities missed by RAD are evaluated differently 
between and among professionals and women, and the counselling advantages due to the 
targeted scope of RAD in the pre-test and post-test situation are relative. RAD is cheaper 
than karyotyping, but this cannot settle the issue.
We conclude that, from a moral point of view, the case for RAD is less strong than it may at 
first seem. It is not immediately obvious that RAD is more in line with the requirement of 
respect for autonomy than karyotyping. Nor is it clear that the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages is more favourable for the women concerned in the case of RAD. Neither 
does the fact that women with a prior risk for common aneuploidies are offered wider 
testing to which others have no access amount to a serious injustice. However, even if a 
separate assessment of the alleged advantages of RAD does not show any of them to be 
decisive, it can still be asked whether their cumulative effect might not decide the argument 
in favour of RAD. The answer to this will depend mainly on what one thinks the scope of 
prenatal screening and testing should be. The moral framework of prenatal screening itself 
is not decisive in this regard. For those who think that testing for trisomy 21 or perhaps 
for common aneuploidies is what prenatal screening is really about, the arguments for 
limiting the test offer to a narrow or broader RAD may sound convincing. However, others 
may find that there are good grounds for wanting prenatal screening to at least include the 
wider range of conditions that karyotyping might detect. Given that there is no objective 
perspective from whence to decide between these views, leaving the choice to the women 
concerned would at least have the benefit of being in line with the general aim of offering 
opportunities for autonomous reproductive choice.
This approach would also have the more practical advantage of being open towards future 
debates that are most likely about broadening rather than limiting the scope of prenatal 
screening. The dynamics of the field points in the opposite direction from that proposed 
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by those arguing for RAD. New techniques that can identify an even broader scope of 
heterogeneous abnormalities than karyotyping are already on the horizon.48,49 Broader 
diagnostic testing may even become possible on cell-free foetal DNA that is present in the 
plasma of pregnant women.45 Apart from the advantage of allowing testing early in pregnancy 
and without the miscarriage risk adhered to current invasive techniques, the possibility of 
broad non-invasive diagnostic testing raises further ethical issues.50 Without wanting to pre-
empt the debate about whether these developments should lead to further broadening the 
scope of prenatal screening, we suggest that offering RAD as a stand-alone sends the wrong 
message. Is protecting pregnant women from difficult choices the best way of preparing 
for the challenges ahead? Instead of assuming that anything beyond RAD is too difficult for 
them, it may be better to invest in finding approaches to counselling and informed consent 
that are adjusted to broader kinds of testing without compromising central moral principles.
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Abstract
This paper explores the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnostic 
tests (NIPD tests) in prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities. NIPD tests are easy and 
safe and can be performed early in pregnancy. Precisely because of these features, it is 
feared that informed consent may become more difficult, that both testing and selective 
abortion will become ‘normalised’, and that there will be a trend towards accepting testing 
for minor abnormalities and non-medical traits as well. In our view, however, the real moral 
challenge of NIPD testing consists in the possibility of linking up a technique with these 
features (easy, safe and early) with new genomic technologies that allow prenatal diagnostic 
testing for a much broader range of abnormalities than is the case in current procedures. 
An increase in uptake and more selective abortions need not in itself be taken to signal a 
thoughtless acceptance of these procedures. However, combining this with considerably 
enlarging the scope of NIPD testing will indeed make informed consent more difficult and 
challenge the notion of prenatal screening as serving reproductive autonomy. If broad NIPD 
testing includes later-onset diseases, the ‘right not to know’ of the future child will become 
a new issue in the debate about prenatal screening. With regard to the controversial issue 
of selective abortion, it may make a morally relevant difference that after NIPD testing, 
abortion can be done early. A lower moral status may be attributed to the foetus at that 
moment, given the dominant opinion that the moral status of the foetus progressively 
increases with its development.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the discovery of cell-free foetal DNA/RNA (cffDNA/RNA) in maternal plasma in 1997,1 
the possibility to use this cffDNA/RNA for non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) has been 
investigated many times.2-6 cffDNA/RNA can be obtained from a maternal blood sample, 
as early as 4 weeks of gestation,7 but currently only reliably so from 7 weeks of gestation.4 
This development holds the promise of NIPD testing early in pregnancy and without the 
small, but significant risk of foetal loss that the current invasive procedures of chorionic 
villus sampling (CVS) and amniocentesis (AP) carry. NIPD testing for the determination of a 
Y-signal for pregnancies at risk of X-linked disorders and for diagnosis of Rhesus factor status 
in RhD-negative women is now being translated into clinical practice.4 In many European 
countries, discussion about broader applications of NIPD testing can be expected in the 
coming years.8,9 The feasibility of NIPD for trisomy 21, 13 and 18 has already been shown,2 
but large-scale independent studies are still needed. Sex-chromosomal abnormalities (eg, 
Turner syndrome (X0) and triple X syndrome (XXX)) could in principle be diagnosed by NIPD 
testing as well,4 if reliable quantitative tests become available in the future and the maternal 
‘background’ can be excluded from testing. Even if accurate NIPD testing for the mentioned 
abnormalities becomes possible, the clinical utility of the test remains to be assessed. This 
includes balancing the benefits to the harms also with regard to its psychological, ethical, 
legal, social and economic implications.10,11 The possible ethical implications of NIPD as 
a new approach to prenatal testing have so far been reviewed in a few publications.4,8,9, 
12-17 Apart from clear benefits related to avoiding the miscarriage risk of present invasive 
methods, important potential drawbacks have been mentioned as well. For one thing, 
proper counselling and informed consent is argued to become more challenging when 
offering NIPD testing. Moreover, there is a concern that the ease and safety of NIPD may 
lead to prenatal screening being increasingly conceived as a matter of course, both by those 
making the offer and by the women undergoing the test. Related to this is the concern 
that selective abortion of foetuses with minor abnormalities, the wrong sex or unwanted 
paternity, will become normalised.
This paper aims to expand and refine these ethical evaluations and will add some new ethical 
perspectives with regard to possible implications of NIPD at present and in the future.
In our view, it is not so much the fact that foetal material used for prenatal testing can 
be obtained early and non-invasively (allowing easy and safe testing) that would lead to 
moral challenges. Rather, it is the fact that a technology with these features would be open 
to being used for testing a potentially much broader range of abnormalities than those 
included in the presently used method of microscopic chromosome analysis (karyotyping).
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Although NIPD testing can also be applied in high genetic-risk families and for the 
management of pregnancy, the focus of this paper will primarily be on the application of 
NIPD testing in the screening context. The reason for this focus on prenatal screening is that 
in the near future, the question if, and if so, in what way NIPD testing is to be applied within 
prenatal screening strategies should be considered and discussed by policy makers, health 
care professionals and society at large.
To avoid confusion, a preliminary remark is needed on terminology. In medicine, ‘screening’ 
is often used as referring to a kind of test for risk assessment or disease discovery. However, 
after the convention in normative and regulatory discourse, we will use ‘screening’ as 
referring to any systematic and unsolicited offer of predictive testing (using whatever types 
of test) involving individuals who themselves have no reason (yet) to seek medical help for 
the condition in question.18 In this broader sense, screening stands in contrast to ‘diagnosis’ 
as testing on indication.
3.2 Current practice of prenatal screening
Prenatal screening is widely accepted and is considered to be important to enable women 
and their partners to make informed reproductive choices.19 In many countries, prenatal 
screening strategies consist of two elements.20,21
First, screening for Down’s syndrome (trisomy 21) and other aneuploidies by means of a 
risk-assessment test and, in case of a positive initial result, a diagnostic invasive prenatal test 
is offered for further diagnosis such as CVS at 11-13 weeks of gestation or amniocentesis 
at 15-18 weeks of gestation. These invasive procedures may induce a miscarriage in 0.3-
1.0% of the pregnancies investigated.20,22,23 The risk-assessment test generally combines 
biochemical markers in maternal serum and ultrasound markers (nuchal translucency 
measurement) to determine whether there is a higher risk of having a child with DS or other 
aneuploidies. If so, a diagnostic test, such as conventional karyotyping (cytogenetic analysis) 
or rapid aneuploidy detection (DNA analysis), is offered to confirm or exclude the presence 
of a chromosomal abnormality in the foetus.20,22-24
Second, an ultrasound investigation is offered at week 18-20 of gestation to identify major 
structural, congenital malformations and also to look for so-called ‘soft’ markers that 
increase the risk for chromosomal or genetic syndromes. When there is an increased risk, 
a more detailed ultrasound scan and/or invasive prenatal or postnatal diagnostic tests are 
needed for further diagnosis.20
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3.3 Possible dynamics of NIPD testing
3.3.1	 NIPD	testing	in	the	context	of	prenatal	screening
Research into NIPD testing has mainly focused on those chromosomal abnormalities 
currently diagnosed with karyotyping as part of the prenatal screening strategies. Wright 
distinguishes five possible applications of NIPD testing in this context: as an additional 
test to improve overall risk assessment, as an intermediate test between risk assessment 
and invasive diagnostic testing for high-risk pregnancies, as a replacement for current risk-
assessment tests, as a replacement for current invasive diagnostic tests or as a replacement 
for both risk-assessment and diagnostic tests.8 As structural abnormalities per	se are not 
identified through NIPD testing, its possible introduction would not affect current ultrasound 
screening.
In the ethical discussions thus far, NIPD testing as a substitution for the present combination 
of risk assessment and invasive diagnostic testing seems generally to be regarded as 
ultimately the most likely scenario.4,8,12,14,16 Indeed, if NIPD tests can easily, safely, reliably 
and cheaply diagnose chromosomal abnormalities such as trisomy 21 in early pregnancy, 
this will entail abolishment of the current two-step-testing process.
3.3.2	 Increasing	number	of	prenatal	diagnostic	tests
An important implication of NIPD testing as a one-step approach to prenatal screening is 
that prenatal diagnostic tests will be offered to all pregnant women, instead of to a limited 
high-risk group. This increase in the number of diagnostic tests does not mean an increase 
in the extent of the actual group that is approached with an unsolicited prenatal test 
offer: only the nature of this offer will change. Direct access to diagnostic testing has the 
advantage of avoiding false positive and false negative outcomes of risk assessment. This 
means that all pregnant women can profit from the more certain diagnostic test results for 
reproductive decision making, which enhances their reproductive autonomy.25 However, a 
morally relevant aspect is also that a diagnosis early in pregnancy may have the drawback 
of increasing the burden of knowledge and choice for the women concerned. As chances 
of an affected pregnancy ending in miscarriage decrease with gestational age, early testing 
will more often burden women with ‘unnecessary’ decision making concerning pregnancies 
that may spontaneously miscarry.8,26
3.4 Informed consent for NIPD testing: the nature of the test
Concern has been expressed that offering NIPD testing on a wide scale would undermine 
informed consent.8,12-15 If current two-step testing is substituted by a single diagnostic test, it 
is supposed to be more difficult to provide all pregnant women with adequate information 
and pre-test counselling, ‘despite being conceptually easier’.8 The quote refers to the fact 
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that one-step screening can do without the concept of risk, which most people find difficult 
to handle. But why would informed consent in such an approach still be more difficult? 
The idea behind this concern may be that in two-step screening information about the 
challenges and possible outcomes of further testing need only be given to the small subset 
of women with a positive screen result, whereas all necessary information must be given at 
once in one-step screening. However, this view is morally problematic, as it ignores that risk 
assessment is potentially a first step in a sequence of testing with exactly the same possible 
implications as one-step screening. As the information to be given before risk assessment 
should not be limited to this first ‘innocent’ step, it is unclear why one-step screening as 
such would make information and pre-test counselling more difficult. However, a further 
assumption behind the concern about informed consent may be that introducing NIPD 
testing will be combined with enlarging the scope of prenatal screening. As we will argue 
later on in this article that would indeed make informed consent more challenging. But the 
point we want to make here is that there is nothing in the nature of the NIPD test itself (its 
one-step character) that would lead to this greater challenge. Of course, this is not to deny 
that in current practice information, counselling and consent are often inadequately dealt 
with27-30 and this may also be the case with regard to NIPD testing. However, as long as 
NIPD testing will be offered for the same range of abnormalities as in the present two-step 
approach to prenatal screening, there is no reason to assume that these problems will be 
larger than they already are.
3.5 Normalisation of NIPD testing
A further concern that has been raised is that the introduction of NIPD as a risk-free 
procedure may lead to ‘normalisation’ of prenatal testing. In addition to what has more 
generally been referred to as a ‘technological imperative’, the mechanism behind this would 
be driven by the specific features of NIPD testing.4,8,12-14,31 A distinction can be made between 
normalisation of the offer and of the uptake, although these aspects are of course related.
Normalisation of the offer means that NIPD tests will be portrayed by clinicians and 
experienced by pregnant women as part of routine antenatal care, because, due to its ease 
and safety, it seems to be a rather trivial test to offer and take. This may lead to normalisation 
of uptake, ranging from a rather thoughtless uptake to women feeling socially pressurised to 
be tested.8,13,32 If this implies testing without informed consent, uptake cannot be said to be 
the result of nor to be promoting autonomous reproductive decision making. Of course, an 
increase in uptake does not necessarily indicate its normalisation, as it might also reflect a 
conscious positive reception of the new possibilities of NIPD testing by pregnant women,33 
and thus signify the achievement of the aim to ‘facilitate parental reproductive choice’.8
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However, as it has often been observed that in current prenatal screening programmes, 
test uptake is not always on the basis of adequate understanding,32 there is indeed reason 
for concern that the ease and safety of NIPD testing will make this even more difficult 
to achieve. This concern is reinforced by the finding that health care professionals seem 
inclined to the view that a less stringent standard of informed consent would suffice for NIPD 
testing.34 We find this problematic because, iatrogenic risks aside, the possible outcomes 
and consequences of invasive and non-invasive diagnostic testing remain the same. We, 
therefore, agree that introducing NIPD testing should not be regarded as a reason for 
loosening present guidelines for informed consent.34
3.6 Normalisation and trivialisation of early selective abortion
Easy, safe and early NIPD testing might lead to an increase in the number of affected foetuses 
aborted.13 In addition to this possible quantitative implication, concern has been expressed 
about a qualitative change in selective abortion procedures as well. As Hall et al.13 comment: 
‘More generalised use of non-invasive testing could facilitate selective terminations of 
pregnancy in a range of conditions hitherto not diagnosed prenatally and where the 
arguments for and against termination may not have received sufficiently scrutiny’. We will 
consider this possible ‘trivialisation of abortion’ in relationship to the possible earlier timing 
of selective abortion because of NIPD testing.
NIPD testing early in pregnancy may on balance offer important benefits for the women 
involved. It enables earlier reassurance and, therefore, allows for ‘better opportunities 
for prenatal bonding’14 for those women who might experience their pregnancy being 
‘tentative’ during the testing period. At the same time, early testing enables a longer period 
for the decision-making process after a positive test result, which may be valued positively 
by some women as well. In addition, if a positive test result leads to a choice for selective 
abortion, this termination might be physically and psychologically less burdening when 
carried out earlier in pregnancy.13 These implications for women may support the view 
and the experience that early testing and abortion, even if performed for abnormalities 
hitherto not prenatally diagnosed, may be less problematic. Empirical research is needed to 
illuminate women’s attitudes and preferences in this regard.
The early timing of abortion is also ethically relevant because of different opinions about 
the moral status of the embryo or early foetus.35,36 The timing of abortion is only ethically 
insignificant if an absolute or high moral status is assigned to the embryo right from the 
start, or, conversely, when there is no independent status attributed to the embryo/foetus 
at all. However, the dominant opinion in most Western countries, often also reflected in 
legislation, is that the moral status of the embryo/foetus progressively increases with its 
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development (the gradualist view).26 A variant of this view refers to transitional moments at 
specific stages in embryonic or foetal development. As cffDNA/RNA can currently reliably be 
obtained from a maternal blood sample from 7 weeks of gestation (5 weeks of development), 
the beginning of cerebral development at 6 weeks (40 days) (8 weeks of gestation) is of 
special importance in this connection. In some religions, this developmental stage is 
associated with ensoulment.37,38 Adherents of this ‘40 days position’ would presumably have 
no or less moral objections to selective abortion before that specific point in time, because 
of the lower or absent moral status of the foetus before that moment. More generally, 
adherents of a gradualist view will favour the possibility of earlier selective abortions after 
NIPD testing. It is conceivable that this time factor might as well be relevant for the scope of 
the conditions for which NIPD testing will be applied.
To summarise, the lower moral status of the embryo and the possibly less traumatic 
psychological and emotional implications of early abortion might influence and to some 
extent justify a certain broadening of the scope of NIPD testing.
3.7 Changing the scope of prenatal testing
3.7.1	 Narrow	or	broad?
NIPD testing is feared to be applied for more and also for increasingly minor abnormalities, 
without adequate justification: the so-called ‘specification creep’.8,13 The reasoning behind 
this concern seems to be that the invasiveness of current diagnostic testing prevents 
expansion of its scope. Supposedly, one would not take the risk of losing a healthy child 
with invasive testing, but for the detection of (a high risk for) a really serious disease. In this 
view, the ease, safety and early moment of NIPD testing could be an incentive to apply NIPD 
testing for more and less serious conditions in the future. One could, however, also reason 
the other way around: the effort and the risk of the invasive procedure may be an incentive 
to test for as much abnormalities as possible, just to make this risk more proportional and 
to provide a more firm justification.39,40
Karyotyping has been the ‘Gold Standard’ for diagnostic testing in the screening context 
for almost half a century now and also seems to be the reference point for the scope of 
NIPD testing.8 When NIPD testing implies abolishment of the current risk assessment, a 
limitation of the scope of NIPD testing to the chromosomal abnormalities diagnosed by 
karyotyping seems no longer evident. Furthermore, the issue whether the scope of invasive 
diagnostic testing should be narrower or broader than the current scope has already been 
under discussion for some years now.41-43 Limitation to some well-defined anomalies, such 
as trisomy 21, 13 and 18, has been proposed, as well as an expansion of the scope by, 
for example, array-based comparative genomic hybridisation.44,45 One of the main reasons 
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to offer narrow testing is to reduce the probability of unexpected and clinically unclear 
findings. These can lead to difficult pre- and post-test counselling situations, impair informed 
decision making and make decisions regarding selective abortion emotionally more difficult 
and morally controversial. A broader scope is mainly supported by the argument that 
prenatal testing should focus on detecting any possible (severe) disability, irrespective 
of its cause and depending on the woman’s or couple’s choice. If people prefer to have 
maximum information, withholding information would deprive them of their autonomous 
reproductive choice.42
The above shows that the features of NIPD testing in itself do not necessitate a specific 
scope of testing: it could be narrow as well as broad.
3.7.2	 NIPD	testing	for	heterogeneous	abnormalities
Although not feasible in the near future, a possible future expansion of the scope of NIPD 
testing has been brought up several times.4,8,12 If it might indeed become possible to include 
a kind of total genome sequencing in NIPD testing, the scope of NIPD testing in the context 
of common prenatal screening could exceed that of karyotyping. Then its scope might not 
only include (mono)genetic and/or congenital disorders, but also complex and late-onset 
disorders.4,8,12 Such an increase in scope is assumed to be ‘more ethically problematic’.8 It 
has proven to be next to impossible to reach consensus about the definition of a list of 
diseases that are serious enough to test prenatally and to justify selective abortion - even 
if performed early. Partly because of variable expression, changes over time because of 
evolving treatment and personal situation, the severity of diseases is perceived differently. 
Still, broad ethically relevant categories of diseases and genotypes may be discerned: 
causative genetic traits for congenital disorders with clear clinical consequences, causative 
genetic traits for late-onset diseases, genetic variants associated with increased susceptibility 
to disease and carriership of recessive disorders. Inclusion of all these categories in an NIPD-
testing array will lead to different ethical challenges, which will be discussed below.
3.8 Informed consent for NIPD testing: the scope of the test
3.8.1	 Generic	consent
If an NIPD test will be aimed at detection of different categories of disorders simultaneously, 
this would complicate informed consent, counselling and decision-making. Testing for 
(many) heterogeneous abnormalities at once would require more, more elaborate and 
detailed information. In addition, findings of unclear significance, which are always present 
in complex testing, would require special attention. Altogether, this could lead to an 
‘information overload’, which could impair the decision-making process.46 More intensive 
counselling would be needed, which might be too time consuming and expensive if offered 
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on a wide scale. Therefore, the requirement of extensive informed consent for broad NIPD 
testing may be really problematic to comply with.
As regards this subject, the alternative of generic consent has been proposed.47 This concept 
‘would emphasize broader concepts and common-denominator issues in genetic screening’ 
by providing ‘general information to obtain consent for the screening and much more 
detailed information on specific conditions only after they have been detected’.47
A conceivable way of obtaining generic consent for an NIPD test with a broader scope would 
be to inform women in more general terms about categories of abnormalities included. 
On the basis of this information, women might be given the opportunity to indicate what 
kinds of abnormalities they would prefer to be told about.26 This approach has already been 
discussed with regard to current karyotyping.22 Some kind of generic consent seems to be 
inevitable when offering a broad NIPD test. The question is whether this is a justifiable way 
of executing the principle of respecting reproductive autonomy, because it endangers the 
feasibility of truly informed choices.26
In this respect, offering broad NIPD testing to all pregnant women may be seen as the 
molecular equivalent of the second trimester ultrasound scan. As the prenatal ultrasound 
scan may also detect a broad range of foetal defects, informed consent would at least require 
informing women before the scan about the variety of test results they could possibly 
encounter and have to deal with. Although a lack of proper informed consent has been 
reported in this context as well,48,49 this has been a remarkably less debated subject than with 
regard to risk-assessment and invasive prenatal diagnostic tests.27-30,50 The implementation 
of informed consent for these latter two prenatal tests has been proven to be inadequate 
several times, showing a discrepancy between theory and practice in this regard. Hence, 
there is a need to discuss the model and the implementation of informed consent for any 
present and future prenatal screening offer. The question will ultimately be to what extent 
the condition of informed consent is really valued: if the features, scope and implementation 
of prenatal testing are adjusted to the requirements of proper informed consent, the value 
of this condition will be reinforced. If it is the other way around, a declared adherence to the 
value of informed consent may well be deluding.51
3.8.2	 Decision-making	process	and	the	right	not	to	know
NIPD testing for a broad and heterogeneous range of abnormalities would generate a large 
amount of information and inevitably include findings the significance of which would be 
difficult, if at all, to interpret and explain. Unclear findings might lead to extensive diagnostic 
follow-up and even to the testing of parents to establish inheritance of unusual results, 
which may confront parents with unexpected findings about themselves as well. This leads 
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to the question whether such knowledge would be harmful or beneficial for the parents 
and the future child. Unclear findings regarding the foetus could lead to confusion and 
unnecessary anxiety for parents, which is likely to persist throughout the pregnancy and 
into the postnatal period if the pregnancy is continued. A decision to terminate a wanted 
pregnancy on a basis of unclear testing results may be associated with ‘particular feelings 
of guilt’.42 On the one hand, patient autonomy may still be an important consideration for 
providing women with more information about their foetus, if they prefer so.52 On the 
other hand, it has been asserted that prenatal screening for 1000 genetic variations with 
99.9% accuracy for true positives at once may lead to the consequence that ‘every foetus 
will be identified as abnormal’, thereby undermining the aim of this screening.43 These 
different views again underline the necessity of empirical research into women’s attitudes, 
preferences and expected burdens regarding (broad) NIPD testing to assess the requirement 
of proportionality.
The issue of the right not to know of the future child might become a relevant issue in 
case of testing for monogenetic late-onset diseases and for increased susceptibility to 
diseases. Unsolicited knowledge of these traits would be an invasion of the autonomy of 
future children who have prenatally been diagnosed. If NIPD testing included these different 
kinds of disorders and the pregnancy was continued, it would resemble the possible 
future scenario of whole genome profiling of newborns, which would not be directed at 
any particular disease, but would reveal information about many and heterogeneous 
abnormalities, including late-onset diseases.53 As such, the resemblance of broad NIPD 
testing with newborn profiling indicates a blurring of the distinction between reproductive 
and non-reproductive screening. Testing foetuses would de	facto amount to testing (future) 
children. Disclosure of findings about late-onset diseases in the neonatal screening context 
is considered to be incompatible with the widely, but not universally, endorsed maxim that 
predictive genetic testing should in principle be avoided in minors to protect their autonomy 
and privacy.53,54 The only accepted exception is if medical interventions are available to alter 
the course of the disease.53,54
3.9 NIPD testing for non-medical reasons
NIPD testing for establishing sex or paternity, which is currently commercially offered, 
and subsequent selective abortion if the foetus is of the ‘wrong’ sex or from the ‘wrong’ 
biological father are generally thought to be problematic.8,14,55-57
With regard to gender testing, one concern is the preference in some societies of having a 
boy over a girl, which could have disrupting effects on those societies if selective abortion 
of female foetuses would be performed on a large scale. In that case, society could have 
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good reason to restrict individual choice, because it undermines a public good.58 Indeed, in 
some countries, sex selection is prohibited for exactly this reason.59 If sex selection would 
reflect a discrimination against women and systematically reinforce that bias, this could 
constitute a moral and legal injustice to be prevented.60 However, sex selection itself does 
not necessarily entail a discriminatory act. It could as well be an act of responsibility for a 
future girl’s interest (eg, to guard it from being treated unjustly) even if this motive would 
arise against the background of a discriminatory society.36,61 Furthermore, couples can have 
personal motives for sex selection, such as family balancing. Some reject this as showing that 
children are increasingly seen as ‘commodities’. However, sex selection for family balancing 
can also be valued as an opportunity for reproductive autonomy.62
With regard to prenatal paternity testing, there are hardly any medical applications, except 
in case of inherited diseases in which the underlying gene defect is not known and prenatal 
diagnostic tests cannot, therefore, be used.16 Non-medical reasons include ambiguous 
paternity in case of women with more than one sexual partner who are unsure of the actual 
father, and women who may be pregnant as the result of rape. In the latter case, paternity 
testing is not disputed, whereas in the former case paternity testing has been criticised.8,13, 
14 It has been suggested to counsel the women involved about the relative significance of 
biological kinship.14 To the extent that this is carried out with the aim of reducing the number 
of prenatal paternity tests, this approach strikes us as morally problematic. Counselling 
should be respectful of how the woman herself perceives the emergency situation leading 
to her request; counsellors should not try to defuse the problem by defining it away. We also 
suspect that reluctance to provide prenatal paternity testing may be prompted by an implicit 
condemnation of a promiscuous life. This would clearly be moralistic and unprofessional.
One should also realise that without paternity testing, women could feel compelled 
to terminate the pregnancy anyhow. Or women could feel compelled to continue the 
pregnancy, with the consequence of having a child fathered by the wrong man. Prenatal 
paternity testing may, therefore, lead to the least harm for the woman involved and be 
morally justified.63
Although personal motives for sex selection and paternity testing may be ethically 
controversial, abortion is allowed under various legal rules regarding social termination.16,61 
In the case of NIPD testing, views regarding the moral status of the early embryo will be of 
relevance with regard to both reasons for selective abortion.
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3.10 Conclusion
On the one hand, women taking part in prenatal screening can profit from the ease, safety 
and early moment of NIPD testing. The introduction of a test with these features has ethically 
favourable consequences: absence of iatrogenic miscarriage because of the test, earlier 
reassurance, a longer period for decision-making and the possibility of an early abortion, 
which may be physically and psychologically less burdening and ethically less problematic 
because of presumed lower moral foetal status. On the other hand, should NIPD testing for 
a broader scope of abnormalities become possible in the future, this will complicate the 
ethical issues regarding NIPD testing. Informed consent will become far more challenging 
- if attainable at all. Moreover, should NIPD testing become available for a wide range of 
disorders including late-onset diseases, this may lead to the same ethical difficulties as with 
regard to wide range testing of newborns, in which the dominant view is that the child’s 
right not to know should be respected. It is difficult to see how this respect can be upheld 
when, after broadening prenatal testing, children will be born with a positive test result 
for a serious late-onset disease. The debate about the ethical challenges of broad genetic 
testing is currently conducted in the contexts of neonatal screening and invasive prenatal 
testing. In this article, we have shown that the same issues will present themselves even 
more forcefully should broad NIPD testing become possible. A proactive further analysis of 
these issues is urgently needed. As we have stressed, this also requires empirical research 
into pregnant women’s attitudes, needs and preferences concerning different modalities of 
prenatal testing.
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Abstract
The great promise of the pending introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) 
for trisomy 21 (18 and 13) is that it enables one-step, early and safe testing for these 
abnormalities. The ethical debate so far has been limited to possible drawbacks of routine 
access to this type of testing: normalization of testing and abortion and adverse effects on 
autonomous decision-making. We address the ethical implications of the fact that routine 
NIPD affects the scope and strategy of current prenatal screening cascades. A decision is 
needed whether complementary (invasive) testing remains in place in order to avoid a loss 
of information as compared with current practice. If so, the supposed advantages of NIPD 
may be less significant than generally assumed. Accumulation of tests challenges informed 
consent and proportionality. Therefore, an ethical evaluation of the implications of NIPD for 
the prenatal screening strategy as a whole is needed. 
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4.1 Introduction
Screening for aneuploidies in the developed, primarily Western, world generally consists 
of two stages: (i) a risk assessment for trisomies 21 (Down’s syndrome), 18 (Edward’s 
syndrome) and 13 (Patau’s syndrome), based on the combination of maternal serum 
testing, fetal nuchal translucency (NT) measurement and/or maternal age; (ii) a diagnostic 
follow-up test in case of an increased risk, performed on material obtained through invasive 
procedures: amniocentesis (AC) or chorionic villus sampling (CVS).1,2 Trials with non-invasive 
prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) using cell-free fetal DNA and RNA in maternal blood are currently 
performed worldwide and focus primarily on NIPD for trisomy 21, although trisomies 18 
and 13 may follow.3-5 As a result, the current two-step testing may be replaced by a one-step 
diagnostic test targeted at these specific abnormalities.6 
Although there has been some ethical debate about this prospect, the discussion has 
concentrated mainly on NIPD itself and on possible implications of routine access to one-
step, early, easy and risk-free prenatal diagnosis. The issues discussed include the perceived 
risk of normalization of testing and abortion, the fact that non-medical applications such as 
testing for fetal sex and paternity will become more easily available, and a possible negative 
effect on autonomous decision-making.7,8 Although these issues need to be addressed as 
well, we assert that the expected introduction of routine NIPD testing for trisomy 21 (and 
18 and 13) urgently calls for ethical reflection on the overall scope and strategy of prenatal 
screening. A decision is needed whether complementary (invasive) testing remains in place 
in order to avoid a loss of information as compared with current practice. We discuss the 
practical and ethical implications of routine NIPD testing either for trisomy 21 only or for 
trisomies 21, 18 and 13. 
4.2 Timing of NIPD-testing
Fetal DNA can be detected from 5 weeks of gestation and reliable NIPD may be feasible from 
7 to 9 weeks of gestation.9 Therefore, it has been assumed in the literature that NIPD will take 
place rather early in the first trimester. This would have the advantage that test results are 
received early, leaving more time for decision-making. Furthermore, possible termination of 
pregnancy in case of an adverse test result at this stage of pregnancy may be emotionally less 
burdensome than in the current approach, where diagnostic results are available after 11-
14 weeks (CVS) or 16-20 weeks (AC) of gestation. Early testing is favourable from an ethical 
point of view as well. According to the dominant account, the moral status of the embryo/
fetus is relatively low at the start and increases with further stages of development (the 
gradualist view).10 This notion of a gradually increasing moral status implies that selective 
abortion early in pregnancy is morally different from termination of affected pregnancies 
later in the first trimester or in the second trimester. 
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However, a serious disadvantage of early NIPD is that it may increase the burden of choice for 
women, since abnormal fetuses will be identified that would have miscarried spontaneously 
later in pregnancy.11 Moreover, the timing of an NIPD test offer will depend on how NIPD can 
best be integrated in the overall screening strategy. 
4.3 Complementary testing: trisomies 18, 13 and NT measurement?
A possible scenario is that NIPD will initially be introduced for diagnosing trisomy 21 only 
and replace current two-step testing for this abnormality. This would maximize the benefits 
of NIPD at an early stage of its development: the drawbacks of false-positive and false-
negative results generated by current risk assessment and the miscarriage risk attached to 
current invasive diagnostic methods would thereby be.6,12 A recent study by Susman et al. 
suggests that this procedure would lead to 84% fewer invasive procedures, while diagnosing 
an additional 7% of trisomy 21 cases (corresponding with the false negatives in current risk 
assessment). However, this procedure would also imply that about 50% of chromosomal 
abnormalities other than trisomy 21, including trisomies 18 and 13, would be missed even 
when follow-up detection by the mid-trimester fetal anomaly scan is included.13,14 So to 
prevent testing being less informative than current practice, a solution would be to leave 
risk assessment and invasive diagnostic testing in place as a complementary screening 
trajectory for trisomies 18 and 13. Of course, the need for this does not arise as soon as 
these trisomies can be included in the NIPD array. 
Abolishing current risk assessment raises a similar question with regard to NT measurement. 
Although offered as part of risk assessment for common aneuploidies, this procedure may 
concurrently lead to the early identification of pregnancies at a high risk of both chromosomal 
and non-chromosomal disorders, such as congenital heart defects and Mendelian disorders 
such as Noonan syndrome.15,16 Assuming that this information has added value in terms 
of reproductive options, the question arises what to do with NT measurement when 
introducing NIPD for the three trisomies. Should NT measurement be left in place as a 
separate screening test, complementary to NIPD? That would have the benefit of avoiding 
a reduction of the scope of prenatal screening and of the reproductive options that it is 
meant to provide. It would then only be logical to also offer this separate NT measurement 
to women who are currently not having risk assessment testing for common aneuploidies 
or who do not opt for NIPD in the future. However, separate NT testing must also be in line 
with the requirements of proportionality and informed consent. 
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4.4 Proportionality and informed consent
First, offering complementary testing comes at the price of confronting women with 
additional test offers shortly after NIPD has been performed. This may add to the burden 
of testing, because screening will increasingly become fragmented, leading to a series of 
moments of choice for women and possibly to a prolonged period of anxiety. To avoid this 
possible drawback of successive testing, NIPD and complementary tests could be offered 
simultaneously at weeks 11-12 of gestation, which is the usual period for risk assessment 
and gives the best performance for the NT measurement.15 From a logistic point of view, 
such a combination would also be advantageous. However, it may be challenging to 
adequately inform women about those simultaneous, but very different test offers. A 
targeted diagnostic test for trisomy 21, a risk assessment test for trisomies 18 and 13, and 
NT measurement for a broad range of abnormalities are very dissimilar in kind and scope. 
They also differ with regard to the kind of test outcomes (risk versus diagnosis) and decision-
making consequences (follow-up testing versus termination/continuation of pregnancy). 
Furthermore, this 3-fold combination of tests would diminish the advantages of a ‘stand-
alone’ NIPD as the moment of testing would be delayed. In contrast to the promise of more 
simple counselling as a result of the conceptually easy character of NIPD11, counselling would 
in fact become more complicated because of the heterogeneity of this compound test offer. 
Although NIPD would still have the advantage of being safe to perform, the other supposed 
advantages (early, easy) would, in this scheme, be less significant than generally assumed. 
Second, since prenatal screening also requires the just use of scarce financial resources 
(distributive justice), the detection/cost ratio of NIPD for trisomy 21 or for trisomies 21, 18 
and 13 with or without specific complementary testing has to be considered as well. A cost-
effectiveness analysis should take into account all the relevant aspects of the test options, 
including costs for counselling, for follow-up testing and for the lifetime provision of care for 
people with abnormalities undetected by a stand-alone NIPD. 
Third, the advantages of possible additional invasive testing for trisomies 18 and 13 may not 
evidently outweigh the disadvantages for participants, because its very limited target would 
negatively affect the detection/miscarriage ratio.17 
Fourth, separate NT measurement would amount to turning current ‘incidental’ findings 
into a screening target and require that informed consent be adapted accordingly. Presently, 
the possibility of those ‘incidental’ (non-aneuploidy-related) findings is not always included 
in pre-test information.15 As a consequence, pregnant women may be confronted with 
findings that they were not prepared for and that they might otherwise have indicated that 
they did not want to receive.18 It is evident that pre-test information will have to cover these 
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findings should NT measurement become a separate test. But given that an enlarged NT 
(≥3.5 mm) may indicate a risk for a wide range of abnormalities, this will not be possible on 
the level of specific abnormalities. As a form of more ‘generic consent’19 seems unavoidable 
here, the challenge is to offer not too much but yet enough information to enable women’s 
informed decision-making with regard to this testing. 
4.5 Conclusion
The general opinion is that NIPD holds great promise to enable prenatal diagnostic testing 
earlier in pregnancy and in a one-step, easy and safe manner. However, as our ethical 
considerations of the pending introduction of NIPD for trisomy 21 (and then 18 and 13) 
suggest these expectations may well reflect a one-sided view that overlooks the broader 
context of prenatal screening in which NIPD has to be implemented. A decision is needed 
whether only NIPD or NIPD and complementary testing will be offered. This requires a 
proactive ethical evaluation to find out which approach is most in line with the principles of 
respect for autonomy and of beneficence, underlying the normative framework for prenatal 
screening. 
Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis for aneuploidy: toward an integral ethical assessment
63
Chapter 
4
References 
1.  Bui T-H, Meiner V: State of the art in prenatal diagnosis. In: Leuzinger-Bohleber M, Engels E-M, Tsiantis J (eds): 
The	 Janus	 Face	of	Prenatal	Diagnostics.	A	European	Study	Bridging	Ethics,	 Psycholanalysis,	 and	Medicine. 
London: Karnac Books, 2008, pp 61-86.
2. Saller D, Canick J: Current Methods of Prenatal Screening for Down Syndrome and Other Fetal Abnormalities. 
Clin	Obstet	Gynecol 2008;51:24-36.
3. Chiu RW, Akolekar R, Zheng YW, Leung TY, Sun H, Chan KC, Lun FM, Go AT, Lau ET, To WW, Leung WC, Tang 
RY, Au-Yeung SK, Lam H, Kung YY, Zhang X, van Vugt JM, Minekawa R, Tang MH, Wang J, Oudejans CB, Lau TK, 
Nicolaides KH, Lo YM: Non-invasive prenatal assessment of trisomy 21 by multiplexed maternal plasma DNA 
sequencing: large scale validity study. BMJ 2011;342:c7401.
4. Ehrich M, Deciu C, Zwiefelhofer T, Tynan JA, Cagasan L, Tim R, Lu V, McCullough R, McCarthy E, Nygren AO, 
Dean J, Tang L, Hutchison D, Lu T, Wang H, Angkachatchai V, Oeth P, Cantor CR, Bombard A, van den Boom D: 
Noninvasive detection of fetal trisomy 21 by sequencing of DNA in maternal blood: a study in a clinical setting. 
Am	J	Obstet	Gynecol 2011;204:205.e201-211.
5. Papageorgiou EA, Karagrigoriou A, Tsaliki E, Velissariou V, Carter NP, Patsalis PC: Fetal-specific DNA methylation 
ratio permits noninvasive prenatal diagnosis of trisomy 21. Nat	Med 2011;17:510-513.
6. Go ATJL, van Vugt JMG, Oudejans CBM: Non-invasive aneuploidy detection using free fetal DNA and RNA in 
maternal plasma: recent progress and future possibilities. Hum	Reprod	Update 2011;17:372-382.
7. Benn PA, Chapman AR: Practical and Ethical Considerations of Noninvasive Prenatal Diagnosis. JAMA 
2009;301:154-2156.
8. Schmitz D, Netzer C, Henn W: An offer you can’t refuse? Ethical implications of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis. 
Nat Rev Genet;2009;10:515.
9. Wright CF, Burton H: The use of cell-free fetal nucleic acids in maternal blood for non-invasive prenatal 
diagnosis. Hum	Reprod	Update 2009;15:139-151.
10. de Wert G: Looking	ahead.	Reproductive	technologies,	genetics	and	ethics. Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 1999.
11. Wright C: Cell-free	fetal	nucleic	acids	for	non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis. Report of the UK expert working 
group. PHG Foundation, 2009.
12. de Jong A, Dondorp W, de Die-Smulders C, Frints S, de Wert G: Non-invasive prenatal testing: ethical issues 
explored. Eur J Hum Genet 2010;18:272-277.
13. Susman M, Amor D, Muggli E, Jaques A, Halliday J: Using population-based data to predict the impact of 
introducing noninvasive prenatal diagnosis for Down syndrome. Genet	Med 2010;12:298-303.
14. Benn P, Chapman A: Ethical challenges in providing noninvasive prenatal diagnosis. Curr	 Opin	 Obstetr	
Gynecol;2010;22:128-34.
15. Bilardo C, Timmerman E, Pajkrt E, van Maarle M: Increased nuchal translucency in euploid fetuses-what 
should we be telling the parents? Prenat	Diagn 2010;30:93-102.
16. Sonek J: First trimester ultrasonography in screening and detection of fetal anomalies. Am	J	Med	Genet	C	
Semin	Med	Genet 2007;145C:45-61.
17. Health Council of the Netherlands: Prenatal	 Screening:	 Down’s	 syndrome,	 neural	 tube	 defects,	 routine-
ultrasonography. Publication no. 2001/11. The Hague: Health Council of the Netherlands, 2001.
18. de Wert G, Dondorp W: Ethical issues. In: van Vugt M, Shulman K (eds): Prenatal	medicine. New York/London: 
Taylor & Francis, 2006, pp 575-604.
19. Elias S, Annas G: Generic Consent for Genetic Screening. New	Engl	J	Med;1994;330:1611-1613.

Chapter 5
Microarrays as a diagnostic tool in 
prenatal screening strategies. 
Ethical reflection 
de Jong A, Dondorp WJ, Macville MVE, de Die-Smulders CEM, van Lith JMM, de Wert GMWR
Human	Genetics (in press)
Chapter 5
66
Abstract
Genomic microarray analysis is increasingly being applied as a prenatal diagnostic 
tool. Microarrays enable searching the genome at a higher resolution and with higher 
sensitivity than conventional karyotyping for identifying clinically significant chromosomal 
abnormalities. As yet, no clear guidelines exist on whether microarrays should be applied 
prenatally for all indications or only in selected cases such as ultrasound abnormalities, 
whether a targeted or genome-wide array should be used, and what these should include 
exactly. In this paper we present some ethical considerations on the prenatal use of 
microarrays. There is a strong consensus, at least in Western countries, that the aim of 
prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities should be understood as facilitating autonomous 
reproductive choice for prospective parents. The tests offered should be valid and useful to 
reach that purpose. Against this background we address several ethical issues raised by the 
prenatal application of microarrays. First we argue that the general distinction between a 
targeted and a genome-wide microarray needs to be scrutinised. Then we examine whether 
microarrays are ‘suitable tests’ to serve either a screening or a diagnostic purpose. Given 
the wide range of findings possibly generated by microarrays, the question arises whether 
microarrays actually promote or interfere with autonomous reproductive decision making. 
Moreover, if variants of unknown clinical significance are identified, this adds to the burden 
and complexity of reproductive decision making. We suggest a qualified use of microarrays 
in the prenatal context.
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5.1 Introduction
Array-based molecular cytogenetic techniques (in short: microarrays) have for quite some 
time been routinely used in the postnatal setting, in particular to evaluate children with 
mental retardation or other abnormal phenotypes with unknown cause.1-3 Microarrays 
enable searching the entire genome for copy number variants (CNVs) at a higher resolution 
and with higher sensitivity than conventional karyotyping, and can detect more clinically 
relevant abnormalities.4-7 Because of this increased yield, microarrays are increasingly 
applied as a prenatal diagnostic tool. For the moment, microarray analysis will be performed 
on invasively obtained foetal material, although considerable effort is being put in methods 
for genome-wide diagnostics by means of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT).8,9
So far, no clear guidelines exist if and when to use microarrays prenatally. In 2010, the 
International Standards for Cytogenomic Arrays (ISCA) Consortium published a consensus 
statement in which the evidence at that time was thought to be insufficient to allow 
recommendations regarding prenatal applications.10 The ISCA proposed to use traditional 
cytogenetic methods instead. Earlier, in 2009, the American College of Obstetrics and 
Gynecology (ACOG) recommended to use conventional karyotyping as the principal 
cytogenetic tool in prenatal diagnosis, although a targeted array that focuses on detecting 
chromosomal abnormalities for known genetic syndromes was proposed as an adjunct 
tool in case of a combination of abnormal ultrasound findings and a normal conventional 
karyoype.11 The Italian Society of Human Genetics (SIGU) has in 2012 recommended a 
genome-wide array instead of a targeted array in this situation.12 Some expect or recommend 
microarray analysis to become the ‘first-tier test’ for all pregnancies because of its increased 
yield, irrespective of the indication.5,13-15 Others are more reticent about introducing this 
test prenatally. This reticence is mainly due to the fact that microarrays identify CNVs that 
can be categorised as being likely benign, likely pathogenic or a variant of unknown clinical 
significance (VOUS)16, and that arrays generate more VOUS than karyotyping.4,17,18 Thus, 
finding more clinically relevant abnormalities comes at the price of finding more VOUS: 
estimations of the percentage of VOUS in all prenatal samples vary from 0,3 - 1%, depending 
on the population tested and the platform used.4,19,20
Despite the differing opinions about the prenatal application of microarrays, they are already 
used for several indications, and mostly applied in case of foetal abnormalities shown by 
foetal ultrasound scans.5,21-23 Most pregnancies with ultrasound anomalies show a normal 
karyotype and remain without an aetiological diagnosis if only conventional karyotyping is 
applied. Testing by microarrays at a higher resolution and for more abnormalities is therefore 
supposed to be beneficial because of increased detection rates.5,7,21-24: it can provide around 
6% extra diagnoses in this situation.4,6,21 Another indication to perform microarray testing 
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is to interpret chromosome rearrangements detected by conventional karyotyping of 
which the clinical consequences are unsure. Microarrays allow for determining the size of 
the imbalance and the gene content, which may help to distinguish between pathogenic 
versus benign findings and to shed some light on the associated phenotype.4,6,21 Moreover, 
microarray testing can be offered to women with an increased risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 
13, either based on risk-assessment outcomes or advanced maternal age. This will improve 
the overall detection rate of clinically significant chromosomal abnormalities compared 
to conventional karyotyping, since microarray may reveal around 1,7% more cases in this 
group.6,15,25 For this same reason it has also been proposed to offer microarray as a first-tier 
test to all pregnant women.4,14,15
To address the question what kind of microarray testing should be offered and to whom, 
it is morally important to assess whether this would be done for the purpose of finding 
a diagnosis or for screening and whether a targeted or a genome-wide microarray is a 
‘suitable test’ for these purposes. In this paper, we will first briefly elucidate the notion of 
a suitable test and show how this relates to the normative framework for medical testing 
(diagnosis and screening). We will then go on to scrutinise the distinction between a targeted 
and a genome-wide microarray, and show that these notions are in need of a conceptual 
clarification to allow insight into the ethical implications of both. Next, we assess whether 
microarrays serve a diagnostic or a screening purpose, and whether they can be seen and 
justified as ‘suitable’ tests.
5.2 A suitable test
One of the well known Wilson & Jungner criteria for population screening is that there 
must be a suitable test.26 This notion refers to the quality of a test in relation to its aim. The 
quality of a genetic test can be determined on different levels: analytical validity, clinical 
validity and clinical utility. Analytical	validity is the ability of the test to accurately determine 
the genotype of interest. Clinical	validity is the accuracy with which the test can predict a 
phenotype. This comprises both formal test characteristics as well as predictive value in a 
specific population. A diagnostic test is a test with ~100% positive and negative predictive 
value. A screening test may have a somewhat lower score in this respect and still be suitable, 
if a positive result can be followed up by a test of diagnostic quality. Finally, clinical	utility 
refers to quality in the wider sense of the ability of a genetic test to generate information 
that is relevant and important given the specific aim of the testing procedure.27 Taken in 
this wider sense, a ‘suitable test’ is one that would show a positive balance of aim-related 
advantages and unavoidable disadvantages (drawbacks and costs) of testing. 
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At this level, the notion of a suitable test connects with ethical acceptability, more specifically 
with the conditions of ‘appropriateness’ and ‘proportionality’.28 To be appropriate, a medical 
activity must lead (or contribute) to achieving a legitimate aim of medicine. With regard 
to genetic testing, a distinction must at this point be made between the aims of diagnosis 
and screening. In clinical care the aim of testing is to clarify the medical problem with 
which the patient presents, in order to allow treatment or secondary prevention. Prenatal 
diagnosis (indicated either in view of a genetic risk that was known prior to conception 
or as diagnostic follow-up testing in a prenatal screening context) is a special case, as 
the aim of testing in this context is to clarify the situation in order to either reassure the 
prospective parents, or to allow them to make a decision about whether or not to continue 
the pregnancy to term. The aim of screening programmes generally is the early detection 
of disease or risk factors in persons without clinical symptoms or complaints, so as to allow 
timely intervention (treatment or primary prevention) expected to lead to a significant 
health gain on a population level. Prenatal screening, however, is a special case here. There 
is a strong consensus, at least in Western countries, that the aim of prenatal screening for 
foetal abnormalities should be understood as facilitating autonomous reproductive choice 
for pregnant women (and their partners), rather than to achieve a population health gain by 
trying to prevent the birth of children with congenital abnormalities.29
Assuming that medical testing is appropriate in view of a legitimate aim, the further condition 
of ‘proportionality’ requires that any drawbacks, burdens and costs are proportional to 
the importance of achieving that end. For instance, a costly and burdensome test which 
is known beforehand only to have a limited impact on clinical management, may well be 
disproportional. Moreover, if there is a choice between different ways to reach the same 
end, the least risky, burdensome, costly, etc alternative should in principle be chosen (this is 
often referred to as the condition of ‘subsidiarity’).30
In addition to requiring a legitimate aim and a suitable test (in the sense just given), the 
ethical acceptability of medical testing requires that the person to be tested (or this person’s 
representative) has given his or her informed consent. This presumes a professional duty 
to provide him or her with the information needed for making a well-considered decision, 
including information about the aim and nature of the procedure, but also about implications 
of possible outcomes for the testee and any other stakeholders.
As we will show, the implementation of microarray testing in the prenatal testing cascade 
challenges some of these conditions of what, from the perspective of ethical acceptability, 
would be a suitable test.
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5.3 Genome-wide versus targeted microarray: a moot distinction
Generally, a distinction is made between a genome-wide and a targeted microarray, but the 
meaning of the adjectives ‘genome-wide’ and ‘targeted’ is not as clear as it may seem at 
first sight.
First, both kinds of tests are genome-wide in the sense that both search throughout 
the entire genome for possible sub-microscopic deletions and duplications. A targeted 
microarray, however, is designed to only cover genomic regions across the genome that are 
known to be associated with phenotypic abnormalities: thus, it can focus on various regions 
throughout the whole genome and include as many or as few microdeletion and duplication 
syndromes as thought to be needed.5 Moreover, the density of probes in both targeted 
and genome-wide arrays can vary. Whereas karyotyping can only detect anomalies to a 
resolution of 5-10 Mb, bacterial artificial chromosomes (BAC) arrays and high-resolution 
oligonucleotide arrays are capable of detecting changes at a much higher resolution - up to 
50-100 Kb.31,32 Microarrays can also be designed to have a different resolution for specific 
parts across the genome. For example, ‘critical regions’ that are known for being associated 
with specific abnormalities, may be searched at a higher resolution (thus detecting smaller 
deletions and duplications), whereas the remaining regions (so-called backbone regions) 
are searched for deletions and duplications of a greater size only.5,7,31 Since every microarray 
is biased in the sense that its design is based on a decision of what size and kind of deletions 
and duplications are to be detected, a so-called “unbiased whole-genome array-CGH”33 does 
not exist. It is therefore important to know what particular design an array has (resolution 
for critical and backbone region).
Second, the main feature of targeted prenatal microarrays, that they only cover genomic 
regions known to be associated with phenotypic abnormalities, has the advantage (and 
purpose) to minimise the number of VOUS, in order to equally minimise the emotional 
burden and counselling difficulties associated with VOUS.11,33-37 Still, their design means 
that the ‘target’ is not per se related to the initial indication. The microarray is mostly used 
for a diagnostic purpose, namely to explain a specific unclear (mostly foetal ultrasound 
scan) abnormality, but a targeted array targets all	known genomic regions, whatever the 
indication. In that regard, it clearly differs from targeted testing by molecular methods for 
rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD)38: whereas the scope of RAD is explicitly limited to the 
few abnormalities for which the pregnant woman is found to be at increased risk, the scope 
of a targeted microarray is not limited to a few indication-related specific genomic regions 
only. We therefore conclude that ‘targeted’ in the prenatal context is not a clear concept, 
but has two different meanings. On the one hand, targeted indicates that the scope of the 
technique is explicitly limited to the diagnostic question, i.e. to the purpose of identifying 
one or only a limited number of well-described disorders indicated by a specific symptom or 
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risk-assessment. This meaning applies to the narrow RAD test. On the other hand, targeted 
indicates that the scope of a test is limited in that it does reveal all known clinically relevant 
abnormalities and does not -or at least as little as possible- generate unclear findings. In the 
case of prenatal microarrays, this second meaning of targeted de	facto applies: although 
there is a specific reason to perform an array -a diagnostic indication- the design of the array 
itself is not specifically tailored to this indication. This is not only a terminological issue, 
but bears ethical relevance too. From a normative perspective, the scope of a diagnostic 
test should be adjusted as much as possible to the initial diagnostic question. This basic 
conceptual clarification is an essential part of the justification for doing that specific test 
(criteria of appropriateness, proportionality and subsidiarity). In the case of prenatal 
microarrays this does not evidently hold.
As our analysis shows, the terms ‘genome-wide’ and ‘targeted’ are equivocal and in our 
view therefore not suitable for indicating the ethically relevant characteristics of the two 
kinds of microarrays. To avoid any confusion about what ‘genome-wide’ and ‘targeted’ in 
the prenatal context mean when indicating diagnostic tests, we propose to use the terms 
‘undirected’ and ‘directed’ for describing the arrays instead. ‘Undirected’ arrays search the 
whole genome, or part(s) of it, for all CNVs, both those that are associated with a known 
phenotype and those of uncertain clinical significance. ‘Directed’ microarrays aim to provide 
maximum detection of all clinically significant CNVs. The term ‘targeted’ will be reserved for 
tests whose scope is attuned to the diagnostic question (See: Table 1).
Table 1 | Ideal types of testing
Denotation Characteristic of test
Undirected The test seeks all, both clear	and	unclear, aberrations (known and unknown CNVs) 
Directed The test seeks all	known and clear aberrations (known CNVs)
Targeted The test only seeks the aberrations indicated by the diagnostic question 
From this classification it follows that an undirected microarray can never be targeted. A 
directed array can sometimes be understood as targeted, namely if and insofar the diagnostic 
question is totally undefined, as may be the case when unclear foetal ultrasound markers are 
found. If the direction of the diagnostic search cannot be derived from the markers, it may 
be necessary to look for all known and clear aberrations (directed microarray) to enlarge 
the chance of finding a clarification. However, a specific ultrasound finding, for example a 
foetal heart defect, indicates that the diagnostic search by microarray can focus on regions 
associated with cardiogenetic diseases only.
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5.4 The use of microarrays: between prenatal diagnosis, screening and  
 research 
5.4.1.	 The	case	for	targeted	arrays
Microarrays are increasingly used as a follow-up test in a prenatal diagnosis context. One 
application is to clarify chromosome rearrangements detected by conventional karyotyping. 
In that case, the focus and aim are rather straightforward: to give more clarity about the 
nature and the phenotypical consequences of a specific chromosomal abnormality. Such 
information is important for pregnant women to make a well-informed decision about 
whether to terminate or continue the pregnancy. In this situation a targeted microarray, 
focusing on the specific region that needs clarifying only, should ideally be applied to answer 
the diagnostic question. An array that focuses on more regions would exceed the scope of 
the question and would in that sense not be appropriate but amount to excessive testing. 
The most frequent application of microarrays in prenatal diagnosis is to clarify foetal 
ultrasound abnormalities, and in this situation the focus is less clear-cut. First- and second 
trimester ultrasound scans may show major structural anomalies as well as markers that 
may indicate heterogeneous abnormalities and syndromes. In the latter case, as will be 
discussed below, a targeted array will often not be possible. However, the cause of (some) 
major and isolated structural abnormalities may be relatively easy to identify.39 Whenever 
this is the case, it would seem that an array meant to clarify the findings need not look 
beyond the particular genomic region(s) associated with them. 
But even in cases where it would be possible to target the design of the array itself or to 
target the analysis of the data obtained by an (un)directed microarray1,40, to the best of our 
knowledge not a targeted but a directed or an undirected array is generally used. Directed 
arrays as described in the literature and as used at various institutions cover around 75-200 
genomic disorders7 and most of these “known deletion and duplication syndromes would 
not present with any specific prenatal risk factors or characteristic ultrasound findings”.41 
This suggests that in practice, the indication or diagnostic question does not determine the 
decision of what test platform to use or what analysis to perform. The same arrays are 
used for pre- and postnatal samples and for different indications, mainly for practical and/
or financial reasons. Since directed (and targeted) arrays necessitate frequent updating to 
include new relevant CNVs, some commentators insist that such arrays are simply not cost-
effective and impractical from a laboratory point of view.24,42 A similar argument is made 
by Rehm with regard to next-generation sequencing (NGS). She remarks that “although 
disease-targeted testing is likely to remain useful for the short term, laboratories are faced 
with the never-ending incremental costs to develop and to validate each new disease-
targeted panel, as well as to update constantly the content of existing panels as new genes 
are identified. This burden is causing laboratories to consider more efficient approaches 
than targeted testing.”43
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However, these considerations cannot conceal that in situations where a targeted test 
would suffice to clarify the karyotyping or ultrasound findings, the use of wider tests marks 
a step from prenatal diagnosis to a wider prenatal screening paradigm, where (un)directed 
microarrays serve as a tool to identify any foetal abnormality detectable by microarray, 
rather than just answer the clinical question. The same shift is behind offering (un)directed 
microarrays to pregnant women at increased risk for common aneuploidies (trisomies 21, 
18 and 13).4,14
Excessive testing is ethically problematic, as it adds to the unavoidable drawbacks of testing 
without a possible justification in terms of aim-related advantages for the testee(s). From a 
proportionality perspective, a test with such implications can hardly be suitable for prenatal 
diagnosis. This problem may seem to disappear with the implicit shift from prenatal 
diagnosis to prenatal screening, where the aim of testing for foetal abnormalities is no 
longer bound by an indication. If prenatal screening is aimed at providing women or couples 
with whatever information about the foetus they may find relevant in view of autonomous 
reproductive decision-making, there may seem to be no such thing as ‘excessive testing’. 
Some have followed this path towards proposing that all pregnant women should be offered 
an (un)directed microarray.14 However, even if it could be argued that a ‘maximum yield 
approach’ would be appropriate given the aim of prenatal screening, more is needed to 
speak of a suitable test, especially in view of what this would entail for the testees in terms 
of the balance of benefits and drawbacks (‘proportionality’).
5.4.2	 The	place	for	directed	arrays
If multiple ultrasound abnormalities are found, this indicates that the pregnancy could be 
‘at-risk’, but the question at risk for	what can mostly not be answered exactly. An enlarged 
nuchal translucency (NT) thickening (at 11-12 weeks of gestation), usually defined as ≥ 3.0 
- 3.5 mm, is associated with an increased risk of congenital cardiac disorders and a number 
of genetic and non-genetic disorders, thus giving reason for follow-up testing.44 The mid-
trimester ultrasound scan examines over-all basic foetal anatomy including, amongst other 
things, head, heart, abdomen, spine, limbs and extremities45 and is used to identify a broad 
range of aberrations indicating heterogeneous abnormalities and syndromes. The broad 
and unselective character of these ultrasound scans brings about that if foetal anomalies 
are found, it will not always be possible to specify the diagnostic question and thus also to 
limit the scope of the follow-up diagnostic test to specific parts of the genome. 
If the aim of a directed array is to clarify unspecific	ultrasound findings by identifying their 
possible cause, such an array would in so far be ‘targeted’: a directed microarray may identify 
6% more clinically significant CNVs than conventional karyotyping would do. Indeed, it can 
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be argued that offering an ultrasound screen involves a duty to as much as possible clarify 
any unclear findings in order to either provide reassurance to pregnant women or to allow 
them to make a meaningful decision about whether or not to continue the pregnancy. But 
even if answering to an obvious indication for follow-up testing, the use of a directed array 
in such cases blurs the distinction between diagnosis and screening: while giving a better 
chance of clarifying the earlier findings for the prospective parents, at the same time the 
test will detect any other submicroscopic chromosomal abnormalities known to be relevant 
for the health prospects of the future child. 
In the literature, an undirected array has regularly been referred to as a “diagnostic screen”33 
or as “genome wide screening”.24,46 However, as our analysis suggests, this qualification also 
applies to the use of directed arrays, even where this approach would be appropriate (rather 
than excessive) follow-up testing. De	facto, the use of such arrays comes down to scanning 
the foetal genome for any possible abnormality, related or unrelated to the ultrasound 
findings. As a result, prenatal microarrays have an ambiguous character, which tends to 
obscure their purpose as a follow-up test. This may explain why publications about prenatal 
microarrays do not usually specify the percentage of results that actually answers the 
diagnostic question raised by ultrasound abnormalities. Neither is the classical distinction 
made between intended and incidental findings when indicating the yield of microarrays; 
this distinction seems to be fading with the shift towards screening for any (known) genetic 
abnormality. With this implicit shift, it also becomes less obvious why one would use a 
directed instead of an undirected array in case of unspecific ultrasound abnormalities.
5.4.3	 The	problem	with	undirected	arrays
Proponents of an undirected array want to optimise the identification of all possibly clinically 
relevant CNVs. To detect these, both known and unknown regions are included in the testing 
array. A directed approach is seen as disadvantageous in that it will miss yet unknown 
clinically important aberrations.24,47,48 But it is far from evident that the extra yield of an 
undirected array gives a better chance of clarifying unspecific ultrasound findings. In most 
cases, what it adds is not a more adequate diagnosis, but VOUS and the hope that through 
further classification and research, VOUS may be turned into meaningful findings.6,49 This 
entails assessing “clinical findings, literature, available databases, and gene content and 
size to determine whether there (is) sufficient information on which to base the prediction 
of phenotype and, if so, whether the phenotype (is) of sufficient clinical relevance to be 
reported.”6 In other words: if VOUS are classified, this will to a large extent be based on 
estimation and subjective evaluation of its possible meaning.50 This may explain why, next to 
the differences in the array design, estimations on the number of VOUS vary from around 0.4% 
to 12%.49,51 The conclusion must be that for lack of clinical validity, undirected microarrays 
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are a research tool rather than an instrument of clinical care. This is also apparent from 
regular remarks in the literature saying that the number of VOUS will decrease as ’genome-
wide’ arrays will be applied more often, and more novel clinically relevant CNVs will be 
detected.21,52 Or, as de Wit et al. state: “To allow the discovery of new pathogenic CNVs, 
whole genome array platforms should be recommended in the prenatal setting (…).”39 From 
an ethical point of view, there is a clear danger here that ignoring the distinction between 
research and care will lead to turning pregnant women into research subjects without their 
knowledge and consent. Bassem et al.53 have remarked “(…) whole-genome arrays are 
explorative by design and by purpose.” They therefore want to reserve undirected arrays 
for research purposes only, and propose to use directed arrays in diagnostic laboratories in 
order to protect patients against possible wrong interpretations. “After all”, they say, “we 
serve patients, not study subjects.”53
Why indeed burden pregnant women with VOUS if this will not lead to a better diagnosis? 
The implicit ‘shift towards screening’ provides proponents of undirected arrays with a simple 
argument: because any information that something may be wrong with the foetus can be 
relevant for the decision to continue or abort the pregnancy. For instance, according to 
McGillivray et al.54 it would be paternalistic of professionals to withhold information about 
VOUS, because “(a) result of uncertain significance is still information” and “(i)f it is all about 
choice, then, no option or information potentially relevant to a woman’s choice and her 
decision-making processes should be withheld.” They add that professionals should not be 
held responsible for women’s decisions to terminate a pregnancy in case of unclear findings. 
But from an ethical point of view, this equation of a ‘maximum yield approach’ to microarray 
testing with ‘facilitating autonomous reproductive choice’ as the accepted aim of prenatal 
screening is too simple. It ignores the crucial question how generating (further) unclarities 
would possibly serve this purpose. The message “we have found something in your foetus, 
but we do not know what it means” cannot reasonably be seen as relevant and helpful 
for prospective parents’ reproductive decision-making. Choices must be meaningful to be 
worthwhile. If they are not, the problem is not just that reproductive autonomy becomes an 
empty concept, but also that its pursuit comes at a price that is no longer proportional, given 
the added burdens of anxiety and stress and the possible long-term impact of a decision to 
terminate a wanted pregnancy for what may have been false alarm. In terms of the ethical 
framework set out earlier in this paper, the conclusion must be that undirected arrays are 
not a suitable test, neither for the purpose of prenatal diagnosis, nor for that of prenatal 
screening.
Of course, the issue of unclear test results is not new and unclear findings are difficult to 
completely avoid in prenatal testing. Conventional karyotyping may also generate results 
of which the clinical significance is unclear and even a directed microarray may incidentally 
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reveal unclear findings. The same holds for the use of prenatal ultrasound. Analysts and 
clinicians are used to deal with these situations and especially clinicians may be expected 
to act prudently and take into account the principle of non-maleficence when reporting 
test results to their patients. Still, these latter situations have to be distinguished from the 
scenario that unclear findings are deliberately generated - as is the case with undirected 
microarrays.
In our view, professionals who want to offer undirected arrays to their patients, should 
make clear that the main purpose of doing so is research: to contribute to the steadily 
growing knowledge about genotype-fenotype relations and thereby to reduce the amount 
of VOUS. But it may well be that in some cases individual patients would directly benefit 
from participating in this research, as some unclear findings may be clarified swiftly and 
sufficiently enough to provide them with relevant information (even though still ahead of 
formal proof of validity). This possibility may be a reason why well informed patients may 
find it worthwhile to consent to participating in such research, while accepting that this 
comes at a price of being confronted with more unclear or ambiguous outcomes than would 
otherwise be the case. Still we think that, as part of the pre-test and consent procedure, 
professionals offering such ‘experimental diagnosis’ should make clear to the woman or the 
couple that ‘true VOUS’ will not be reported to them.
5.5 Informed choice and counselling for microarray testing
Ganesamoorthy et al. have recently suggested that “the issue of balancing the use of 
the highest resolution arrays to maximise detection against the drawbacks of novel or 
uncertain findings may best be managed by giving parents the option of high-resolution 
or low-resolution, targeted, prenatal analysis.”55 We do not agree. If undirected arrays 
are unsuitable precisely because they undermine rather than serve autonomous decision 
making by pregnant women and their partners, offering this choice in the name of that 
ideal is a non-starter. It seems a thin disguise for the attempt to preserve the option of using 
genome-wide arrays while relegating the responsibility to the patient. However, leaving 
the decision to the woman or the couple may well be an option where there would be a 
choice between a targeted and a directed array. In cases where a targeted array would be an 
appropriate follow-up test for karyotyping or ultrasound findings, opting for a directed array 
would reflect the shift from diagnosis to screening. If only the prospective parents are aware 
of this, there seems nothing wrong with allowing them to choose this option, assuming 
that a directed array can more easily be justified as a suitable test for prenatal screening 
purposes, than an undirected one. Allowing this choice between a targeted follow-up test 
and a wider screening test is similar to the ‘individualised choice’ between a targeted RAD-
test and karyotyping.56
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This still raises the question how to provide prospective parents with adequate information 
in order to facilitate them to make an informed choice whether to be tested or not, and 
what outcomes to receive or not. The traditional interpretation of meaningful informed 
consent is that testees are in the pre-test situation informed about all conditions tested 
for, so that they can indicate what results they want to receive or not. It is clear that in 
case a of microarray test, this traditional interpretation of informed consent is untenable. 
It is impossible to extensively inform prospective parents about all the possible findings, 
including their clinical consequences. To do so would probably result in such an overload 
of information, that parents will in fact be incapacitated to give their informed consent. 
Categorising findings may be the best and in fact the only feasible option in the case of 
microarrays.57
To ensure that prospective parents’ views and preferences are taken into account, pre- and 
post-test counselling has to satisfy more than the requirements of adequate information and 
non-directiveness alone. The ‘interpretive model’ of the professional-patient relationship 
as introduced by Emanuel and Emanuel58 seems to comply best with what is needed in 
this situation. This model allows for a collaboration of the professional and the pregnant 
woman to choose the test option that suits the woman’s situation and preferences best. To 
reach that, the professional informs her about the available options and helps the woman 
to clarify her own wants and values to reach the decision that best fits her. 
5.6 Late-onset diseases: include or exclude?
Apart from the overall suitability of microarray(s) for diagnostic testing, an important question 
is whether there is reason to explicitly exclude specific results from testing beforehand. 
A prenatal microarray may not only generate information about congenital disorders but 
may as well reveal, amongst other things, (predispositions for) late(r)-onset diseases and 
the already mentioned VOUS. In that regard it can be seen as a precursor of the possible 
future prenatal application of whole exome sequencing (WES), whole genome sequencing 
(WGS) and broad or narrow analyses of these sequences that are likely to be introduced in 
prenatal screening strategies as well.59-61 Donley et al. have identified six different types of 
information that may be identified when analysing data of WGS and asked whether these suit 
the purpose of informed reproductive decision making: congenital disorders, non-medical 
traits, susceptibility genes, carrier status, VOUS, and late-onset diseases (highly penetrant 
genetic conditions that cause symptoms only later in life).60 Here, we will shortly address 
the last type of information since this raises the most urgent ethical issues that necessitate 
a decision to either include such outcomes in a testing platform or not. Elsewhere, this issue 
has been discussed in more detail.59
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Classic examples of untreatable, severe late(r)-onset diseases are Huntington disease 
(HD) and hereditary early-onset Alzheimer disease. If these findings are included in a 
broad test, and if the pregnant woman has indicated that she wants to receive these test 
results, then she will be informed about them in case of a positive result. If the woman 
then decides to continue the pregnancy, this would mean that the child will be born with 
burdening knowledge about future conditions: one would de	facto be screening the future 
child.18,57,59,60 In that regard, the distinction between prenatal and postnatal testing becomes 
blurred. Screening newborns and children for late(r)-onset conditions that are untreatable 
is generally considered to be morally unjustified in view of the children’s anticipatory 
autonomy rights and the principle of non-maleficence. Children have the right to decide 
themselves, when competent to do so, to be tested for these conditions or not. To test them 
either in childhood, neonatally or prenatally, would deprive them of this right and amount 
to an infringement of the principle of respect for persons.18,62,63 This means that a conflict 
arises between the (prospective) parents’ right to know because and insofar this is linked 
with their reproductive decision-making, and the future child’s right not to know. 
The question here is which of the two should prevail in the prenatal context. Are prospective 
parents entitled to all health-related information about their foetus because, based on 
their reproductive autonomy, they should be enabled to make well-informed reproductive 
decisions on the basis of such information? Not without limitation. As it may be necessary 
in the neonatal context to override parental autonomy to receive certain information “to 
prevent harm and to preserve a minor’s future autonomy”64, so it may also be needed in the 
prenatal setting to limit reproductive autonomy, if a clear reproductive interest is absent and 
a future minor’s future autonomy has to be protected. However, insofar pregnant women 
want to use this information to make a well-informed decision to terminate the pregnancy, 
there is indeed a reproductive interest to receive this information and in principle there will 
not be a future child to be harmed. Therefore, it has been suggested to only give conditional 
access18,59, namely “to only provide this information if the woman has indicated in pre-test 
counselling that she indeed intends to ask for a termination if confronted with this type 
of finding.”18 This stance is opposed by several commentators. For instance, in an earlier 
debate about prenatal testing for HD, the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive 
Technologies rejected the idea of conditional access for several reasons.65 They claim that 
prospective parents who do not consider selective abortion for HD would not ask for the 
test, that people do not know in advance what they will actually do, that it is morally and 
legally unacceptable to enforce abortion, and that the problem will seldom occur. De Wert 
(2002) has argued that these objections are not decisive for declining conditional access 
to prenatal testing for late-onset diseases, given the possible violation of the rights and 
interests of the future child. Therefore he argues that conditional access to such testing 
is “morally justified, or even morally imperative.”66 We agree with this latter view and 
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moreover point out that with the increase of genome-wide testing, possibly revealing a 
predisposition for late-onset diseases, the issue is likely to occur more often if no measures 
are taken against including this type of finding in a testing platform. We of course agree 
that women can never be forced to actually proceed in accordance with their expressed 
intention to abort in case of an adverse test result. Still, they will then be aware of the 
possibly destructive implications of burdening their future child with such knowledge - and 
they have to take the responsibility for that.
5.7 Conclusion
Microarrays enable identifying more clinically significant abnormalities in the prenatal 
context than conventional karyotyping and this is usually seen as a benefit, also in the 
prenatal context. Although we acknowledge the advantages of microarrays, we have also 
shown the drawbacks of the fact that the phenotypical consequences of many CNVs are 
uncertain. We noted a tendency to use broader arrays than would be needed for clarifying 
karyotyping or ultrasound outcomes and an implicit shift from a prenatal diagnosis to a 
prenatal screening paradigm. This causes microarrays to have an ambiguous character. A 
clear distinction should be made between targeted, directed and undirected microarrays. 
If the indication pregnant women present with is clear, diagnostic testing should be done 
by what we have defined as a targeted microarray, ideally focussing on regions that are 
associated with the specific type or category of earlier findings. If, for instance, former 
outcomes point to cardiac problems, a targeted array would not look for CNVs associated 
with neurogenetic abnormalities. If such an array is not available, or cannot be made 
available at a reasonable cost, or if there are other justified reasons to apply a broader 
microarray, a directed microarray may be a suitable test. With regard to undirected arrays, 
we have suggested that generating VOUS serves a research purpose and does not contribute 
to the aim of autonomous reproductive decision making. 
Even in case of a directed microarray, autonomous decision making and adequate informed 
consent are complicated by the heterogeneous amount of findings that a microarray can 
generate. Prospective parents should be made aware of the intrinsic uncertainty of possible 
findings by microarrays in pre- and post-test counselling. The complexity of the information 
at hand may even ask for moving up the moment of the provision of prenatal testing 
possibilities to the preconceptional period, in order to leave enough time for adequate and 
autonomous parental deliberation. Furthermore, post-test information about late-onset 
diseases should only be made conditionally accessible in order to protect future children’s 
anticipatory autonomy rights
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More in general, the current prenatal application of microarrays seems to be complicated 
by the fact that the development of this technique and the gain of knowledge about its 
outcomes are still in progress: the application is therefore taking place in the intermediate 
phase between research and implementation. As a result, decisions have still to be made 
about what possible findings to include in a testing array or not. In that regard, the prenatal 
use of microarrays may reflect a so-called ‘extemporaneous’67 translation of research into 
clinical care, instead of a well-balanced introduction of this technique after a profound 
evaluation of clinical, empirical and normative issues. With increasing knowledge, it may be 
possible to differentiate microarrays per diagnostic question in order to offer a suitable test 
and a clear answer to the medical question at hand.
For now, prospective parents will be confronted with the question whether they want to 
terminate or continue the pregnancy affected with any of the CNVs found. Since selective 
abortion is an emotionally and ethically charged decision, providers of prenatal tests have 
the obligation to carefully decide what findings they will confront prospective parents with 
and where the line between beneficial and maleficent provision of information will be 
passed. Allowing pregnant women an ‘individualised choice’ between a targeted follow-up 
test and a wider screening test (directed microarray), may be an alternative. This option is 
in line with the aim of prenatal screening and offers women or couples the opportunity to 
choose the test that best fits their individual wants and needs.
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Abstract
Prenatal screening strategies are undergoing rapid changes owing to the introduction of 
new testing techniques. The overall tendency is towards broadening the scope of prenatal 
testing through increasingly sensitive ultrasound scans and genome-wide molecular tests. 
In addition, non-invasive prenatal diagnosis is likely to be introduced in the near future. 
These developments raise important ethical questions concerning meaningful reproductive 
choice, the autonomy rights of future children, equity of access and the proportionality of 
testing.
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6.1 Introduction
Current prenatal screening cascades in the developed (primarily Western) world consist 
of similar testing methods.1,2 These include a first-trimester risk assessment for the most 
common aneuploidies and a second-trimester fetal ultrasound scan to identify fetal 
anomalies.3 In the case of a positive risk assessment, invasive procedures (amniocentesis 
or chorionic villus sampling) are offered to allow diagnostic follow-up testing. For decades, 
conventional karyotyping has been the gold standard for this form of prenatal diagnosis. 
However, it is now being replaced by molecular techniques that will allow narrowing or 
broadening of the scope of diagnostic testing (See: Figure 6.1). This raises questions 
about the range of conditions for which such testing should be offered and why. A distinct 
development is the pending introduction of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD). This 
promises to make prenatal screening easier and safe but again raises the question about its 
scope. As we discuss here, there is an important ethical dimension to the developments and 
choices that the field is currently facing.
Most of the ethical questions discussed in this paper are relevant for shaping future 
prenatal screening practices both in settings where services are largely offered as a market-
driven commodity (as in the United States) and in countries where they are part of public 
health care (as in most European countries, Canada and Australia). Standard-setting and 
debate about guiding principles have contributed to the formation of an internationally 
acknowledged normative framework for the provision of prenatal screening (See: Box 
6.1). On a general level, this framework builds on the basic principles of biomedical ethics: 
respect for persons, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. More specific norms for 
population screening include proportionality, equity of access and informed consent.4 A 
core element of the normative framework for prenatal screening is that informed consent 
as a mere precondition is not enough. Enabling meaningful reproductive choice with regard 
to parenting or avoiding a child with a serious disorder or disability is (or should be) the 
very aim of offering testing for fetal abnormalities.5,6 This is in order to ensure that abortion 
decisions remain personal and are not turned into instruments of societal goals, such as 
prevention and cost-reduction by bringing down the number of people requiring life-long 
and costly care.
Here we provide an overview of current developments in prenatal screening, showing 
how each of these relates to the normative framework and what ethical challenges they 
entail. We then address some ethical issues in more detail and make suggestions about how 
specific challenges might be addressed. Although we take the current normative framework 
as our point of departure, our message in this paper is that the dynamics of the field may 
also put the framework to the test.
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Because selective abortion is a major issue of moral sensitivity in debates about prenatal 
screening, it seems appropriate to make the following preliminary remarks. A first debate 
concerns the moral status of the fetus. The prevailing view, also reflected in legislation allowing 
abortion up to a certain limit, is that the status of the fetus is relatively low and increases 
with its development. Those who take this view usually accept that abortion may be justified 
if the parents want to avoid having a child with a serious disease or disability.7 Although it is 
sometimes proposed that society should come up with a list of diseases serious enough to 
warrant prenatal testing, it is widely accepted that this is unrealistic and undesirable, given 
that many disorders have a variable expression and that the impact of a disease is, to a large 
extent, context-dependent.8 A second debate concerns the selective nature of abortion for 
fetal abnormalities. According to the ‘disability rights critique’, prenatal screening sends the 
Box 6.1 | Key ethics terminology
The ‘normative framework’ regarding prenatal screening for fetal anomalies refers to the set of 
ethical (and/or legal) norms that together provide the context of justification for professional 
practice and public policy making with regard to prenatal screening. This framework can be 
regarded as a context-specific articulation of the basic principles of health-care ethics.4  
• The principle of respect for persons reflects the notion that, as autonomous agents, human 
beings deserve to be treated as moral subjects. In the context of screening, this requires that 
decision making about participation and all further steps in the screening process must be based 
on adequate information and voluntary choice (‘informed consent’).
• The twin principles of beneficence and non-maleficence stem from the Hippocratic roots of 
medical ethics. As screening is offered on the initiative of the health-care system, it is essential 
that the possible benefits for participants clearly outweigh the disadvantages (burdens and risks) 
that such programmes always also have — for instance, as a consequence of false-positive or false-
negative outcomes.
• The principle of justice requires that equity of access to screening programmes is ensured 
and that they are provided on the basis of a fair distribution of benefits, burdens and financial 
resources.
Building on these ethical norms, the framework for prenatal screening fits in with the more general 
set of principles for population screening, as initially formulated by Wilson and Jungner.49
But prenatal screening has a different aim than most other forms of population screening.6,50 
Instead of providing options for treatment or prevention of disease, prenatal screening aims 
at providing pregnant women and their partners with information that they may want to use 
as a basis for decision making about whether to continue the pregnancy. The ‘clinical utility’ of 
prenatal screening depends on the extent to which it allows participants to make well-informed 
and autonomous reproductive choices. However, (prenatal) screening programmes must also be 
proportional. This cannot be decided merely in terms of the balance of benefits and drawbacks for 
participants. One should also look at possible consequences for other individuals and groups and 
to societal implications, including costs.51
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message that it would have been better if those living with the targeted conditions had 
not been born.9 However, the claim that this is true by implication does not hold. Whether 
prenatal screening has discriminatory effects depends on how the programme is presented 
and implemented in practice. If informed decisions rather than abortion rates are taken as a 
measure of success, the disability rights critique is less convincing.7
A final remark on terminology: we use the term prenatal screening to refer to the whole 
of the testing trajectory offered to low-risk pregnant women. Prenatal diagnosis refers to 
follow-up testing as a part of this trajectory. Prenatal testing is used as a generic term.
Figure 6.1 | Prenatal screening cascade: current and possible future test-routes
f1
s
5VQR
s
5VQR
0CVWTG4GXKGYU^)GPGVKEU
  
 s
5VQR


s s s s s s s s s s
6KOG
YGGMU
%QPXGPVKQPCN
MCT[QV[RKPI
4CRKFCPGWRNQKF[
FGVGEVKQP
4#&
#PQOCNKGU!06űOO!
+PETGCUGF
TKUMVTKUQO[
!
(GVCNWNVTCUQWPFUECP
OKFVTKOGUVGT0WEJCNVTCPUNWEGPE[OGCUWTGOGPV
sYGGMU
5GTWOUETGGPKPI

ȮTUVVTKOGUVGT
+PXCUKXGRTGPCVCNFKCIPQUKU%85
űYGGGMUQT#%
űsYGGMU
/CVGTPCNDNQQF
RNCUOC
%GNNHTGGHGVCN&0#40#
űsYGGMU 0QPKPXCUKXGRTGPCVCNFKCIPQUKU
űYGGMUTGNKCDNGűYGGMU
)GPQOGYKFG
OQNGEWNCTVGUVKPI
+PXCUKXGRTGPCVCNFKCIPQUKU 0QPKPXCUKXGRTGPCVCNFKCIPQUKU
%QPXGPVKQPCNMCT[QV[RKPI
4#&QTIGPQOGYKFG
OQNGEWNCTVGUVKPI
(QNNQYWRCȎGT
WNVTCUQWPFCPQOCNKGU0WEJCNHQNFűOO (QGVCNWNVTCUQWPFCPQOCNKGU
4#&QTIGPQOGYKFG
OQNGEWNCTVGUVKPI
Test routes in current and possible future prenatal screening cascades. The horizontal arrow at the top denotes 
the gestational age. In the case of an increased risk of trisomies 21, 18 or 13, invasive prenatal diagnosis is 
offered: conventional karyotyping, rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) or genome-wide molecular testing. A nuchal 
translucency ≥ 3.5mm or fetal ultrasound anomalies may lead to either follow-up ultrasound testing or invasive 
prenatal diagnosis. Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) using cell-free fetal DNA or RNA that is obtained from 
maternal blood (plasma) may, in the near future, be implemented clinically as a one-step diagnostic test for trisomy 
21 (and possibly also trisomies 18 and 13) using RAD or genome-wide molecular testing, including next-generation 
sequencing, for the detection of paternal mutations that underlie monogenic disorders. NIPD could also be offered 
as a follow-up test after ultrasound anomalies. See: Table 6.1 for more details about each type of test.
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6.2 Developments in prenatal screening
6.2.1	 Rapid	aneuploidy	detection	
In most developed countries, the diagnostic test after a positive risk assessment for trisomies 
21, 18 and 13 is still conventional karyotyping.1,10 This method detects all microscopically 
visible chromosome aberrations, including rare numerical or structural abnormalities 
that may have serious clinical consequences but also deletions, duplications or other 
chromosomal anomalies that can have mild, uncertain or even no clinical consequences.11,12 
As a result, women may be confronted with other findings than those for which they were 
offered risk assessment and follow-up testing. This is one of the reasons why, particularly 
in northern European countries, some have advocated to replace conventional karyotyping 
with a targeted molecular ‘rapid aneuploidy detection’ (RAD) test.13,14 Three common RAD 
techniques are currently being used: interphase fluorescence in situ hybridization (FISH), 
quantitative fluorescent PCR (QF-PCR) and multiplex ligation-dependent probe amplification 
(MLPA)15 (See: Table 6.1). These tests generate reliable results within 3 days, which is much 
faster than karyotyping, and are used to diagnose only trisomies 21, 18 and 13, although 
probes often also include the sex chromosomes. In terms of the normative framework, the 
question arises whether avoiding additional findings that may complicate decision making 
render RAD a better approach to diagnostic follow-up testing than karyotyping.16 Or is the 
opposite the case, given that RAD reduces the range of possible outcomes that women 
may find relevant for reproductive choice?11 Does the miscarriage risk attached to current 
invasive procedures require that testing should be maximally informative?17 While this 
debate is still going on18, both karyotyping and RAD are currently offered, either as stand-
alone tests or as options between which pregnant women may choose.19-21
6.2.2	 Prenatal	ultrasound	
Whereas the framework for prenatal screening was developed at a time when a limited 
number of fetal abnormalities were screened for, the introduction of fetal ultrasound 
screening has effectively changed this. The second-trimester fetal ultrasound scan has a 
wide range of possible outcomes. Apart from various structural defects (with severe, mild or 
unknown clinical consequences), these screens increasingly reveal so-called ‘soft markers’ 
that indicate a risk of a wide range of genetic disorders, which require further diagnosis to 
confirm. Although ‘controversial’ soft markers may sometimes be discarded22,23, the trend 
seems to be towards more detailed screening.3 Remarkably, the question of how women can 
be properly prepared and give informed consent for this complex form of prenatal screening 
has, until now, received only scant attention.24
Nuchal translucency measurement at around 11 weeks of gestation was introduced as part 
of the risk assessment for common trisomies but has developed into a de facto screening 
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test for other defects as well. An enlarged nuchal translucency of ≥3.5 mm is associated 
with an increased risk of intra-uterine fetal death, congenital heart defects and many other 
structural defects and genetic syndromes. This finding generally leads to follow-up diagnostic 
testing by using further ultrasound scans, karyotyping or genome-wide molecular tests.25,26 
However, pre-test information does not usually cover this possible further trajectory. This 
means that women may be confronted with outcomes they were not prepared for and may 
find difficult to handle.
6.2.3	 Genome-wide	molecular	testing	
The debate about RAD can be expected soon to give way to the question of whether the 
scope of diagnostic testing should be broader than karyotyping. That, at least, seems to be 
the thrust of technological developments.27 Molecular genetic tests with a higher resolution 
than conventional karyotyping include several array-based platforms and shotgun or parallel 
sequencing that can be used for genome-wide analysis29,30 (and perhaps, in the future, even 
whole-genome analysis28) (See: Table 6.1).
Abnormalities that such tests might detect include small interstitial or telomeric deletions 
or duplications and partial or uniparental disomies that may, in addition to identifying 
childhood-onset disorders, also lead to the detection of genetic risk factors for late-onset 
disorders such as hereditary cancers. In some centres in Europe and the United States, 
genome-wide tests are offered to women at an increased risk of chromosomal abnormalities 
or in cases of ultrasound anomalies.31,32 Some propose targeted testing by using arrays that 
are designed to detect clinically significant abnormalities while minimizing the detection 
of unclear findings.32,33 However, others favour wider arrays in order to identify more 
aberrations.34 Although more comprehensive testing may have benefits in terms of clinically 
relevant findings that would otherwise be missed, a serious challenge is that, with the 
present state of knowledge, many of the results of such testing are impossible to interpret. 
This leads to a lack of clarity about what women should be told and, more generally, to 
concerns about the feasibility of well-informed decision making for comprehensive testing. 
For example, copy number variants (CNVs) that are detected by array comparative genome 
hybridization (array-CGH) or SNP analysis can be categorized as likely to be pathogenic, likely 
to be benign or of unknown clinical significance35 (See: Table 6.1). The balance of benefits 
and burdens will also be affected if unnecessary anxiety is caused by such outcomes. Further 
questions relating to genome-wide molecular testing are whether the autonomy rights of 
future children may be violated and whether justice would require offering such testing to 
all pregnant women.
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6.2.4	 Non-invasive	prenatal	diagnosis
In the next 2 to 5 years, it is expected that NIPD performed on cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) and 
cffRNA in maternal blood will be introduced as a routine screening test for aneuploidies (See: 
Box 6.2; Figure 6.1). In high-risk families, NIPD will also possibly serve as a routine diagnostic 
test for autosomal-dominant and autosomal-recessive traits, such as Huntington’s disease 
and cystic fibrosis, respectively.36-38 In the short-term, this may be limited to the detection 
of paternally inherited traits owing to difficulties in distinguishing between maternal and 
fetal DNA.
As the benefits of an early and safe one-step approach to prenatal diagnosis are clear, 
it would seem that current risk-assessment practices for common trisomies can be 
abandoned in the screening context. However, if nuchal translucency measurement –which 
is currently a part of this risk assessment– were also to be dropped, a much smaller range of 
abnormalities will be identified. Introducing NIPD may thus lead to a reduction in the scope 
for autonomous reproductive decision making by pregnant women. Although this loss can 
be averted by offering stand-alone nuchal translucency measurement as a complement to 
NIPD, that would make the testing trajectory more costly, complicated and burdensome. 
In terms of the aim of prenatal screening, piling up additional tests may have the adverse 
effect of undermining autonomous choice.
Box 6.2 | Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis
In 1997, Lo et al.52 discovered circulating cell-free fetal DNA (cffDNA) and cffRNA in maternal 
plasma, creating possibilities for non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD). The main advantage of 
this is that the procedure-related miscarriages of current invasive techniques (namely, chorionic 
villus sampling and amniocentesis) are avoided, as NIPD requires only blood samples, which are 
taken from the mother as well as the father. The cffDNA and cffRNA appear the maternal blood 
circulation from early placenta formation (from 5 to 6 weeks of gestation - the trophoblast stage), 
which makes reliable NIPD possible from 9 weeks of gestation. NIPD is already implemented in 
clinical practice for fetal Y-chromosome detection in case of X-linked disorders and for fetal Rhesus 
D (RhD) determination.53
Many research groups are now trying to detect the most common trisomies, 21, 18 and 13, through 
NIPD. These trisomies can be detected either by shotgun sequencing or massively parallel genomic 
sequencing.54,55 Recently, the first large-scale validation study for trisomy 21 has been published56, 
and clinical implementation is expected within 2 to 5 years. Targeted NIPD for combined testing of 
trisomies 21, 18 and 13 remains more challenging. The number of known trophoblast-expressed 
genes is still limited, and as long as the use of epigenetic signatures that offer potential for detecting 
trisomies - for example, DNA methylation - has not become routine, it is difficult to develop a 
targeted, robust and cheap aneuploidy test.57,58
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Some commentators expect that, eventually, genome-wide NIPD testing will become 
possible.39 Although this would reduce the need for complementary tests, concerns about 
the feasibility of adequate informed consent and decision making are heightened when 
broad genetic testing takes the form of a safe and simple blood test to be performed as 
early, perhaps, as 7 weeks of pregnancy.40 As NIPD will take away the ‘gatekeeper’ effect of 
the current risk of miscarriage that comes with amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling, 
concerns have also been raised that it will contribute to testing for minor abnormalities or 
non-health related conditions and to a corresponding ‘trivialization’ of abortion.38
6.3 Specific ethical issues
6.3.1.	 Meaningful	reproductive	choice
Given that prenatal screening should be aimed at providing pregnant women with 
opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice, a crucial issue is whether new tests 
expand or undermine these opportunities.18 The classic interpretation of informed consent is 
that a decision to be tested or not must be well-informed for every condition included in the 
test panel. Ideally, the woman undergoing the testing should also be given the opportunity 
to indicate which specific outcomes she does not want to be informed about (‘the right not 
to know’). But the clear tendency towards ever-broader testing makes this model appear 
increasingly out of touch with reality. Broad prenatal testing may generate findings that 
vary from severe conditions, such as Duchenne muscular dystrophy, to predispositions for a 
wide range of early- or late-onset diseases and to CNVs for which the clinical consequences 
are unclear. To give detailed pre-test information on the level of all such outcomes is not 
realistic. It would lead to ‘information overload’ and would frustrate rather than serve the 
aim of autonomous choice.7
How can this problem be solved? One option is to look for an alternative approach to 
informed consent, avoiding information overload but still allowing well-informed decision 
making. A possible model proposed in the context of multiplex neonatal screening is that 
of ‘generic consent’.41 This involves presenting pre-test information in general categories 
of types of outcomes.7 In the context of prenatal testing, relevant categories include: 
congenital lethal disorders; early- or late-onset disorders requiring intensive medical care; 
early- or late-onset disorders requiring limited medical care; susceptibilities for complex 
disorders; conditions involving only minor health problems; and abnormal findings of which 
the clinical implications are unknown.
A key question is whether this still facilitates well-informed decision making. One problem is 
that the different categories may fail to capture the variable expression of many disorders. 
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Moreover, the severity of different diseases is perceived differently among both health-care 
professionals and pregnant women. The practical feasibility of such alternative models of 
informed consent needs to be tested in empirical studies.
A second option is the use of filters to minimize findings that may be unclear or otherwise 
difficult to handle. This would allow counselling and decision making to be limited either to 
a few selected serious conditions or (in the context of broader testing and linked with a form 
of ‘generic consent’) to a smaller or wider subset of the six categories mentioned above. 
This approach has the advantage of avoiding the problem of whether pregnant women’s 
interests are really served by being offered the choice to receive information about all 
possible outcomes of genome-wide molecular testing. If, as we think, the answer to this is 
‘no’, it is inevitable that professionals and other stakeholders must find a balance between 
allowing women to decide for themselves as much as possible and helping them to do so by 
defining the range of meaningful choices.
6.3.2	 The	autonomy	rights	of	the	future	child
A second issue that arises in the scenario of genome-wide molecular testing is that of the 
future child’s ‘anticipatory autonomy rights’.42 These rights may be violated when prenatal 
testing has revealed a predisposition for a late-onset disease that is not amenable to 
treatment or prevention starting in childhood and the woman decides to continue the 
pregnancy. Testing children for such conditions is generally regarded as unacceptable, not 
just because benefits for the child that might outweigh any burdens are absent but also 
because it deprives the individual of his or her right to self-determination. This includes 
determining whether to be tested once mature enough to do so.43,44 But then, clearly, 
it is also problematic to perform such tests in fetuses that may well grow into children. 
There are two possible solutions here. One solution is to limit the scope of testing by using 
targeted arrays or algorithms, avoiding as much as possible the detection of predispositions 
for late-onset diseases. The drawback of this is that women who might have chosen to 
terminate the pregnancy in case of such a finding are effectively deprived of what for them 
would be a meaningful reproductive option. The alternative solution is to allow women to 
undergo genome-wide analysis but only after they have expressed, in pre-test counselling, 
the clear intention to choose abortion if a predisposition for a late-onset disease is found. 
Although women cannot, of course, be forced to stick to this intention, this approach may 
provide the optimal balance of respecting the autonomy rights of the woman and those of 
her possible future child.28 The same approach is used in the context of prenatal diagnosis 
for Huntington’s disease.45 Empirical studies are needed to see whether this would also be 
feasible in the different context of prenatal screening.
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6.3.3	 Equity	of	access
What about the justice of offering genome-wide prenatal tests only to women with a 
positive risk assessment for common trisomies? Other pregnant women may rightly 
complain that they have the same a priori risk for all other outcomes of such tests. This issue 
already arises with karyotyping as a diagnostic follow-up, but it becomes more prominent 
with genome-wide molecular testing, in which more abnormalities may be found and the 
detection/miscarriage ratio will be more favourable. This problem of formal justice can be 
theoretically eliminated in two ways. One is to only offer RAD as a follow-up test. The other 
is to offer invasive testing to all pregnant women, as is the case in the United States.10 The 
former solution amounts to a form of ‘levelling down justice’: denying possible benefits 
to some because others cannot have them. Problems of capacity aside, the latter solution 
(access for all) seems to be most in line with the general aim of offering opportunities for 
autonomous reproductive choice.18,46 Although concerns about exposing women to the risk 
of miscarriage without good reason are certainly relevant for counselling, denying access to 
invasive procedures on these grounds is paternalistic. This seems difficult to justify, given 
that the relevant tests may reveal serious fetal abnormalities. Of course, it does not follow 
that testing for whatever conditions women find important should be covered by public 
or collective funding. This is an issue of distributive justice and proportionality that we will 
briefly comment upon in the next section.
6.3.4	 Overall	proportionality
A crucial element in the moral evaluation of screening programmes is their proportionality, 
meaning that the moral importance of what the programme will achieve must outweigh 
any disadvantages. On the level of the benefits and burdens for individual women and their 
partners, the developments outlined above raise the question of how the tendency towards 
broader screening will affect this balance. To answer this question, data are needed about 
the psychosocial aspects and decision-making dynamics of wide-scope prenatal testing, 
including the possible implications for family members. As follows from our discussion of 
the expected introduction of NIPD-based prenatal screening, proportionality may also be 
challenged when new and better tests do not replace what was offered before but instead 
lead to additional testing. Moreover, the consequences of new developments for different 
social groups and society at large should also be taken into account. Testing for only some 
abnormalities (as is the case in using RAD) may reinforce the criticism that prenatal screening 
contains the message that certain groups of people are not welcome in society.9 However, 
this argument loses much of its sting with the further broadening of the scope of prenatal 
testing.47 If prenatal screening is used for a broad range of conditions, no groups need to find 
themselves specifically targeted.
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On a societal level, the proportionality of prenatal screening is also a matter of cost-
effectiveness.48 With ever-broader testing, this becomes more complicated than when 
prenatal screening was still directed at a few serious abnormalities, such as Down’s 
syndrome - the costs of which for society are high, and the detection of which leads to, in 
most cases, a termination of pregnancy. It seems reasonable that public funding must cover 
prenatal testing for disorders that have a considerable impact on the lives of children and 
families but not necessarily more than that. Inevitably, this will refuel the debate about 
which conditions are serious enough to warrant prenatal testing, although it will do so from 
the different perspective of access and funding. Indeed, this may well lead to a shift towards 
giving more emphasis to considerations that are relevant from a public health perspective.
6.4 Concluding remarks
We have discussed four developments that challenge the current normative framework for 
prenatal screening. Our conclusion regarding RAD is that offering women the choice between 
conventional karyotyping and narrower testing is most in line with the aim of prenatal 
screening. With regard to ultrasound screening and genome-wide diagnostic testing (based 
on current invasive procedures or in the context of NIPD), we think there is a clear need to 
explore the feasibility of alternative models of informed consent. As it seems inevitable that 
filters will have to be used, debate is needed about how these should be defined. Genome-
wide prenatal testing will have the effect of blurring the distinction between prenatal testing 
and predictive testing of minors. Until now, these were different worlds with their own 
normative frameworks, focusing, respectively, on reproductive choice for pregnant women 
and on the interests (including future autonomy rights) of the child. We have argued that, 
in the light of these interests, the right of the pregnant woman to obtain information about 
the genetic make-up of her future child is not unlimited, nor unconditional. Finally, the clear 
tendency towards ever-broader testing in the context of prenatal screening raises morally 
relevant questions about access, funding and proportionality. As this article has shown, the 
choices are as much about ethics as they are about technology.
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Abstract
The increasing number of prenatal diagnostic tests in prenatal screening strategies, raises 
the question what tests to offer and why. This qualitative study investigated the views and 
preferences of professionals and potential users regarding four diagnostic test options 
for women at increased risk for common aneuploidies. Seven focus group sessions were 
conducted in The Netherlands between October 2009 and June 2010, with various categories 
of participants (n=55): professionals engaged in prenatal testing and potential users of this 
testing (meaning pregnant women and parents of young children). Participants were invited 
to mention all pros and cons and their preferences regarding four hypothetical diagnostic test 
options, presented on vignettes: a standard offer of rapid aneuploidy detection, karyotyping 
or array comparative genomic hybridization, representing a narrow, traditional and broad 
test, respectively, and the option of individualised choice. Then, a semi-structured group 
interview was conducted. The data were analysed by the constant comparative method. 
Participants identified similar test-specific pros and cons but showed different preferences. 
Users’ opinion on what test to offer as a general policy differed from what they would 
choose themselves. All participants agreed that in theory, users should be enabled to make 
an informed choice about what test to apply, but they disagreed about the feasibility of 
this ideal. Standard narrow testing was favoured for its limiting effects on emotional and 
organisational burdens; individualised choice was preferred for assuring women’s decisive 
influence. The varying opinions reflect different views on what autonomy in the prenatal 
screening context means, suggest that a single standard test offer is inadequate and that 
differentiation will be needed. 
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7.1 Introduction
Current prenatal screening cascades include a first-trimester risk assessment for common 
trisomies and mid-trimester foetal anomaly scans. Invasive diagnostic testing is offered 
to women at an increased risk of chromosomal or genetic abnormalities.1,2 Conventional 
karyotyping, that can reliably diagnose numeric chromosome aberrations and (major) 
structural abnormalities, has long been the standard diagnostic test. But alternative 
techniques, that allow testing for either a more limited or broader scope, are increasingly 
being introduced instead. Techniques for rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) target only 
trisomies 13, 18 and 21 and mostly sex chromosomal abnormalities.3 Other techniques, 
such as microarray-based comparative genomic hybridisation (array CGH), are used to 
detect a broader range of heterogeneous abnormalities.4,5 Whereas some favour targeted 
arrays to detect selected abnormalities and avoid unclear or troublesome test results6-8, 
others prefer genome-wide, non-targeted arrays to maximally identify all kinds of clinically 
relevant aberrations.9,10 The implementation of these different techniques has led to debate 
about what diagnostic test should be offered to pregnant women and why.11,12 There is no 
consensus among professionals about what specific test to offer in the prenatal testing 
cascade and pregnant women themselves have different preferences regarding the scope 
of testing as well.13-15
Empirical studies on the preferences of professionals and ‘users’ (pregnant women, 
prospective parents and consumers) regarding the scope of prenatal testing have mainly 
focused on determining the differences with regard to choice outcomes amongst and 
between these two categories of respondents and on identifying the correlation between 
preferences on the one hand and characteristics of the tests and/or of the respondents 
on the other hand. Studies included a limited number of tests only. Boormans et al. and 
Grimshaw et al. introduced three test options: a test targeted on Down’s syndrome only, 
RAD and karyotyping. 16,17 These studies showed that testing for Down’s syndrome only was 
hardly chosen, that professionals mostly wanted to offer RAD, and that opinions differed 
among pregnant women and between professionals and women. ‘Individualised choice’ 
was suggested as a solution for these differences.16 Pieters et al. studied pregnant women’s 
attitudes towards ‘microarray-based genomic profiling technologies’, which they referred 
to as ‘prenatal full-scale testing for genetic disorders’.18 They found that this kind of test 
was not readily accepted, but that women with a low educational level were more likely to 
be interested in full-scale testing. More research into the factors that influence pregnant 
women’s decisions was thought to be needed. When studying consumers’ opinions 
toward reproductive testing, Hathaway et al. found a wish to have prenatal testing for 
more conditions than generally offered.19 These further conditions included for example 
mental retardation, deafness and cancer. The studies mentioned give a good overview of 
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what test would be preferred by whom. We however wanted to know on the basis of what 
considerations professionals and users come to a certain choice. Therefore, we aimed to 
explore the spectrum of underlying views that play a part in the evaluation of prenatal tests 
and influence decision making. Given the current broad range of available techniques, we 
studied these views with regard to four prenatal test options: three diagnostic tests that are 
actually offered in current prenatal testing cascades: conventional karyotyping, a narrow 
test (RAD), and a broad test for heterogenous abnormalities (array CGH). Offering women 
an ‘individualised choice’13 between these three tests was introduced as a fourth option. 
Although in current north-west European practice this option is limited to a choice between 
RAD and karyotyping3,13,14, we included array CGH into this alternative as well, because this 
test is increasingly applied. To explore the underlying views of professionals and potential 
users, we aimed to address three main questions: (1) how do Dutch professionals and 
potential users (meaning pregnant women and parents) evaluate the pros and cons of the 
four different test options; (2) what test options do they think should be offered to women 
in general and for what reasons; and (3) what test options do users prefer for themselves 
and why?
7.2 Materials and methods
7.2.1	 Data	collection
This study was undertaken in The Netherlands, between October 2009 and June 2010. Focus 
groups were conducted with potential users of prenatal testing and professionals who are 
involved in prenatal testing. We preferred a group-based approach over individual interviews, 
because groups are an effective source for eliciting views, for stimulating people to share 
and debate these, and for generating new ideas.20 We composed homogenous groups, to 
effect that participants could speak freely among their peers and to reduce the risk that 
some participants would dominate the discussion based on their professional background 
or experience, or that others would feel uncomfortable or inhibited to contribute.20,21
Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of each session. Users were offered a 
monetary incentive; all participants were offered a reimbursement for travel expenses. This 
study was cleared for approval by the Medical Ethics Committee of the Maastricht University 
Medical Centre+, azM, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
The focus groups were moderated by WD, ADJ or GDW and co-moderated by ADJ or JB. The 
group sessions all lasted 2 h. All focus groups started with a brief plenary introduction of the 
aim of the study and of the session, namely to explore all views of participants and explicitly 
not to reach consensus. Then vignettes containing four test options were distributed 
(Box 7.1). The four options involved three standard test offers: (A) conventional karyotyping, 
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(B) RAD and (C) a non-targeted array CGH. The fourth option (D) entailed asking pregnant 
women to choose themselves between (A), (B) and (C). We used vignettes to make sure 
that all participants had the same picture and a basic understanding of the four options. 
We described these test options in general terms and did not distinguish between different 
types of RAD or variants of array CGH. Instead, we focused on the common factors to avoid 
that participants, and especially professionals who actually offer these tests, would start 
to discuss the facts and details of different test techniques. The users and midwives had 
also been e-mailed this vignette the week before the group session, to make them already 
familiar with the subject to be discussed.
We sketched the scenario that women at increased risk for trisomies 13, 18 and 21 were 
offered a diagnostic test performed on material obtained by an invasive procedure (either 
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling). We chose this scenario because it resembles 
current practice that participants were likely to be familiar with, in order to avoid that it would 
be experienced as too hypothetical. After briefly explaining the content of the vignettes 
Box 7.1 | Vignette with four test options
Option A - current 
Pregnant women are offered a standard test: karyotyping
This test can identify all chromosomal abnormalities, including Down syndrome. 
Some of these abnormalities have severe and others have mild clinical consequences 
Generally, clear information can be provided about abnormalities found  
Sometimes, the clinical consequences of abnormalities are unknown
Test results: 2 - 3 weeks  
Option B - narrow 
Pregnant women are offered a standard test: RAD 
This test can identify a few most severe chromosomal abnormalities, including Down syndrome.   
Clear information can always be provided about abnormalities found  
Test results: 2 - 3 days 
Option C - broad
Pregnant women are offered a standard test: array-CGH 
This test can identify all chromosomal abnormalities, including Down syndrome 
This test can also indentify other kinds of abnormalities, such as the hereditary disease cystic 
fybrosis  
Often, clear information can be provided about abnormalities found  
Sometimes, the clinical consequences of abnormalities are unknown
Test results: 2 - 3 weeks 
Option D - choice
Pregnant women are offered all three tests: A, B and C  
They may choose themselves which test they prefer 
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and answering informative questions, participants were asked to write down individually 
all pros and cons of the four test options and to give their opinion on what option should 
be offered to pregnant women. Users had to indicate as well what they would choose for 
themselves. Subsequently, they were asked to mention and explain the arguments and 
preferences they had written down. By following this procedure we wanted to ensure that 
all participants’ initial thoughts were mentioned, and to prevent that the discussion would 
too soon strike out on a certain course. All arguments and preferences were listed on a 
flip-chart, to guarantee that they were all covered and rightly understood. To explore the 
considerations more in depth, a semi-structured group interview was conducted, guided by 
both a predetermined topic guide and the flip-chart notes. This qualitative design enabled 
to bring forward the individual views and to profit from the dynamics of a group discussion. 
All group sessions were digitally recorded and transcribed.
7.2.2	 Sampling	and	recruitment
As potential users we included pregnant women and parents (both male and female) of 
young children (0-3 years). The assumption was that these persons had been offered testing 
and would possibly have to deliberate about testing in a next pregnancy. We included fathers 
in the latter group, because of their partaking in the reproductive decision-making.22,23 We 
included three categories of professionals, whose professional involvement in prenatal 
diagnostic testing differs: midwives have mainly initial involvement in counselling and 
reference to specialist care; gynaecologists from regional and urban hospitals are involved in 
the standard-test procedures; experts from academic centres actually perform specialised 
(follow-up) testing on a daily basis. By selecting these categories of participants, representing 
different perspectives, we aimed to collect a broad range of relevant views from persons 
directly concerned with prenatal testing.21
The users were recruited in the south-west of The Netherlands by advertisements in local 
newspapers and by distributing an information leaflet to pregnant women who visited the 
obstetric outpatient clinic at Leiden University Medical Centre. We recruited the midwives 
and academic experts from across the country by sending a digital general invitation trough 
their national professional societies. To reach relevant gynaecologists across the country, we 
asked the academic experts for possible referrals.
7.2.3	 The	sample
Seven focus groups were conducted that included 55 participants. Of these, 25 potential 
users were divided over four group sessions: two groups with in all 15 pregnant women 
(user pregnant = UP) and two groups with in all ten parentsof young children (user male 
and female = UM and UF, respectively). We included 30 professionals who were divided 
per profession over three group sessions: one group with nine midwives (professional 
The scope of prenatal diagnosis for women at increased risk for aneuploidies: views and preferences of professionals and potential users
107
Chapter 
7
midwife = PM), one group with ten gynaecologists from regional and municipal hospitals 
(professional gynaecologist = PG), and one group with 11 experts from academic medical 
centres (professional academic = PA). The latter consisted of gynaecologists (n=4), clinical 
geneticists (n=3), cytogeneticists (n=2) and clinical cytogeneticists (n=2). Because in the 
course of the group sessions no new information was obtained and redundancy occurred, 
data saturation was achieved24 and no further participants were included.
7.2.4	 Analysis
Analysis was conducted on the content of participants’ notes, the flip-charts and the 
transcripts to identify major themes and sub-themes. The coding process started on the 
content of the notes and flip-charts, and followed the constant comparative method.25 To 
reduce the chance of bias and ensure consistency, two members of the research team (ADJ 
and WD) independently coded the content systematically and iteratively, with guidance 
from an experienced qualitative researcher (AK). In this first phase of the analysis, we 
did a descriptive coding to label the various topics in the text. These open codes differed 
minimally and were adjusted slightly. The resulting scheme was used for subsequently 
analysing the text content of the transcripts, using the NVivo8® software program. Here, the 
same method was applied: ADJ coded the full content and WD checked for consistency by 
coding and comparing segments across the transcripts. In the second phase, we grouped the 
topics into sub-themes and found the same patterns in all three sources of data by means 
of an inductive reasoning method. The text belonging to these sub-themes were found to 
differ with regard to the ‘level’ of discussion: the test features as such were mentioned and 
classified, but the concepts of informed choice and autonomy elicited a more reflective 
discussion. This led to the distinction between the themes of ‘evaluation of test features’ 
and ‘informed choice’ as presented in the ‘Results’ and ‘Discussion’. Participants’ and 
users’ preferences were approached as separate subjects, in order to give insight in how 
users differentiate between themselves and ‘the public’. All researchers contributed to the 
discussion in the analysis process with regard to the formulation of the major conclusions. 
Thus, investigator triangulation was achieved.
7.3 Results
7.3.1	 Themes	and	preferences
Two major themes emerged in the focus groups. Participants first focused on features of the 
test options, such as test outcomes, wait for results and costs and classified these as pros 
and cons. Secondly, a more reflective discussion started about the meaning of informed 
choice and autonomy in the prenatal screening context. The results caused us to distinguish 
between two groups of professionals, namely midwives and physicians (gynaecologists 
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and experts from academic medical centres); we will refer to them accordingly. Pregnant 
women and parents together are called users. We talk about participants if we mean both 
professionals and users. The most important sub-themes are elaborated in the sections 
below and are often illustrated by representative quotes. Sometimes, citations are slightly 
adjusted for reasons of readability. Whenever an aspect relates to a specific test option, the 
denominator (A, B, C or D) is added between brackets. Participants’ choices and reasons 
to choose a particular test option and users’ preferences for themselves are presented 
subsequently.
7.3.2	 Evaluation	of	test	features
Test	outcomes
Considerations regarding the amount and type of abnormalities possibly generated by the 
tests were mentioned by all participants. In general, more extensive information about the 
foetus was favoured. Users tended to associate broad testing (C) with certainty and narrow 
testing (B) with ‘fake certainty’. UP13: ‘(…) test C (…) is the most comprehensive test, with 
complete clarity, because you know everything possible. (…) The disadvantage of B is that 
you don’t have complete clarity and you can be falsely reassured as there may be other 
abnormalities’. Although professionals thought that more information could also ‘falsely 
reassure’ women, they stressed that a broad test could identify relevant abnormalities 
that would otherwise be missed. Yet, all realised that the profit of possibly generating 
more abnormalities would come at the price of an increase in (unclear) findings that 
would complicate counselling and decision making and aggravate the dilemma whether to 
terminate the pregnancy or not. A pregnant woman (UP2) commented: ‘One has to take 
in a large amount of information and the spectrum of findings will become very large, so it 
will be really difficult to make a choice’. And a professional (PG2) stated: ‘Some of the test 
results, such as deletions and translocations, are complicated and we hardly know what 
to do with them (…). It is not always clear what it all means to the foetus and this makes 
it difficult for the layman. And for us as well’. Some professionals mentioned that C could 
also generate unexpected findings about the parents and predispositions, which would be 
problematic if couples had not been adequately counselled beforehand. PA10: ‘In addition 
to what has been said about C: an array does not only generate information about the 
foetus or causal mutations. It can indirectly also generate genetic information about the 
parents and about risk factors, such as a BRCA mutation (…).’
Participants agreed that a narrow test (B) would avoid these problems while still identifying 
some severe abnormalities. Still, testing for all kinds of serious disorders (C) was found 
important. Users were particularly interested in hereditary diseases and limitation to some 
specific abnormalities (A and B) was debated. UP2: ‘(…) it started with Down’s syndrome, 
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because one could easily test this, when naturally there are other disorders that are even 
more serious. This is positive with C, that you can also find those other abnormalities and 
take them into account.’ However, all recognised that differentiation between serious, mild 
and marginal abnormalities was difficult. Because of that, some participants feared that 
broader testing (C) would lead to the pursuit of a genetically perfect child and that abortion 
would increasingly be performed for minor abnormalities. UP5: ‘Where does it stop? I think 
that the danger is that if there are possibilities to know more, that people increasingly will 
want to know more, and then it becomes the norm, a slippery slope. This frightens me.’
Finally, some found that less information would make the miscarriage risk of invasive testing 
disproportionate. PG3: ‘It is dangerous to do an amniocentesis. So the moment that choices 
about the scope have to be made, my approach would be do it to the best of the possibilities 
available.’
These considerations about broad and narrow testing show that participants struggled to 
find the balance between their wish to test for all kinds of severe abnormalities and the 
drawbacks of too much findings.
Wait	for	results,	costs	and	familiarity
Tests differ with regard to throughput time. Participants favoured quick test results (B) for 
three reasons. First, the period of stress and anxiety while waiting for test results would 
be minimised. PG5: ‘I think that speed will reduce fear. There is a big difference between 
waiting for results for 3 weeks or 3 days.’ Second, if test results were generated earlier 
in pregnancy, this would leave more time for the decision to terminate or continue the 
pregnancy. UP1: ‘One might have more time to make that decision in peace and quiet. And 
surely with the second test (amniocentesis, ADJ) you have to decide rather quickly whether 
you want an abortion or not. This decision that you have to make within 2 to 3 weeks will be 
decisive for your life.’ Third, earlier results would enable a possible earlier abortion, which 
was thought to be emotionally less traumatic. PM8: ‘The pregnancy progresses too. So if 
women choose an abortion, then they of course rather have the termination of pregnancy 
at 16 weeks than at 18 weeks. Or at 9.’
The financial costs of the tests were approached from different perspectives. Most 
professionals asserted that costs, including time and personnel needed for counselling and 
logistics, would be high for C and D, and they considered this problematic from a public 
policy point of view. This problem was recognised by some users but ‘solved’ differently. 
They proposed public funding for a minimum set of tests (A and B) and (income related) 
out-of-pocket payment in case of more expensive testing (C and D) to ensure availability of 
all options. Other users, taking the individual user’s perspective, found it unseemly to talk 
about financial costs of prenatal testing, because it would complicate the already precarious 
situation of prospective parents who were offered testing.
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Finally, nearly all users appeared to only be superficially familiar with the organisation 
of current testing cascades and unaware of the fact that women are generally offered 
conventional karyotyping (A). This led to a striking contrast between professionals and 
users in how they evaluated A. While the longstanding experience with and reliability of A 
was considered a great asset by professionals, users thought that this test did not have any 
advantage at all. UM2: ‘A is neither here nor there. So if you have A, B, or C, than I would go 
for B or C. I think A is a compromise and combines the disadvantages only.’
The discussion about these aspects shows that only a short waiting time is unanimously 
favoured, but that participants differ in their evaluation of financial costs and testing 
experience.
7.3.3	 Informed	choice
Individualised	choice:	ideal	and	feasibility
In theory, all participants favoured an ‘individualised choice’ as presented in D. Terms 
mentioned were: promotion of autonomy, ideal informed choice, and control over own 
pregnancy. At the same time, they realised that the scenario presented in D would encounter 
practical drawbacks, because it would be difficult to adequately inform and counsel women 
and such a complex choice could overtax women and throw them off balance. UP10: ‘With 
regard to D, the choices can be overwhelming and then you are not competent to make a 
rational assessment. So where do parents base their choices on, then?’ Despite agreement 
on these both sides of D, participants reached opposite conclusions when discussing the 
feasibility of D in practice. Two groups could be discerned: (1) those who were sceptical 
about the feasibility of D, and (2) those in favour of D being dedicated to achieve it.
The first group, including most physicians and some users, considered it as good as impossible 
to provide women with adequate information and ensure adequate counselling. Especially 
physicians were sceptical about women’s capacity to make the choice presented in D. PG4: 
‘It’s a lot to ask of your patients. And the question is also if people are really waiting for all 
that information and all those choices. Mostly they’ll be at a loss.’ It was called a ‘spurious 
option’ (PG3), because it would provide women with a sense of control which would not 
correspond with the actual situation. PG7: ‘And D, hmm, how is a layman going to make this 
choice. (…) except the advantage that men and woman have a feeling of control concerning 
their lives, there is no other real advantage in giving them the possibility to choose.’ Users in 
this group stressed the emotional burden of choice and doubted whether women actually 
wanted to make it. UF4: ‘I can imagine that as a pregnant woman you might find it scary to 
make that decision, and that it would be a lot easier if one test was simply offered.’ Thus, the 
overall conclusion of this group was that D might provide for autonomous choice in theory 
but not in practice.
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Participants in the second group, consisting of most midwives and most users, found that 
women’s reproductive options should not be constrained by others. They considered 
the choice for a specific test to be an essential part of women’s autonomy and especially 
midwives felt uncomfortable with an intrusion upon it. PM6: ‘People have to make this 
choice themselves. Especially if various test alternatives are available, who do I think I 
am to withhold this information from them?’ This view was placed in the societal context 
of an increasing individual freedom and availability of choices in many fields of personal 
life, including health care, and was reinforced by the awareness that women very much 
differed in their views and preferences. UP7: ‘That you have a choice what type of test 
you would want, just gives you more freedom. Some want all available information even if 
the consequences are not clear, others do not. Personally, I would only want to know the 
information that is a hundred percent certain and if I can understand what it means. But 
that is me, I think that is different for each individual.’ Still, there were ambivalent feelings 
toward the choice scenario. 
Midwives sensed that professionals devolved their responsibility (to choose the right test) 
unto pregnant women. PM1: ‘You are putting the responsibility with the parents. But the 
feeling that you are passing the buck, makes me feel uncomfortable and reluctant.’ The 
users in this group expressed worries regarding the responsibility and emotional impact of 
such a choice. They feared making the wrong choice and subsequent regret, particularly if 
the test chosen would miss an abnormality that would make the child suffer after birth. UP3: 
‘The moment that you have decided against these tests… can you forgive yourself if your 
child is born with an abnormality and dies after three pain-filled and dreadful years. How 
well can you look at yourself in the mirror with the knowledge that you could have known. 
There is no going back, that is what I find difficult about these tests.’ The midwives and users 
in this group also thought that the complexity of such a choice could have the effect that 
women would (want to) rely more on professionals. Therefore, they emphasised that great 
effort should be put in informing and counselling women to enable them to make the choice 
offered in D. Since a standard approach would probably not meet women’s individual needs, 
it was thought essential to tailor both the test offer and the counselling to women’s different 
capacities and wishes. UF2: ‘Just give the woman what she needs. I think that a 16-year old 
pregnant girl will be frightened by all these options. But a 40-year old woman is going to 
think more realistically, yes, there are risks. Well, I’m going to dwell upon all these options.’
These considerations show that the difficulties and possible drawbacks of individualised 
choice are acknowledged, but that this group wants and expects to overcome these with 
adequate counselling in order to respect women’s autonomy.
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Choice:	consistency	and	fairness
Related to participants’ different views on individualised choice itself, they dissented on 
how the testing cascade should be evaluated. The scenario in our study was that diagnostic 
testing was offered to women whose risk-assessment showed an increased risk for trisomies 
13, 18 or 21. This led to discussion about the relation between the two successive tests. 
Those who were sceptical about C and D, took the risk-assessment as their point of departure 
and argued that the scope of subsequent diagnostic testing should be consistent with that 
(B). Possible additional findings of A and C were labelled as ‘excessive’ diagnostics by some 
physicians. PG2: ‘In my opinion, it is an advantage that the results are the same as what 
the patients have undergone the screening for; that was the reason to do this. The results 
of the diagnosis would be equivalent to what you are screened for and nothing else.’ Some 
users agreed that if the first test was for Down syndrome, one should not be troubled with 
avoidable other findings later on. Furthermore, it was thought ‘unfair’ if only women at 
increased could test for more abnormalities, while others, having the same risk for these 
surplus findings, had no access to this test.
The midwives and users who placed great importance on women’s own choice, exactly 
reasoned the other way around and argued that access should be attuned to the favoured 
scope of diagnostic testing. They criticised the current focus on the trisomies and thought it 
unfair that women who were not at risk for these particular abnormalities had no access to 
broader testing. UP6: ‘I don’t think this is logical. I am forced to be tested for chromosome 
abnormalities for which you need to be at high risk and only after that am I allowed to test 
for hereditary disorders, whereas I might only want the foetus to be tested for hereditary 
abnormalities.’ Therefore, they proposed to adjust the policy of admittance in order to 
enable access to broader testing for those women who wanted it.
7.3.4	 Views	and	preferences
When asked what specific test options should be offered to pregnant women and why 
(research question 2), a majority of participants tended to choose between two extremes: 
either D or B (See: Table 7.1). Most users and midwives chose D, because it allowed women 
(and their partners) to make their own choice on what test would best suit their personal 
situation. Most physicians and the other users chose B for various reasons. Feasibility 
in terms of women’s competence, counselling and costs, and consistency with women’s 
indication (increased risk for trisomies) were mentioned most by the physicians. The 
emotional impact was decisive for users: B would only produce information about severe 
and clear abnormalities and therefore avoid difficult decision making and emotional burden. 
Only a few participants chose options in between: long-standing familiarity with A caused 
some professionals to chose this test, whereas C was seen as the best alternative between 
D (too complex) and A and B (too restricted). 
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Table 7.1 | Test option that should be offered to women according to participants 
Participant 
                  Preference A B C D No
Pregnant women (n=15) 4 11
Parents (n=10) 4 1 5
Midwives (n=9) 1 1 6 1
Academics (n=11) 2 8 1
Gynaecologists (n=10) 9 1
The picture changed when users indicated what test option they would prefer for themselves 
(research question 3) (See: Table 7.2). Their preferences were spread over four options: B, 
C, D or no testing at all. Reasons for B and D were the wish to limit the emotional burden 
of unclear findings and decision making, and to have the opportunity to make one’s own 
choice, respectively. In this respect, there was no difference with the reasons mentioned 
for their ‘general’ preference. But some users who preferred D in general, did not want 
to bear the responsibility in this option themselves. The accumulation of decision-making 
moments throughout the pregnancy was experienced as an additional burden. UP8: ‘The 
largest disadvantage for me would be that there has been an offer of choice in asking if the 
mother to be is willing to take part in the risk-assessment and in the high risk amniocentesis. 
And to make a further choice once more then between 3 different tests would be really 
difficult for me. So, one option would be enough for me.’ Therefore, they chose the test that 
was most comprehensive (C) but still not too burdensome. 
Table 7.2 | Test option that users prefer for themselves 
Participant 
                  Preference A B C D No
Pregnant women (n=15)  4 5 6  
Parents (n=10)  3 1 1 5
Finally, part of the users indicated that they would choose no testing at all, either because 
they were opposed to abortion or would not want to risk losing the pregnancy because of 
iatrogenic miscarriage, whatever the possible benefit of testing.
7.4 Discussion
This qualitative study on professionals’ and users’ views and preferences regarding four 
prenatal test options showed two levels of deliberation: classification of test features and 
reflection on the concepts of informed choice and autonomy. The latter seemed to have the 
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largest influence on participants’ preferences. Furthermore, personal bearing capacity led 
some users to give a different answer with regard to what they would choose for themselves 
and to what choices should be offered to pregnant women in general.
7.4.1	 Features	of	testing:	pros	and	cons
Initial observations regarded the features of tests, including test outcomes, wait for results 
and financial costs. Since other studies have shown the relevance of these ‘test attributes’13 
in the evaluation of prenatal diagnostic tests16-18, we expected these issues to arise in our 
focus groups as well. Users and professionals identified similar test-specific aspects, but 
their evaluation did not coincide in all respects. The same inventory of aspects however 
suggests that users in our study realised both the beneficial and adverse aspects of various 
tests - despite existing doubts whether they have adequate understanding of the drawbacks 
of particularly broad testing.18 Although users understood that, compared with karyotyping 
(A) and RAD (B), more and different abnormalities could be identified by broad testing (C), it 
was not clear whether they realised that the incidence of these other findings is considerably 
lower. Remarkably, this lower incidence was not a major issue for the professionals either 
when evaluating the various test options. However, pre-test information should include 
a distinction between common findings and possible but rare findings26 and may differ in 
both quantity and detail. But the question remains how to provide complex information 
in the actual counselling situation without confronting users with either a deficit or an 
overload of information. In either case users would not be adequately equipped to make an 
informed choice to either participate or not engage in testing. Moreover, user’s individual 
comprehension and the time-pressure in the prenatal context should be taken into account. 
Although we observed that users and professionals identified the same set of test-specific 
features, these appeared not to be decisive for choosing a specific test option.
7.4.2	 Reproductive	autonomy:	limiting	burdens	or	maximising	options
Although all participants agreed that reproductive autonomy was in theory best served by 
leaving the decision for a specific test to pregnant women themselves, the feasibility of such 
an informed choice in practice was evaluated differently.
The view that an informed choice as intended in option D and needed in option C is too 
complicated and that optimal decision making and limitation of burdens should prevail 
over maximising information, may be seen as paternalistic.27,28 However, adherents of a 
narrow test seemed to assume that limiting choices better accords with the aim of prenatal 
screening to enable autonomous reproductive choice, given the requirements of, amongst 
other things, adequate counselling, informed consent and proportionality (benefits for 
participants outweigh the burdens).29 This view also leaves room for what we have earlier 
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called the ‘logic of the screening strategy’ argument30, holding that the limited scope of the 
preceding risk-assessment justifies and requires offering a corresponding diagnostic test to 
ensure consistency throughout the testing phases. In this view, a broader test is not rejected 
per se but may be offered for specific indications. Indeed, broader testing (C) has already 
been introduced and was favoured by professionals in our study in case of foetal ultrasound 
abnormalities.5,10 Although it seems only logical that problems regarding comprehension 
and counselling will also arise in this situation -albeit on a smaller scale- these were hardly 
discussed for this context. In this regard, the justification for limiting the scope of testing and 
reproductive options was contextualised: physicians tended to reason from an organisational 
point of view, taking the existing screening system as their point of departure.
Participants preferring D reasoned primarily from a users’ perspective. They asserted that 
reproductive autonomy required enabling an individualised choice: allowing pregnant 
women themselves to determine whether they would benefit more from a comprehensive 
or a limited test. In this view, the scope of and access to diagnostic testing should not 
be limited by others but valuable options should be available to all. Still, the possible 
disadvantages of such a choice was acknowledged. Users’ fear for making a wrong decision 
and regret afterwards -the so-called anticipated decision regret31- and midwives’ concern 
about professionals’ failure to take their responsibility reflect the anticipation of a so-called 
decisional conflict. Such a conflict may arise when people are faced with an inherent difficult 
choice and other complicating factors32 such as -in this case- lack of knowledge and time 
pressure. To obviate these drawbacks, extensive counselling was thought to be crucial.
Although counselling models as such were not discussed, it was obvious that participants 
thought that a situation in which professionals only provide ‘objective’ information and 
subsequently leave the decision making to the testee alone, would have serious shortcomings. 
This so-called information model33 has formerly been criticised for being too simplistic and 
inaccurate, for the misconception that a strict distinction between facts and values can be 
achieved, and for ignoring professionals’ duty to help patients handle information in order 
to reach an autonomous choice.33-35 Precisely this latter aspect of responsibility to support 
is well addressed in the ‘interpretive model’, in which the professional not only provides the 
patient with adequate information but also acts as a counsellor who engages in patient’s 
autonomous decision making. The interaction between professional and patient thus aims 
to ‘elucidate the patient’s values and what he or she actually wants and help the patient 
select the available medical interventions that realise these values’33. Because the agenda 
of the user is directive in this process, the interpretive model may also meet the ambivalent 
feelings that users expressed with regard to extensive counselling: that women presumably 
want to be supported by professional guidance when facing a difficult choice, that such 
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support can make women depend on and be influenced by professionals, which may both 
contrast with autonomous choice. If the counselee herself determines the direction and 
content of counselling, these possible drawbacks can be countered. This would also enable 
to meet the different interpretations that women may have of informed choice and the 
specific support they expect from the professional.36 Nevertheless, in view of the doubts 
expressed about the feasibility and desirability of more extensive counselling, there is a 
need for further ethical reflection and empirical research on what counselling model would 
be appropriate in prenatal testing scenarios to ensure that women are really enabled to 
make an autonomous reproductive choice.
7.4.3	 Users’	preferences:	general	policy	versus	private	choice
A majority of the users expressed similar considerations and preferences for themselves as 
for women in general. However, a large minority mentioned new arguments and different 
preferences when deliberating about what option they would choose for themselves as 
opposed to what should be offered to women in general.
First, some declined all forms of testing because either abortion as such or the procedure-
induced miscarriage risk was unacceptable to them. Importantly, these users emphasised 
that they did not want to impose their personal choice on others: every woman should 
make up her own mind what option best suited her personal situation and whether she 
would terminate a pregnancy or run the risk of losing a healthy foetus. Therefore, they still 
approved of the general offer of testing. As for their personal preferences, a correlation 
between declining prenatal testing and abortion is consistent with other studies.37,38 The 
iatrogenic miscarriage risk is also a known reason for rejecting prenatal testing.39 It is likely 
but as yet unclear whether the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing40 means that 
these particular users will accept testing if the miscarriage risk is absent or at least the 
number of unnecessary invasive procedures will be reduced.41 If so, the question remains 
if they would test for either a narrow or broad range of conditions, as soon as the latter 
becomes possible.42,43
Second, half of the users who appreciated D in general chose C for themselves. This alternative 
of a standard broad test enables maximising information, albeit at the cost of possible difficult 
test-outcomes and decision making, but avoids the burden and responsibility to choose the 
‘right test’. This dilemma between wanting a choice and experiencing ambivalence about 
subsequent decision making in the prenatal setting has been described before44 and reflects 
awareness of the chance of a decisional conflict. These considerations reinforce the need for 
giving adequate support to individual women in their decision-making process.
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7.4.4	 Concluding	remarks
The controversy shown by the views and preferences in our study reflects one of the central 
ethical questions in current prenatal screening, namely how reproductive autonomy in this 
context has to be interpreted. Does it mean that the amount of reproductive options for 
women should be maximised and individualised choice be offered to all? Or should the 
burdens be limited, the decision-making process be optimised and a standard narrow test be 
offered in order to ensure a real autonomous choice? Our results confirm the finding in other 
studies that the question what test option best complies with the aim of prenatal screening 
is answered differently by both professionals and users, and suggests that a ‘one-size fits-all’ 
approach fails to take into account the different views and preferences of pregnant women 
and their partners.45 Since both a broad and a small standard test offer may interfere with 
women’s autonomy, differentiation may be needed. The ethical and practical conditions for 
such a differentiated test offer are still to be defined. Whatever the test offer may include, 
our findings suggest that not only adequate information and non-directivity are crucial in 
counselling, but that there is also a need for reflection on counselees’ values and for support 
to realise these. The interpretive model may be helpful in this regard.
7.4.5	 Limitations
This study has several limitations. First, the sample size was limited and our sampling method 
cannot rule out that participants might have been biased and may not be representative of 
the Dutch professionals and users. This means that findings cannot be generalised without 
caution. Second, in this study participants reflected on a hypothetical situation and persons’ 
hypothetical responses may not match actual behaviour. These limitations did however 
not hamper the aim of this study to explore views and preferences of potential users and 
professionals. The general criticism of qualitative research, that it is too subjective and that 
researchers’ beliefs contribute too much to the findings46,47, we refute as follows: the data 
collected were rich in content as all participants could among their peers express their views 
and give comprehensive explanations, and the analysis was conducted independently by 
various researchers. The strength of this study is that various categories of participants, 
who can be considered stakeholders of prenatal testing policies, were enrolled and that they 
provided a broad range of considerations that can inform further reflection on the scope of 
prenatal screening.
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Abstract
The advent of new genetic and genomic technologies may cause friction with the principle of 
respect for autonomy and demands a rethinking of traditional interpretations of the concept 
of informed consent. Technologies such as whole-genome sequencing and microarray 
based analysis enable genome-wide testing for many and heterogeneous abnormalities and 
predispositions simultaneously. This may challenge the feasibility of providing adequate 
pre-test information and achieving autonomous decision-making. These challenges are 
presented for three different areas in which these so-called ‘new genetics’ technologies are 
increasingly being applied: newborn screening, prenatal screening strategies and commercial 
personal genome testing. In this paper, the discussion will build upon the existing ethical 
framework for a responsible set-up of testing and screening offers and some of its criteria 
will be reinterpreted in the light of the new genetics. It will be argued that the scope of a 
responsible testing or screening offer should align with the purpose(s) of testing and with the 
principle of respect for autonomy for all stakeholders involved, including (future) children. 
Informed consent is a prerequisite but requires a new approach. Preliminary and general 
directions will be presented for an individualised or differentiated set-up of the testing offer 
and for the informed consent process. The discussion in this paper may contribute to the 
formation of new ideas on how to tackle the issues of autonomy and informed consent for 
(public) healthcare and direct-to-consumer applications of the new genetics.
The new genetics and informed consent: differentiating choice to preserve autonomy 
123
Chapter 
8
8.1 Introduction 
Since the completion of the Human Genome Project in the early 2000s, worldwide research 
in human genetics has included the study of both specific genes (genetics) and genomes 
in their entirety (genomics), and has led to the development of increasingly rapid, simple 
and financially attractive technologies for the mapping and the scrutinising of (parts of) 
the human genome, which are called the ‘new genetics’. The most frequently used and 
promising techniques are micro-array based analysis and whole-genome/whole-exome 
sequencing (referred to as WGS and WES, respectively) (See: Box: 8.1). In the practice of 
(public) healthcare, these new technologies are increasingly replacing traditional test 
procedures. WGS is expected to be broadly implemented within the next couple of years.1 
In prenatal screening, conventional karyotyping (See: Box 8.1) is being replaced by genome-
wide array-based techniques2, and the dropping costs of the new genetics may also bring 
about their application in newborn screening programmes.3,4 Some commentators even 
claim that in the near future every individual child will be ‘profiled’, leading to enhanced 
options for treatment and prevention later in life.5 Moreover, the new genetics has found 
its way to the public outside of healthcare systems, through direct-to-consumer (DTC) 
marketing, often without the involvement of healthcare professionals.6 
The new genetics significantly increase the chance of identifying relevant disorders, but 
also of revealing ‘incidental’ and possibly unwanted findings. In fact, whole-genome tests 
routinely reveal such findings, not only about the testee but possibly about his or her close 
relatives as well. Generating all this information may be welcomed insofar testees are able 
to understand it and willing to use it for preventive strategies or reproductive decision-
making. However, this information will not merely be beneficial, but may cause harm as 
well. If testees become confused and anxious due to test outcomes, or if they are wrongly 
reassured by false-negative test results, this may adversely impact their health. Therefore, 
decisions regarding what information (not) to generate through a genome-wide test and 
(not) to report back to testees should be made carefully and take into account both the 
possible benefits and burdens of receiving such information.
Genome-wide tests do not necessarily yield so much information. The analysis of the data 
set generated by microarray or whole-genome sequencing technologies can be very broad 
in scope, but it can just as well be restricted to one single disease or to a few abnormalities 
only. In the public health and clinical context, there are established medical and ethical 
criteria for determining the scope of a responsible testing or screening offer.7 Basically, a 
test should be “meaningful: the condition screened for must be serious, the test highly 
predictive, and follow-up actions must be available in terms of healthcare interventions.”8 
Also, testing should be preceded by informed consent.
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Box 8.1 | Explanation of testing techniques
• Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) refers to technologies for sequencing the whole genome: 
the ordering of all nucleotide bases that constitute an individual’s ‘genetic blueprint’. This process 
generates a data set of roughly three billion base pairs. 
• Whole-exome sequencing (WES) focuses 'merely' on the exome, being 1% of the DNA coding for 
the construction of proteins. Both WGS and WES require further analysis to enable the deduction 
of meaningful information. This analysis can be conducted on the whole genome (WGA) or whole 
exome (WEA), or instead focus on specific areas in the sequence only (targeted analysis).
• Microarray based technologies can simultaneously detect hundreds of thousands or millions of 
single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs, common single-base variants in the DNA molecule) across 
the genome. This can be done quickly, easily and at a relatively low price. SNPs are associated with 
genetic susceptibilities to common complex diseases. If assembled in a genetic risk profile, SNPs 
associated with the risk for a particular disease may indicate an overall increased or decreased 
personal risk for developing that disease. Personal genome tests based on genome-wide SNP-
analysis commonly include a multitude of genetic risk profiles.
• Conventional karyotyping allows for the reliable identification of all numerical and structural 
chromosome abnormalities that are visible by microscope (abnormality size > 3 to 5 Mega base). 
Karyotyping is time-consuming and labour-intensive, because it requires the culturing of foetal 
cells obtained by amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, with the aim of obtaining cells at the 
metaphase stage.
The aim of informed consent is to gather autonomous authorisation of the person involved 
for an act that would otherwise be an infringement of that person’s rights.9 Many medical 
interventions, including genetic testing and screening, require permission, both legally and 
morally. Informed consent presupposes adequate information, competence, voluntariness 
and comprehension.10 The traditional model for informed consent in the context of genetic 
testing is derived from clinical genetics, where the testee is offered extensive and non-
directive pre-test counselling to enable autonomous decision-making. The testee has a 
right to know, but also a right not to know genetic information. Guidelines require that 
–before giving informed consent– the testee should receive and understand at least the 
following information: “medical facts of the disorder, risk figures, (possible) benefits and 
harms of testing, limitations of the test, reliability of the test, implications of testing, 
familial implications, probabilities of inheritance, prevention and treatment, information on 
available support and alternative choices.”11,12 Communication of all this information for one 
disease usually takes much time and often multiple counselling sessions. It is reasonable 
to assume that such a meticulous procedure will not be feasible in the context of the 
new genetics. The enormous quantity of information generally involved in genome-wide 
testing makes it difficult to meet the requirements of comprehension and competence in 
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lay testees. Moreover, children and young minors are often incompetent to give informed 
consent. Therefore, their parents are allowed to represent them and give or withhold 
consent for medical interventions. As we will show, the legitimacy of such parental consent 
is not unlimited, since it may infringe upon the child’s present and future autonomy rights, 
including the right not to know.
In this paper, the (pending) implementation of the new genetics will be discussed for three 
areas: newborn screening, prenatal screening strategies, and DTC personal genome testing. 
In all three areas, a carefully designed testing offer and adequate informed consent are 
considered of paramount importance to respect persons’ autonomy, to protect testees’ 
rights, and to guard them from being harmed by testing (non-maleficence). As will be 
shown, the position of (future) children deserves special attention.
8.2 Three applications of the new genetics
8.2.1	 Newborn	screening:	profiling	the	newborn
Newborn screening was first conducted in the USA in 1962 and has since been a routine 
intervention performed on nearly all newborns in many countries. The aim of newborn 
screening has traditionally been to discover inborn diseases which manifest early and 
for which safe and easy treatment is available.13 Initially, screening aimed at detecting 
phenylketonuria (PKU), which is (relatively) common, can be reliably diagnosed and is easy 
to treat. Since the introduction of newborn screening, the different programmes have come 
to include increasingly more diseases, some of which are less obvious candidates when 
traditional criteria of treatability and reliability of the test are applied.14  As a result, the 
screening offer has become more diverse and now includes diseases of varying seriousness, 
treatability and time of onset. The potential harm associated with such expansions have 
prompted some authors to insist that mandatory newborn screening or screening with 
minimal informed consent procedures, are no longer acceptable.15 Instead, parents should 
be offered the option to choose whether or not (and to what extent) to have their newborn 
tested, at least when screening might generate information which is not of immediate 
medical benefit to the child.
Recent suggestions to further expand newborn screening by means of microarray based 
technologies or WGS/WES, raise –with a new urgency– the question of informed consent 
and the standardisation of the screening offer. These new genetic technologies are likely to 
routinely generate incidental findings.3 Furthermore, it has been suggested that newborn 
screening should be structured as a continuous process instead of a once-and-for-all affair. 
Such an approach would be in line with the notion of ‘profiling’ newborns, which implies the 
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possibility of creating a ‘health dossier’ that could be used for the prevention, diagnosis and 
treatment of diseases in different stages of a person’s life.16 When considering these options 
from the perspective of autonomy, two sets of questions stand out.
The first set of questions relates to the standardisation of the offer. On the one hand, the 
diversification of possible test outcomes seems to give force to the argument that parents 
should be offered the option of choice. On the other hand, however, the complexity of 
the material seems to make autonomous choices with regard to preferred test outcomes 
practically very difficult. How should this tension be resolved? In order to facilitate 
understanding and decision-making, different categories of potential outcomes could be 
distinguished. These categories however would be defined by –perhaps paternalistic–
authorities beforehand and may thus also limit the options. Can information justifiably be 
withheld on the grounds that informed consent would not be possible otherwise?17
The second set of questions concerns the future autonomy of the child. These arise when 
late-onset diseases are concerned or when test results are retained and accessed later on 
in the child’s life. Testing for late-onset diseases has traditionally been considered morally 
unjustified in view of children’s right not to know, because it would deprive them of their 
right to decide (when competent to do so) whether to be tested for these conditions.18 
Other questions relate to who has access to the information and when, and for how long it 
should be stored. If we take seriously the possibility of newborn profiling, the accompanying 
informed consent procedure should address these issues.
8.2.2	 Prenatal	screening:	Individualised	choice
Prenatal screening strategies for detecting foetal abnormalities were introduced in the late 
1960s, initially to prevent the burden and suffering caused by the birth of children affected 
with serious chromosomal conditions (notably Down’s syndrome) and open neural tube 
defects. This scope has remained rather constant for decades. Screening consisted of a 
standard one-step test offer that pregnant women could either accept or decline. In the 
course of time, the aim of prenatal screening shifted to offering pregnant women (and their 
partners) the opportunity to obtain information about their foetus that they may want to 
use for their decision whether or not to continue the pregnancy - in short, to facilitate well-
informed, autonomous, reproductive choice.19,20   All this time, conventional karyotyping 
remained the gold standard for diagnostic testing. This practice, however, is now rapidly 
changing due to an overall tendency towards broadening the scope of screening and 
diagnostic testing.2 Microarray based techniques are being implemented as diagnostic tests 
in case of ultrasound abnormalities. Some even propose to offer this technique as a one-
step screening test to all pregnant women.18
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This development challenges both the traditional scope of prenatal screening and the 
aim of facilitating autonomous reproductive choice. Until recently, autonomous choice 
in this context meant being given the opportunity to decide whether or not to accept a 
standard prenatal test offer, targeted at a limited number of serious conditions only. But 
since the scope of a standard offer is becoming less obvious, the question arises whether 
offering a standard test optimally meets the aim of reproductive choice. At first glance, 
one might assume that reproductive autonomy is best served by maximising the amount 
of reproductive options and thus by offering array-based techniques that enable broad-
scope testing. However, it is well known that preferences regarding the scope of prenatal 
testing differ considerably between and amongst professionals and pregnant women.21,22 
Therefore, it may be preferable to differentiate the testing offer in such a way that it meets 
individual women’s interests and wishes. Offering an ‘individualised choice’ -meaning that 
pregnant women themselves are allowed to determine whether they would benefit more 
from a comprehensive or a narrow test- may thus better accord with the aim of prenatal 
screening. However, the merits and feasibility of such a choice are unclear, because of 
the associated burdens and the difficulties of informed consent in the context of the new 
genetics. Whether women are offered one broad array-based standard test or a set of 
testing options to enable individualised choice, in either case they are confronted with a 
large quantity of complex information. A new approach to informed consent will thus be 
needed for prenatal screening.
Another problem arises in case prenatal testing identifies a late-onset disease (especially 
a disease that is untreatable and possibly severe) while the pregnancy is being continued: 
one would de	facto screen a future child. This raises a similar issue to the one raised in the 
newborn screening context, for the child’s right not to know would then be violated. Thus, a 
dilemma may arise between the reproductive autonomy of the prospective parents and the 
future child’s right not to know. In contrast with the newborn context, obtaining information 
about late-onset diseases in the prenatal setting may also serve a reproductive interest: 
prospective parents may want to use this information to decide about termination of the 
pregnancy. 
These issues in the prenatal context –how to serve reproductive autonomy, how to ensure 
informed consent and how to respect the autonomy of the future child– necessitate a 
reconsideration of both the aim and the scope of prenatal screening. 
8.2.3	 DTC	personal	genome	testing:	bypassing	the	healthcare	system
Thus far, we have discussed two public health applications, but the new genetics is also 
confronting the public directly through online DTC marketing by private companies. Targeted 
genetic tests for specific diseases have been available through online DTC services since the 
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early 2000s.23 As of 2007, however, a new generation of companies has been offering genetic 
testing services for multiple diseases simultaneously. For a few hundred dollars, consumers 
can now order ‘personal genome tests’ that map hundreds of thousands of genetic variants 
across the genome and estimate disease risks for dozens of diseases and other phenotypic 
traits. Today’s testing offers include complex diseases, such as cardiovascular diseases, type 
2 diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, Crohn’s disease, psychiatric conditions, and 
many types of cancer, but also pre-conception carrier screening and tests for monogenic 
disorders. Most services contain pharmacogenomic tests, and some offer ‘entertainment’ 
testing and ancestry testing as well. A complete personal genome test can thus be as 
elaborate as 243 diseases and other traits, in one single purchase.24 Accordingly, the aim of 
DTC testing has shifted from the prediction of an individual’s genetic risk for a single disease 
to something like ‘getting to know as much as possible’ on the basis of a genome-wide scan. 
Personal genome testing is thus no longer exclusively medical in nature but has become 
multi-purpose, and continues to expand its scope.
As a result, one personal genome test can include many different tests for many different 
diseases and other traits with corresponding different implications at the medical, personal 
and social level. The standards of pre-test information provision and informed consent 
used in clinical genetics can hardly be met in a relatively under-regulated commercial 
context25,26, in which professional knowledge, skills and values are often lacking.27,28 Lack 
of adequate information and informed consent may harm consumers both directly and 
indirectly: directly through the receipt of unwanted and potentially harmful information 
(e.g. knowing that one is at increased risk for an untreatable or unpreventable disease, such 
as Alzheimer’s disease), and indirectly through misunderstanding or misinterpretation, and 
associated personal, social and health risks.29,30 The inclusion of potentially harmful tests 
(e.g. for untreatable conditions) goes against the ethical criteria for a responsible screening 
offer.14 
Informed consent is needed not only to help prevent the potential harms associated with 
personal genome testing, but also to help ensure that genetic testing is the result of an 
autonomous decision rather than the ‘inconsiderate’ acceptance of a commercial offer. 
Given the unequalled quantity, complexity and diversity of the information involved in 
personal genome testing, however, the construction of adequate informed consent and the 
enabling of autonomous decision-making will be a major challenge. It could be helpful to 
differentiate the testing offer, to make the aim(s) of testing explicit to the consumer as part 
of the pre-test information provision process, and to have the scope of testing correspond 
with these aims. This means that separate informed consent could be asked for (categories 
of) tests that are associated with different aims - and preferably also for (categories of) tests 
that are associated with a higher potential for harm.
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A further issue arises when additional stakeholders are taken into account, namely children. 
Parents are increasingly interested in ordering (DTC) genetic testing for their children, also 
for late-onset diseases31 and diseases for which there are no treatment options32, and 
providers do indeed perform genetic testing in children and minors.33,34 This practice runs 
against the broad consensus among researchers, clinicians and policymakers that predictive 
genetic testing of children should not be allowed unless there is clear medical benefit to be 
obtained through early interventions in childhood, which cannot otherwise be attained.35,36 
Professional guidelines indicate that testing should be deferred until adulthood.37 It would 
be inconsistent to allow private companies to act differently in this regard. 
8.3 Discussion: informed consent and the new genetics
We have discussed three contexts of the new genetics and their implications for the principle 
of respect for autonomy. Although the neonatal, prenatal and DTC testing contexts each 
raise different sets of questions, common issues can be identified. Three main issues merit 
further ethical reflection and discussion: first, the original aims of testing and screening are 
subject to change and tend towards increasing choice while not necessarily increasing well-
considered, autonomous choice. Second, the notion of individualised choice needs fleshing 
out in the different contexts, with special attention to the variety of stakeholders involved, 
including (future) children. And lastly, the interpretation and practice of informed consent 
needs adjustment to meet the challenges raised by the introduction of new genetics.
Since the scope of genetic testing and of screening offers within and outside healthcare is 
expanding, the aims of testing and screening are shifting accordingly. In newborn screening, 
direct medical benefit seems no longer the single aim of screening. Parents may benefit 
from knowing early that their child will develop a disease in childhood or is carrier of a 
mutation, because they can use the latter information to decide about future pregnancies. 
Also in DTC personal genome testing, the aims of testing seem to include broader notions 
of utility. Testing for incurable diseases such Alzheimer’s disease, for example, may help at-
risk individuals to prepare for the future.38 In all three contexts, however, it holds that more 
choice is not necessarily better than less, because choices imply costs as well as benefits: 
they require time and resources, and they entail burdens and responsibilities.39 As a result, 
maximising information or choice is not always beneficial, but may as well undermine 
comprehension and autonomous decision-making.40 Respect for autonomy and adequate 
informed consent thus seem to demand a trade-off between maximising choice on the one 
hand, and keeping information relevant and comprehensible on the other hand. 
The notion of individualised choice requires serious ethical consideration. Irrespective of 
whether tests have a narrow or broad scope, a standard offer means that the scope of 
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testing is determined by others than testees themselves (with ‘testees’ we now refer to 
pregnant women or couples, parents of newborns and/or adult individuals to be tested). 
On the one hand, standard offers may fail to take into account the different preferences of 
testees. Ignoring the technological possibilities to enable testees to take some control over 
the scope of testing and screening, and opting for a traditional ‘take it or leave it’ approach 
would be difficult to justify, as it would disregard opportunities to improve autonomy. On 
the other hand, it will not be feasible nor desirable to give individuals complete control over 
the testing process. In the prenatal setting, for instance, not all parental wishes regarding 
genetic testing in their unborn children should be granted, as they may run counter to the 
principle of respect for the autonomy of the future child. The (legitimate) purpose of prenatal 
screening is not to offer limitless insight into the genetic make-up of a future child. A similar 
issue applies to newborn screening programmes: parental control over the screening offer 
could and should be limited, in cases of harm to the child or disrespect for the autonomy 
of the adult-to-be. As a general contention, the right to self-determination of the child may 
trump parental choice. 
When considering individualised choice, it is important to acknowledge all stakeholders 
involved, particularly the future child and the adult to-be. Thus, the principle of respect 
for autonomy may be best served through a middle way between a standard offer and 
individualised choice: a differentiation and pre-structuring of the testing or screening offer, 
a ‘menu of options’41,42 from which testees may legitimately choose. With regard to (the aim 
of) prenatal screening this means that testing options should be limited to conditions that 
meet a clear reproductive interest of the prospective parents18, in order to avoid harming the 
future child’s autonomy rights. A form of ‘conditional access’ would be needed and require 
thorough genetic counselling.2 Pregnant women should be strongly discouraged from 
having their foetus tested for late-onset disorders if they are not willing to terminate the 
pregnancy in case a mutation is found. Conditional access would mean that the traditional 
non-directive character of counselling should be abandoned. Obviously, however, it would 
not only be difficult, but also undesirable to enforce abortion in case of a positive test result. 
Ultimately in these matters, voluntariness remains a basic ethical requirement. But it should 
be clear that testing for (genetic susceptibilities to) late-onset diseases should preferably 
not be conducted in pregnancies which –regardless of test outcomes– will be carried to 
term, that is to say: not in future children. 
Finally, the notion of informed consent itself may need revision in light of the new genetics. 
There are important differences between the tests included in broad testing or screening 
offers, both in terms of clinical validity and utility (some may be highly predictive and have 
implications for clinical decision-making, others less so) and in terms of characteristics 
of diseases tested for.43 For example, not all persons will want to know their genetic risk 
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for diseases for which there are no treatment or preventive options44, or for psychiatric 
diseases.45 In the DTC context, such information may come as a terrible surprise for 
consumers who have purchased a very broad personal genome test without much thought 
to its precise contents, without having given informed consent, and thus without (mental) 
preparation for the receiving of such test results.30  Differentiation of the testing offer and 
adequate procedures for informed consent will be indispensable protective shields against 
the potential harms of expanding genetic testing and screening offers, whether offered 
within (public) healthcare or outside. 
The aim of informed consent in the context of the new genetics should in our opinion be 
to improve informed and autonomous decision-making with regard to genetic testing and 
screening. As a consequence of the quantity, complexity and diversity of information possibly 
involved, detailed and specific consent will simply not be possible. Therefore, informed 
consent requires a new model. Generic consent, which focuses on general concepts and 
common-denominator issues46, seems a viable and often-mentioned alternative. But ideally 
–and in line with the proposed differentiation and pre-structuring of the testing offer– a 
generic consent process should also be differentiated, for if pre-test information is too 
generic, it may fail to constitute informed consent. The aim is to render pre-test information 
manageable and comprehensible in order to maximise understanding, without failing to 
convey important messages about the different versions of testing offers and to enable 
considered and informed decisions with regard to the scope of testing to be conducted. 
Generic but differentiated consent should allow persons to opt out of receiving information 
about themselves or their children that they may not wish to receive or that may harm 
them. The facilitation of informed consent for an ‘individualised’ version of a testing or 
screening offer is a minimal condition for any responsible offer of a genetic (screening) 
test. Empirical research will be needed to determine effective ways of designing adequate 
consent procedures in the context of the new genetics.
8.4 Concluding remarks
New genetic and genomic technologies such as microarrays and whole-genome or whole-
exome sequencing technologies are technical means to generate genetic and genomic 
data, not medical tests in themselves. They have, however, brought along a tendency to 
expand the scope of testing and screening. Three areas have been discussed in which new 
genetics technologies are currently gaining ground - newborn screening, prenatal screening 
and DTC personal genome testing - and the implications of expansions of testing offers 
for the principle of respect for autonomy and informed consent. It has been discussed 
that an expansion of testing offers may yield valuable information and medical benefit, 
and may enhance autonomous (reproductive) choice. There are however moral limits to 
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these expansions. When testing (unborn) children, the right not to know and the right to 
self-determination of the (future) child should be respected. This means that the scope 
of newborn screening should be restricted to childhood diseases only, and that access to 
prenatal testing for late-onset diseases should be conditional. DTC personal genome testing 
should not be conducted on children or minors.
The new genetics enable testees to have a say in determining the scope of testing and 
screening offers, and thereby to improve autonomous decision-making with regard to 
genetic testing or screening. To achieve this, standardised approaches to the design of 
testing and screening offers may need to be replaced by differentiated or individualised 
approaches that take into account individual informational preferences. In the context of 
newborn screening programmes, for instance, this means that there are strong ethical 
arguments for allowing parents to choose whether or not to have their newborn child tested 
for childhood diseases for which there are no therapeutic or preventive options.
Still, due to the quantity, complexity and diversity of the information involved in genome-
wide tests, the new genetics may threaten comprehension of pre-test information and thus 
hinder informed decision-making. The traditional model of detailed informed consent is 
no longer tenable for genome-wide genetic tests. Therefore a generic but differentiated 
approach to informed consent has been supported instead, which aims to convey 
important information about (categories of) diseases tested for and to enable informed and 
autonomous decision-making for or against specific versions of the testing offer. By placing 
limits on the scope of testing and by requiring generic but differentiated consent, a morally 
responsible design of genetic testing and screening practices –respecting the individual 
autonomy of both adults and (future) children– may be possible.
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9.1  Introduction
In this thesis, I have focused on three developments in prenatal screening: 1) a narrowing of 
the scope of testing, 2) an increase in the number of heterogeneous prenatal tests, and 3) a 
broadening the scope of testing by the application of ever more advanced ultrasound scans 
and genome-wide testing techniques. The possibility to offer a narrow, rapid aneuploidy 
diagnostic (RAD) test targeted at trisomies 21, 18 and 13 (and mostly X and Y as well) 
instead of karyotyping allows for earlier test results and avoids unexpected and unclear 
findings, but reduces the range of possible outcomes that women may consider relevant for 
their decision-making. Non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has recently been introduced 
as a second-tier screening test in the testing cascade for the most common trisomies1,2, 
but expectations are that one-step diagnostic NIPT will eventually replace current two-
step testing. If so, this also implies a limitation in the diagnostic scope, unless additional 
testing is offered. Complementary tests however would complicate the testing trajectory 
and present the question of what exactly to offer as a supplementary: NT-measurement 
and invasive diagnostics for other aneuploidies and disorders? Another development is the 
introduction of broad, genome-wide diagnostic testing for various reasons, but primarily to 
clarify ultrasound abnormalities found by an increasing number of foetal ultrasound scans 
throughout the pregnancy. Whereas more comprehensive testing allows for the detection 
of more clinically relevant abnormalities, it also increases the number of unclear and 
possibly unwanted findings that are difficult to handle in the prenatal situation. Eventually, 
genome-wide NIPT might be feasible too.3,4 All in all, the scope of testing becomes 
increasingly indistinct because the various diagnostic techniques allow for both a narrowing 
and a broadening of the traditional scope, and because an increase in the number and a 
fragmentation of prenatal tests becomes apparent. This development raises the question 
what to test for and why, and may ultimately challenge the very aim of prenatal screening: 
is reproductive autonomy promoted by offering more options or is meaningful choice 
impracticable when offering more and heterogeneous tests? Other questions are whether 
the offer of the various tests meets  the requirements of proportionality and can be justified 
in terms of justice.
The aim of this thesis was to provide an ethical analysis of possible implications of narrow, 
more, and broad prenatal testing. I performed this analysis in relation to the existing 
normative framework for prenatal screening that will be elaborated below. This led to 
the identification of various tensions that arise between new prenatal tests and the moral 
framework for prenatal screening. A secondary goal of this thesis was to explore if the 
notion of autonomous reproductive choice that is traditionally interpreted as the choice to 
either accept or refuse a standard test offer, can be given the wider interpretation of offering 
pregnant women opportunity to individually decide what information they wish to receive 
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about their foetus: a so-called 'individualised choice'. Furthermore, I conducted an empirical 
study amongst stakeholders of prenatal testing in order to explore their considerations and 
opinions on these issues.
In this concluding Chapter, I will recapitulate and more extensively discuss if and how the 
introduction of new testing techniques may challenge some of the basic assumptions and 
normative requirements regarding prenatal screening, and how to resolve these. To that 
end, the general discussion is divided into three parts. In Part I, the development and 
content of the current normative framework will be discussed (9.2). Then, I will outline 
in Part II the three developments mentioned and more deeply explore how these relate 
to different aspects of this framework: standard narrow testing by RAD and NIPT (9.3); an 
increase in the number of tests (9.4); and standard broad testing by microarray (9.5). Finally, 
in Part III, I will explore whether individualised choice can be a meaningful and feasible 
option for rephrasing the concept of reproductive choice in the prenatal context (9.6) and 
how the concept of reproductive autonomy needs to be qualified (9.7).
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Part I  The normative framework for prenatal screening
Introduction
In this first part of the general discussion I will discuss how the normative framework for 
prenatal screening has developed and been adapted in the course of time. Then, two 
paradigms of prenatal screening, namely that of prevention and of informed choice, will 
be discussed. I will clarify how these paradigms influence the way that prenatal screening 
programmes will be presented and evaluated in practice. Finally, the current aim of prenatal 
screening, to offer opportunity for reproductive choice, will be placed in the context of 
these developments and paradigms.
9.2   Prenatal screening: aims, requirements and paradigms 
9.2.1	 The	normative	framework	for	population	screening	in	general
All population screening programs are similar insofar as they regard a health-care initiated 
and (mostly) collectively funded test offer to persons who neither have symptoms of 
illness nor another reason to seek medical help for the condition concerned. In order to 
justify screening, the test offer has to comply with general ethical and legal principles and 
requirements - the 'normative framework' for screening. The widely accepted framework 
for responsible population screening was first formulated by Wilson and Jungner in 1968 
on behalf of the World Health Organization (WHO)5 (See: Box 9.1). Population screening 
programs are guided by these WHO-conditions and the most important criteria can be 
summarised as follows: screening is directed at an important health problem, the offer is 
acceptable to the population addressed, a reliable and valid test is available, an accepted 
treatment is available and the screening is cost-effective. 
Box 9.1 | Wilson and Jungner classic screening criteria 
1. The condition sought should be an important health problem.
2.  There should be an accepted treatment for patients with recognized disease.
3.  Facilities for diagnosis and treatment should be available.
4.  There should be a recognizable latent or early symptomatic stage.
5.  There should be a suitable test or examination.
6.  The test should be acceptable to the population.
7.  The natural history of the condition, including development from latent to declared disease, 
should be adequately understood.
8.  There should be an agreed policy on whom to treat as patients.
9.  The cost of case-finding (including diagnosis and treatment of patients diagnosed) should be 
economically balanced in relation to possible expenditure on medical care as a whole.
10.  Case-finding should be a continuing process and not a 'once and for all' project.
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In the course of time, the underlying principles and the WHO-framework itself were further 
developed. The moral justification of population screening is based on the three basic 
principles of Western medical ethics (and health law), namely that of beneficence/non-
maleficence, justice, and respect for persons. The latter principle has only later gained more 
importance in the screening context and is based on a notion of persons as autonomous 
agents6 having the “right to hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on 
their personal values and beliefs.”7 Autonomy, as understood in this view and in this thesis, 
recognises that a person does not live in a social vacuum, but is influenced by personal 
relationships (peers, friends, family) and by his or her cultural, social and political context. 
Still, a person can be conceived as autonomous insofar as one has the ability and opportunity 
to choose in an un-coerced way his or her own course of action based on an individual 
assessment of the options at hand. In the screening context, the principle of respect for 
persons requires that decisions about participation and about the course of action in case 
of an adverse test outcome is made voluntarily and based on adequate information: the 
well-known concept of informed consent. To secure the irrefutability of the requirement of 
informed consent, it was explicitly included in later adaptations of the normative framework. 
Screening programs not only provide benefits in the sense of possible health gains, but 
can also induce adverse consequences. Examples are the emotional burden of anxiety and 
decision-making and the impact of false-positive and false-negative outcomes. Therefore, 
it should be beyond doubt that the benefits of the unsolicited test offer clearly outweigh 
the disadvantages. This requirement of proportionality stems from the closely connected 
principles of non-maleficence (to not inflict harm intentionally) and beneficence (to act for 
the benefit of persons).7,8 Whereas this condition initially focused on the balance between 
benefits and burdens for the participants, proportionality was later approached in a broader 
way and included the weighing of pros and cons on the societal level too. In this regard 
possible discriminatory effects of screening on persons living with the targeted disorders 
and social pressure on potential participants to accept a test offer, have to be accounted 
for. Finally, the principle of justice requires that a screening program is justified in terms of a 
fair distribution of benefits and burdens, and a fair allocation of scarce financial resources. 
If health care resources are spent on prenatal screening, this means that less resources 
remain for other forms of health care - possibly including the care and treatment of those 
affected with abnormalities screened for. This issue of what counts as a justified allocation 
of resources is too extensive to be addressed here, but is also an important consideration 
when deciding about the scope and extent of prenatal screening. Justice also requires that 
equity of access to the screening program is ensured. A good survey of the adaptations 
made to the initial WHO-framework is provided for by the synthesis of screening criteria by 
Andermann et al. 9 (See: Box 9.2). 
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*Adopted from Andermann et al. (2008)9
9.2.2	 The	adapted	normative	framework	for	prenatal	screening
Although in many respects prenatal screening resembles other screening programs, there 
are important differences too. The most important one regards the aim of prenatal screening. 
Whereas other forms of population screening explicitly aim at health gain by means of 
preventive measures or treatment, prenatal screening does not. Unless, of course, one 
strives to maximally prevent the birth of affected children and portrays selective abortion 
as a means to achieve that. This purpose was indeed implied by earlier publications: “(…) 
the judicious use of therapeutic abortion (…) could help reduce the incidence of human 
chromosomal abnormalities.”10 A less explicit formulation was that reduction of the birth 
prevalence of specific disorders could be achieved “by identifying (….) couples who can have 
prenatal diagnosis and selective termination of pregnancy.”11 These views have been met 
with criticism and concern. Although women were, of course, not legally obliged to have 
an abortion in case of an adverse test outcome, it was feared that women in practice felt 
pressured to do so.12,13 
From the outset of prenatal screening, exactly this issue led and still leads to heavy 
disputes about the officially professed and by some commentators suspected ‘real’ aim of 
screening.14-17 Various objections can be discerned. First, prenatal screening was objected 
to because it would be a form of eugenics, meaning that it aimed to extirpate people with 
certain disorders and characteristics by means of selective abortion. Various motives could 
lie at the bottom of this aim: either these people were seen as unfit and inferior, or they 
were deemed to pose too great a financial burden on society due to the care they needed, 
or both. There were concerns about social pressure on women to screen and act upon test 
results which might amount to a form of ‘collective eugenics’.13 Or, as Lippman put it in 1991: 
“Prenatal diagnosis necessarily involves systematic and systemic selection of foetuses, most 
Box 9.2 | Synthesis of emerging screening criteria proposed over the past 40 years*
	The screening programme should respond to a recognized need.
	The objectives of screening should be defined at the outset.
	There should be a defined target population.
	There should be scientific evidence of screening programme effectiveness.
	The programme should integrate education, testing, clinical services and programme 
management.
	There should be quality assurance, with mechanisms to minimize potential risks of screening.
	The programme should ensure informed choice, confidentiality and respect for autonomy.
	The programme should promote equity and access to screening for the entire target population.
	Programme evaluation should be planned from the outset.
	The overall benefits of screening should outweigh the harm.
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frequently on genetic grounds. Though the word “eugenics” is scrupulously avoided in most 
biomedical reports about prenatal diagnosis except when it is strongly disclaimed as a motive 
for intervention, this is disingenuous.”16 Second, according to the so-called ‘disability rights 
critique’, selective abortion to prevent the birth of an affected child in the prenatal strategy 
sends the discriminatory message that the lives of people living with the disorder concerned 
are less worthy than the lives of those living without it.18,19 Closely related to this view is the 
so-called ‘expressivist argument’ that contends that not only the act of selective abortion 
per se, but offering women the opportunity to do so already expresses the objectionable 
message that the world would be better off without people with diseases and disabilities. In 
this view, the offer of prenatal screening itself is seen as inherently discriminating because 
it implicitly communicates that one should aim to select against disease and disability.20 
If prenatal screening would indeed aim to prevent the birth of children with disabilities, 
this could mean that women are or at least feel pressured to terminate the pregnancy in 
case of an unfavourable test outcome and that they be held responsible for the (financial) 
consequences if they fail to do so.15,21 
Proponents of prenatal screening however, argued that prenatal screening was done for 
good reasons, because prospective parents themselves were able to determine whether or 
not to engage in testing and –in case of an adverse test result– to choose selective abortion. 
Although screening could result in the prevention of suffering caused by serious health 
problems as experienced by those concerned, this did not represent a collective preventive 
aim. It was emphasised that the morally controversial and emotionally burdening option of 
selective abortion should be and remain an autonomous decision of pregnant women and 
not become a means for achieving a societal preventive goal.22 This individual health care 
perspective, derived from clinical genetic practice, is oriented towards the individual person 
and his or her autonomous choices. Still, elements of public health can be recognised in 
the way the prenatal screening program is implemented, namely population wide, and in 
the focus on major health related problems. In that respect it is not different from other 
screening programmes, such as for breast cancer. Prenatal screening is offered population 
wide to a specific group (pregnant women), is generally collectively funded and follows 
similar logistic procedures as other screening programs. Because of this twofold background 
(individual health care and public health programs) prenatal screening has a hybrid character 
and exactly this may cause the controversies and concerns mentioned above. Because even 
the semblance of prevention should be avoided in prenatal screening policies, the essential 
conditions, such as the aim of individual reproductive choice and the condition of informed 
consent, are to be made more explicit. To achieve that, various refinements and adaptations 
were indeed made to the general normative framework for population screening.12,13,23
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In order to avoid the ethically problematic implications of the aforementioned preventive 
purpose and to warrant the acceptability of prenatal screening, its aim has been rephrased. 
It is generally agreed, at least in most Western countries, that prenatal screening does 
not aim at prevention, but that it aims to offer pregnant women (and their partners) the 
opportunity to obtain health-related information about their foetus that enables them 
to have “practical and meaningful courses of action”.24 These courses include the choice 
between terminating an affected pregnancy or preparing for the birth of an affected child. 
In short, the purpose is to provide autonomous reproductive choice. In this autonomous 
choice-account of prenatal screening, the meaning of the requirement of informed consent 
that also applies to other screening programs, is more than just a moral precondition. In 
that regard, ‘consent’ may not be the appropriate term. Its interpretation is extended in the 
sense that providing opportunity for individual’s well-informed choice is (or should be) the 
very aim of offering testing. To ensure the actual realisation of this interpretation, informed 
consent has been specified in more detail: the test offer has to be presented in a very careful 
way, with well-balanced and adequate information, and the decision-making should be 
guided by adequate counselling and support.25-27 Thus, informed consent serves as both a 
precondition and as an objective, albeit that in the latter sense it is generally referred to as 
informed choice. 
Like any other screening program, prenatal screening should be proportional in that the 
benefits clearly outweigh the disadvantages for participants. It is well-recognised that 
offering worthwhile reproductive options for participants constitutes an important benefit 
that should be warranted by valid and reliable testing methods. But unlike other programs, 
prenatal screening programs are feared to have drawbacks for other individuals and groups 
in society, more particularly, to negatively impact upon people with disorder(s) targeted by 
the screening. Therefore acceptance of and adequate care for these groups should be given 
due consideration in this context. Prenatal screening is for the most part collectively funded 
in the Western world. Therefore, (distributive) justice requires that not only the immaterial 
gain of worthwhile courses of action but also the financial consequences should be taken 
into account. These include the costs of initial and follow-up testing and the costs and gains 
of the ensuing interventions, including the saved life-time costs for those affected.12,28 In 
that regard, financial considerations can also limit the scope of the prenatal screening. For 
example, expensive tests for rare –although serious– disorders may not be cost-effective 
and therefore not be included in the screening offer.
The additions above show how the normative framework for prenatal screening provides for 
a more detailed and context-specific interpretation of the general framework for screening 
and of the basic principles of health-care ethics. But the moral acceptability of prenatal 
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screening can of course not solely be derived from a professed aim in policy documents 
or by providers. This acceptability just as much depends on how the program is actually 
implemented: the autonomy view should not only be professed in theory, but also be shown 
in how the screening program is performed and evaluated. If, for example, the provision of 
information and counselling is adequate, but the uptake rates or abortion rates are used as 
the gauge of success, then the program reflects both an autonomy view and a preventive 
aim, respectively.21 But if information is biased and/or minimal and counselling provided in a 
directive manner, then the program as a whole reflects preventive perspectives despite the 
officially proclaimed aim of offering autonomous reproductive choice. Practice will seldom if 
ever show all characteristics of the autonomy perspective. In that regard, it is understandable 
that critics sometimes suggest that offering informed choice is not genuinely strived for, 
but only serves as a façade for a testing strategy that actually aims to prevent the birth of 
affected children.16,19,21 It is therefore vital to examine how a screening program is actually 
presented and implemented. The challenge will be to ensure as much as possible that the 
requirements of the autonomy view are met in practice. 
9.2.3		 Paradigms	of	prenatal	screening:	prevention	and	informed	choice	
The difference between what constitutes a morally acceptable or unacceptable provision 
of prenatal screening can be clarified by the practical features of the program. When 
evaluating new prenatal tests and discussing how these relate to the aim and requirements 
of the normative framework, these features will prove to be helpful in identifying the 
possible conflicts. To make explicit what possible decisions and motives underlie screening 
practice, Clarke has articulated some specific features as they would appear in a program 
that aims either at informed choice or at prevention.29 These two contrasting paradigms are 
in literature referred to as “informed choice-paradigm” or “client-centred framework” as 
opposed to the “prevention-paradigm“ or “health-centred framework”29,30, but essentially 
the features are reasonably similar. Here, I will present my own characterization of these 
paradigms as two ideal types, typifying two opposed ends on a continuum. As such they do 
not represent screening practices in all their elements, but they do reflect the assumptions 
that may underlie actual screening practices. A short overview of both paradigms is 
presented in Table 9.1. 
The prevention-paradigm can be placed in the context of public health which aims to 
protect and promote the health of a specific group, population or society at large. Those 
who criticise prenatal screening for its eugenic and discriminatory aim and character, have 
a stronger claim if the following features present in the screening practice. Prospective 
parents will be discouraged to get an affected child, refusal of testing or abortion will be 
seen as deviant, and professionals are directive and influence participants to choose the 
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‘right’ option, namely to accept testing and to abort in case of an adverse test result. In 
order to maximise the uptake and the number of selective abortions of affected foetuses, 
testing is portrayed as routine and as a reassurance for timely prevention, and the provision 
of information is biased. The focus will be on cost-effectiveness of the program, and its 
success is defined in terms of the number of affected foetuses identified and of selective 
abortions, while the socio-psychological impact on participants is considered as of minor 
importance. 
The informed-choice paradigm shows contrasting features. Emerging from the context of 
individual health care, the principle of respect for persons is a core element. To achieve 
the goal of enabling autonomous reproductive choice, there is a sustained effort to ensure 
that uptake is based on adequate and well-balanced information, and that the decision is 
made voluntary. This means that a person is not  forced by coercion, deception or any other 
undue influence. Participants are supported in their decision-making process with regard to 
accepting or declining testing, terminating or continuing the pregnancy. For that purpose, 
professionals adopt a non-directive attitude and provide for adequate pre-test and post-test 
counselling. The burdens of the program itself for participants are monitored, possible side 
effects such as discrimination and social pressure are precluded, and care and support for 
affected people are ensured. The program is evaluated by examining if and to what extent 
prospective parents are actually enabled to make reproductive choices. 
Programs will in reality never coincide with all the features of one ideal type as presented in 
Table 9.1, but always combine characteristics of both paradigms. The evaluation of whether 
a program represents more an informed choice-paradigm or is inclined toward a preventive 
aim, therefore depends on if and to what extent the various conditions are met in practice. 
Table 9.1 | Features of paradigms for prenatal screening
Paradigm Choice Prevention 
Context individual health care public health
Aim
enable autonomous reproductive choice reduce birth affected children
avoid suffering reduce social financial costs
Individual
respect for persons means to achieve preventive aim
voluntariness encourage testing and abortion
informed consent test portrayed as routine 
Test-
program
ensure proportionality burdens - benefits optimise detection affected pregnancies 
prevent discrimination and social pressure ensure cost-effectiveness
Professional
non-directive attitude directive attitude
adequate information and counselling
information biased toward preferred 
option
Evaluation extent of autonomous choices number of cases identified / aborted
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9.2.4	 Autonomous	reproductive	choice	and	the	scope	of	prenatal	screening
The dominant view, at least in the Western world, is that prenatal screening programs 
should be designed according to the choice paradigm. This is also the point of departure 
for the analysis in this thesis. Still, neither the aim to provide reproductive choice nor the 
requirements of the normative framework as such do determine the extent of ‘autonomous 
reproductive choice’ in prenatal screening programs. In general, the right to reproduce 
or reproductive freedom stipulates the right to autonomously decide whether one wants 
offspring, and if so, with whom, the number and spacing of one’s children.31,32 If this freedom is 
conceived as a negative right, it means that persons have a right to make their own decisions 
regarding these reproductive matters, without interference or coercion by others, and as long 
as no substantial harm for others results from it. If, however, this freedom is interpreted as a 
positive right, it follows that others can be required to do something that enables a person 
to exercise her or his freedom regarding reproductive interests. Reproductive autonomy as 
understood in prenatal screening has both negative and positive components: on the one 
hand, others (such as professionals) should not pressurise or interfere with persons if they 
want to use genetic information in reproductive decisions, and on the other hand, these 
others may be required to make important genetic information available.31 The concept of 
reproductive choice in the prenatal screening context can be seen as a specification of the 
notion of reproductive autonomy in that its focus is beyond the more quantitative aspects 
(if, when and how many children), directed at the ‘qualitative’ aspects or traits of one’s 
offspring. As such, it also combines elements of both negative and positive rights. Others 
should not interfere with the decision whether or not to engage in prenatal screening or how 
to act in case of an adverse result (negative right), and prospective parents may require, to 
a certain extent, that they be given access to information about the foetus in order to make 
an autonomous reproductive choice (positive right). Still, the range of reproductive choice 
remains to be defined. As most, if not all, rights, reproductive freedom is not absolute 
and can be limited or restricted when competing moral considerations necessitate doing 
so.7,31 In a maximum interpretation of reproductive autonomy one would have the freedom 
to choose whatever characteristics of her or his child, including non-health related traits 
such as eye colour and cognition. However, in prenatal screening reproductive autonomy 
has always -albeit implicitly- had a weaker and specific interpretation, and been related 
to the so-called “medical model”33 that is limited to health-related traits. Therefore, the 
extent of reproductive choice in the screening context is not unlimited, but confined by 
its interpretation within this model.23,34 This results from the fact that prenatal screening 
policies originated from two medical spheres, namely clinical genetics and population 
screening. Clinical genetic practice concentrated on (prenatal) testing in affected families for 
serious and specific hereditary disorders in order to avoid the suffering caused by the birth 
of affected children. Population screening strategies were directed at the prevention and 
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treatment of conditions that constituted an 'important health problem' and the scope was 
also limited by reasons of cost-effectiveness, because screening is collectively funded. There 
have been attempts to define ‘serious genetic conditions’ for the purpose of screening, but 
no consensus can be reached about how to define these. Professionals, policy-makers and 
the public largely disagree about what counts as a serious condition, due to, for example, 
differences in perception and variable expression of a disease, evolving treatments and 
personal situation.34 This means that the medical model limits the scope of reproductive 
autonomy in the screening context, but the contours of the this model are left undefined. 
However, since the traditional scope (common trisomies and neural tube defects), the 
traditional testing technique (conventional karyotyping) and the traditional way of offering 
screening (a package deal: women can only choose for or against a well-defined test offer) 
has long served as a given and as a reference point in prenatal screening, the scope of 
autonomous choice in prenatal screening was qualified in practice.
The introduction of new testing techniques has challenged this traditional approach, 
including the interpretation of the notion of ‘reproductive choice’. The development of 
RAD-techniques and NIPT may limit the scope of testing, while concurrently the number of 
tests is increasing, and genome-wide diagnostic testing expands the range of abnormalities 
possibly being identified. Thus, new techniques challenge the range of testing and choice 
and necessitate to reconsider what autonomous reproductive choice actually refers to in 
the screening context. Do prospective parents have an unqualified right to be informed 
about all detectable abnormalities that the foetus may be affected with as long as there is 
a ‘recognised need’?9 Or can the provider justifiably limit the scope of the test-offer and if 
so, to what conditions and on what grounds? It is important to recall that, apart from the 
medical model, reproductive choice in this context is also determined by the moral principles 
and requirements that underlie prenatal screening practice. Respect for persons, feasibility 
of informed consent and autonomous choice, and proportionality are particularly relevant 
in this regard. But respect for autonomy, in a positive account, does in itself not imply that 
a maximum amount of reproductive options has always to be favoured and offered. More 
choice is not necessarily better than less, because choices imply costs as well: not only in 
the sense of time, but especially in the sense of emotional burden.6,35 In order to pursue the 
aim of offering autonomous reproductive choice, a decision of what tests to offer requires 
balancing its possible benefits (reproductive options) against its possible burdens (emotional 
burden) and ensuring that benefits for those involved are clearly positive (proportionality). 
On the one hand, a narrow (diagnostic) test offer like RAD or NIPT may limit the burdens, but 
also restricts autonomous reproductive choice. On the other hand, an increased number 
of tests and a broad scope, as in microarray testing, may promote autonomy insofar as it 
maximises prospective parents’ options for choice. But more and broader tests may also 
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undermine autonomy, if prospective parents are confused by the amount and kind of test 
outcomes, and if the feasibility of adequate information and support for pregnant women in 
their decision-making process toward a real autonomous reproductive choice is uncertain.
These considerations show that the preferable scope of autonomous reproductive choice 
in the prenatal screening context is not easy to define. In part II I will explore how new 
techniques like RAD, NIPT and microarrays relate to the aim of and different requirements 
regarding the normative framework for prenatal screening, what this means for the 
interpretation of autonomous reproductive choice, and how prenatal screening should be 
offered.
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Part II  Dynamics of prenatal testing: challenging the normative    
 framework
Introduction 
When observing the current prenatal screening strategies, three developments can be 
noticed that affect the traditional scope of prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities. 
First, there is a trend toward narrowing down the scope of aneuploidy testing, by means of 
rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) techniques and by the recent introduction of non-invasive 
prenatal testing (NIPT) for trisomies 21, 18 and 13. At the same time, an increase in the 
number and types of prenatal tests can be noticed. Third, there is a tendency to broaden 
the scope of testing, by ever more detailed foetal ultrasound scans and by the application 
of broad testing techniques such as microarrays and -in the future- whole genome/exome 
sequencing and analysis. 
In the discussion about narrowing or broadening the scope of prenatal testing, conventional 
karyotyping still serves as reference point for the amount and type of foetal abnormalities 
to be identified: the introduction of RAD has led to a debate about the abnormalities that 
will be missed or avoided by this test, and the increased yield of microarray-based testing 
compared to karyotyping, is always mentioned as a major advantage. In the past, for 
lack of alternatives, there was no reason to question the predominance of conventional 
karyotyping, and its scope may indirectly also have functioned as the standard interpretation 
of ‘reproductive choice’ in prenatal screening strategies. But since some propose to offer 
RAD as the preferred technique in case of an increased risk for chromosomal aneuploidies, 
and others to establish microarray testing as the standard in this and several other situations, 
karyotyping is losing its function as reference point for the pursued scope of prenatal testing 
and for the interpretation of reproductive autonomy in this context. As a result, both are 
left unresolved amidst the ongoing technological developments. In this second part of the 
General discussion, I will reflect on the consequences of the aforementioned developments 
in the prenatal screening strategy and on how these relate to the normative framework for 
prenatal screening. 
9.3 Standard narrow test offer - RAD and NIPT
Down’s syndrome and some other aneuploidies remain a major target in first trimester 
prenatal screening strategies. This is visible in the application of RAD in the Netherlands and 
a few other West-European countries. Providers explicitly intend to limit diagnostic testing 
to trisomies 21, 18 and 13 (although the probes tend to include the sex-chromosomes as 
well).  Although the aim of NIPT was to make diagnostic testing safe and early, and not to 
limit its scope, as yet the scope of testing by NIPT de	facto	is limited as well. NIPT initially 
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focussed on trisomy 21 only1,36,37, but increasingly includes trisomies 18 and 13 too.2,38-40 
Here I will discuss the ethical implications of this narrow scope of RAD and current NIPT, and 
show its impact on the prenatal testing cascade. Then, I will look ahead at the possibility to 
apply a broad NIPT in the future.
9.3.1	 Limitation	of	diagnostic	scope	
As shown in Chapter 2, RAD is introduced as a cheap, fast and targeted diagnostic test that 
allows informed consent and post-test decision-making to be easier because RAD only 
targets a few severe and clear abnormalities (except when sex-chromosomal abnormalities 
are included). The drawbacks are that it may miss clinically relevant abnormalities, and its 
unfavourable detection/miscarriage ratio. It is precisely this latter reason, the iatrogenic 
miscarriage risk of invasive procedures, that prompted the development of non-invasive 
prenatal testing techniques and eventually led to the recent introduction of NIPT in the 
prenatal testing cascade. As soon as NIPT will be used as a follow-up diagnostic test for 
trisomies 21, 18 and 13, the narrowing of the diagnostic scope will be similar to that of RAD. 
This seems to be generally overlooked, since the narrow scope of RAD has been criticised 
repeatedly, whereas the fact that NIPT de	facto narrows the focus to some trisomies as well 
has evokes less criticism. For now, it is important to realise that both RAD and NIPT limit the 
scope of testing to trisomies 21, 18 and 13.41
With the limitation of scope, the range of reproductive choices is limited too. This raises 
the question whether the limitation is compatible with the existing moral framework of 
prenatal screening. Clearly, these test offers facilitate reproductive decision-making and 
allow for adequate informed consent, but then for a few specific abnormalities only. If these 
narrow tests are offered as a standard, this means that not the users of the test (pregnant 
women, prospective parents) but the providers (professionals, policymakers) determine 
what constitutes important knowledge for prospective parents and thus to what range 
reproductive choice extends. As mentioned before (See: Chapters 2 and 6), the decision to 
offer a narrow diagnostic test is also based on the logic of the screening strategy (‘test what 
you screen for’) and takes the initial scope of screening as its point of departure, rather than 
pregnant women’s preferences. Empirical studies, including my own, have clearly shown that 
pregnant women are interested in knowing about more, primarily severe and hereditary, 
abnormalities beyond the traditional aneuploidies. If only a standard narrow test is offered, 
without giving opportunity for broader testing and taking prospective parents’ possible 
other preferences into account, this may not meet the principle of respect for persons, 
insofar as autonomous reproductive choice is not being facilitated. As for proportionality, 
the weighing of the essentials of narrow testing (easy to counsel and decide versus limitation 
of reproductive options) is very difficult and professionals’ and prospective parents’ views 
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considerably differ in that regard. Given these considerations, RAD and NIPT can be deemed 
to unjustly limit knowledge about the genetic make-up of the future child and thus restrict 
autonomous reproductive choice.42 This is not to say that offering more reproductive 
options is always to be favoured: the normative framework for prenatal screening leaves 
room for and can sometimes even necessitate limiting reproductive options for reasons of 
beneficence, proportionality and –in case of a state-funded test offer– of cost-effectiveness. 
But reproductive autonomy may require a broader range of options than a standard offer of 
RAD or NIPT does provide for. 
To solve the issue with regard to the choice between RAD and karyotyping, the concept 
of individualised choice has been proposed by various commentators, including myself.28,43 
Although this alternative may add to the emotional and cognitive burden of choice, it seems 
to comply best -at least in theory- with various features of the choice paradigm: pregnant 
women are allowed to evaluate the burdens and benefits (proportionality) of alternative tests 
themselves; autonomous reproductive choice is enabled, and in that regard the principle of 
respect for persons is respected. Of course, this does require that the individualised choice 
alternative is implemented in a non-directive way and with adequate pre- and post-test 
counselling. Only then the pitfalls of e.g. information overload and emotional or decisional 
overcharge are prevented.
9.3.2	 Limitation	of	screening	scope
NIPT does so far not serve as a safe substitute for invasive diagnostics for aneuploidies, as 
initially was and still is intended, but as a second-step risk-assessment tool for the major 
aneuploidies. In case of an adverse result, confirmation by means of invasive testing is still 
needed. This means that NIPT does not yet fulfil the promise of being early in the sense 
that a definitive diagnosis can be made early in pregnancy, that women have more time for 
deliberating about termination or continuation of the pregnancy, or that selective abortion 
can be performed earlier. However, the current use of NIPT can substantially reduce the 
number of invasive procedures needed for diagnosing aneuploid foetuses44,45, since the 
specificity of NIPT for the detection of trisomy 21 is considerably higher than that of the 
generally applied combined screening test (maternal serum screening and foetal nuchal 
translucency (NT) measurement). As yet, NIPT is neither cheap nor fast, but the cost of 
this test is expected to drop in the near future, and the reporting time may be reduced to 
only a few days. If NIPT will replace the current combined screening test for trisomies 21, 
18 and 13, this would mean that this initial screening will be less informative, since the NT-
measurement that may indicate a broad range of other foetal abnormalities, would then be 
missed. Does the benefit of NIPT, namely less invasive procedures to diagnose the trisomies 
because of its high prediction rate and low false positive rate1,37,46, outweigh this loss of 
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findings in providers’ and pregnant women’s view? In Chapter 4, I have sketched several 
scenarios, containing complementary tests, that would be able to compensate for the loss 
of possible findings. But why bother about this decrease in possible relevant findings? 
The ‘traditional’ and current scope of the combined screening test didn’t and still doesn’t 
explicitly target these other abnormalities after all, and strictly speaking they could be seen 
as ‘incidental findings’ of this screening test. From that perspective, complementary testing 
can be seen as enabling autonomous reproductive choice, but also as a manifestation of 
the purpose to maximise the detection of any affected pregnancy. The latter would point in 
the direction of a prevention paradigm. Therefore, the question whether complementary 
testing would be necessary or advisable in the choice paradigm is not easy to answer. This 
very much depends on what risks or abnormalities the supplementary tests actually target, 
whether pregnant women perceive knowledge about the additional findings as beneficial, 
how they balance this against the possible increased burden of additional testing, and 
whether adequate informed consent for these different test offers can be achieved. Would 
individualised choice offer a solution here as well? To answer this question, a proactive 
evaluation is needed of whether and to what extent this would actually serve reproductive 
autonomy. 
9.3.3	 NIPT	as	a	one-step	diagnostic	test	in	the	future
If NIPT will be offered as a general, 100% reliable, one-step diagnostic test for aneuploidies 
to all pregnant women, the information and issues to be dealt with will become conceptually 
easier, because the difficulties of risk-estimation and iatrogenic miscarriage will be absent.47 
However, the fact that the choice will be more ‘pure’ does not mean per se that adequate 
informed consent is easier to guarantee. Several commentators have argued that an easy, 
safe and early NIPT may be portrayed as a routine test by providers, may result in a rather 
thoughtless uptake by pregnant women, and may cause trivialisation of both prenatal 
testing and selective abortion.48,49 In fact, similar consequences may occur in the scenario 
that NIPT is offered as a second-tier screening test, because then the number of invasive 
procedures also decreases considerably. Trivialisation of testing and selective abortion may 
become an even more urgent issue if NIPT will (in the future) be offered for a much broader 
scope by means of a non-invasive whole genome test50 to all pregnant women. However, an 
increase in uptake and abortion does not necessarily indicate trivialisation, but may as well 
be a result of well-informed choice.51 
A recent empirical study about attitudes towards termination of pregnancy for trisomy 21 
after NIPT suggests that "more women will choose prenatal screening to gain knowledge 
without the intentions to terminate the pregnancy."47 If this attitude is also present in case of 
broad diagnostic testing that includes late(r)-onset diseases, the interests of future children 
should be accounted for and may limit either access to or the scope of testing. Still, if the 
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feared effects of trivialisation will indeed occur as a result of NIPT, it will be hard to maintain 
that prenatal screening allows for autonomous decision-making based on voluntariness and 
informed consent, because such a test offer will result in an ill-considered uptake that does 
not meet the generally accepted aim of prenatal screening. As shown in Table 9.1, these 
consequences are illustrative for a shift from offering opportunity for reproductive choice to 
maximising the number of affected pregnancies detected, and thus for moving toward the 
prevention paradigm. In that situation the early, easy and safe character of NIPT will become 
a disadvantage instead of being the long-sought solution for risky procedures. Is it possible 
that prenatal screening is too easy and safe to be good? As I have stressed in Chapter 3, the 
possible and unwanted consequences of NIPT should not be taken as a reason for rejecting 
this new technology, but as a ground for setting conditions aimed at bringing the test-offer 
in line with the choice-paradigm. This requires ensuring that prospective parents are always 
aware of what choice may ultimately be at stake here, namely termination or continuation 
of the affected pregnancy. As I will show in the next Section this means that the timing and 
way of offering NIPT has to be considered carefully. 
9.4 More and compound prenatal test offers 
Next to the mentioned techniques that either aim at or de	 facto result in more narrow 
testing, there is an inclination to intensify testing throughout the pregnancy and to use the 
same test for different purposes. The first development causes a fragmentation of testing, 
leading to an overall increase in test moments and test procedures, and to various scopes of 
testing. Secondly, it is increasingly the case that the same test has coinciding but conflicting 
goals, namely reproductive decision-making and pregnancy management: formerly I have 
referred to this as a heterogeneous compound test offer (See: Chapter 4). I will discuss these 
two developments in the indicated order. 
9.4.1	 Increase	in	number	of	tests	
In view of recent technological developments it can be expected that prenatal screening 
strategies will be extended to include more tests. An example is the possible offer of a stand-
alone NT-measurement and/or serum screening to compensate for the loss of findings if the 
current combined screening test for trisomies will be replaced by NIPT. Deans and Newson 
(2012) have compared several alternative strategies of implementing NIPT for trisomies 
21, 18 and 13. For that purpose, they assumed that NIPT would be 100% accurate and 
could serve as a diagnostic tool. They concluded that, from an ethical point of view, the 
best option would be to offer all pregnant women NIPT with combined screening for other 
foetal abnormalities and pregnancy-related conditions.52 According to them this alternative 
“would give choice to the greatest number of women, without introducing problems 
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associated with very early testing and loss of potential benefits of combined screening.”52 
Thus, they seem to assume that the potential increased yield of complementary testing does 
countervail the possible burden associated with additional testing. This, however, is not 
evident.6,35 Empirical research is needed to study the possible impact of fragmented testing, 
of sequential choices and of prolonged uncertainty and concern for pregnant women, 
especially if testing is offered throughout the whole pregnancy. Complementary testing for 
foetal abnormalities may lead to further (invasive) diagnostic testing or ultrasound scans 
and this may lengthen the period of what Barbara Katz Rothman has formerly called “the 
tentative pregnancy”53 - even to the extent that the whole pregnancy becomes ‘tentative’. 
The possible burden and confusion caused by test offers may also be increased if these aim 
to detect more and different kinds foetal conditions, as will be discussed in Section 9.5. The 
more tests are offered, the more reason there is to evaluate in advance whether the choice 
paradigm of prenatal screening can still be kept up and whether the possible benefits do 
outweigh the possible burdens. It also calls for carefully monitoring the consequences for 
pregnant women and society in general, in order to evaluate what increased testing brings 
about in practice.
9.4.2	 Heterogeneous	compound	test	offer
Apart from the consequences of an increased number of tests, there is a tendency to use 
one test for several purposes. An example is the use of the combined screening test to 
detect increased risk for pregnancy-related conditions such as pre-eclampsia, gestational 
diabetes, intrauterine growth restriction together with foetal abnormalities.54,55 Nicolaides 
proposes to combine early screening for foetal aneuploides with screening for pregnancy 
complications such as miscarriages and stillbirths, in one integrated prenatal visit at 11-13 
weeks of gestation.56 Based on the findings, a more “individualised patient and disease-
specific approach” will become possible.57 According to Wortelboer one could think of an 
“a la carte” program facilitating pregnant women to choose what foetal abnormalities or 
pregnancy complications they do want or do not want to be tested for.54 Although such 
a program may sound plausible and may seem to do justice to the principle that prenatal 
screening should be a matter of pregnant women’s own choice, there are two problems 
with it.
First, a combined screening test for foetal abnormalities and pregnancy related 
complications would search for fundamentally different matters in one go: on the one 
hand, foetal abnormalities that may be a reason for selective abortion or allow to prepare 
for the birth of an affected child, and on the other hand a test for treatable pregnancy 
complications that give reason for adjusted prenatal care or health interventions. This issue 
is not entirely new, since the same set of different test outcomes can be generated by the 
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second trimester (and increasingly also various first trimester) foetal ultrasound scans that 
all pregnant women are offered and that nearly all of them choose to undergo. According 
to the International Society of Ultrasound in Obstetrics and Gynecology (ISUOG) practice 
guidelines the objective of a mid-trimester foetal ultrasound scan is twofold: ”to provide 
accurate diagnostic information for the delivery of optimised antenatal care with the best 
possible outcomes for mother and fetus” and “to detect congenital malformations”.58 
Antenatal care may increasingly include treatment of foetuses in utero as well.59,60 The 
distinction between these objectives may in practice not always be made clear to pregnant 
women. Moreover, because the scan actually reveals information related to these different 
objectives simultaneously, in the actual provision of test results these objectives may get 
mixed up too.61 Testing for risks in the category ‘pregnancy complications’ are more or less 
taken for granted by practitioners and by most pregnant women, as an act of ‘good clinical 
care’. But when testing is offered in the other category (severe abnormalities in the foetus) 
this should never be portrayed as ‘routine’ or as ‘a matter-of-course’. When both categories 
are offered in one and the same go, it can easily be forgotten, or at least become blurred, 
that regarding the latter type of testing other considerations and choices are at stake that 
need a fundamentally other balancing of interests and values. Screening to ensure adequate 
prenatal and perinatal care and to achieve health gains for the mother and/or the foetus/
future child seems an obvious choice that may even allow a more directive attitude of 
clinicians to comply with testing. However, screening for foetal abnormalities should always 
be offered in a non-directive way and be based on well-informed decision-making in order 
to achieve an autonomous reproductive choice. When screening for pregnancy-related care 
and for foetal disorders will be combined, confusion about the different purposes may arise 
and that the distinction between the frameworks for good prenatal care on the one hand 
and for prenatal screening on the other hand may fade away. In order to avoid a blurring of 
these goals, it will be advisable to combine as little as possible the two different categories 
of screening in one test, at one moment, and in one counselling session. In the case of foetal 
ultrasound scans, however, this is practically impossible: then, the different categories of 
possible test outcomes should be made very clear in the pre-test counselling.
A second concern with a heterogeneous test offered for different purposes and various 
abnormalities is that the complexity of information and choices increases, which challenges 
both adequate provision of information and informed autonomous decision-making. This 
tension will manifest itself increasingly as the range of prenatal testing becomes broader. 
Again, NT-measurement may serve as an example. This test was initially introduced as 
part of the risk-assessment test for Down’s syndrome, but has gradually and more or less 
unnoticed developed into a test that actually also aims at finding different abnormalities. 
An NT ≥ 3.5 mm may indicate congenital heart defects and various genetic syndromes. This 
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means that the combined screening test may result in a need for follow-up testing and may 
eventually necessitate a decision about selective abortion for another reason than women 
were prepared for, namely one of the trisomies. Pregnant women are hardly or not at all 
informed about these possible outcomes in the pre-test counselling.62 However, based on 
the principle of respect for autonomy and the standard of informed consent, pregnant 
women need in the pre-test situation to be counselled about the fact that the combined 
screening test may indicate risk factors for other abnormalities as well. A similar situation 
has actually developed with regard to the aforementioned mid-trimester foetal ultrasound; 
this was -at least in the Netherlands- primarily offered as a test for neural tube defects such 
as spina bifida, but may indicate other disorders and pregnancy related risk factors as well. 
From an ethical perspective, it is favourable that pregnant women should be able to decide 
themselves for what conditions they want their foetus to be examined. But at the same time 
it is clear that this is actually impossible in case of increasingly advanced ultrasound scans28 
and may constitute ethical dilemmas for the clinician. This means that the advancement and 
expansion of prenatal testing capabilities put the feasibility of the ideal of informed choice 
under pressure, and therefore call for a reflection on both this ideal and prenatal testing 
practice. 
9.4.3	 From	prenatal	choice	to	postnatal	treatment
Some propose to include particular abnormalities in prenatal testing for reasons of early 
detection in order to expedite possible (postnatal) treatment as opposed to the option of 
reproductive choice. A recent study suggests that experts in the field of counselling and 
treatment of persons affected with sex chromosomal aneuploidies (SCAs), consider prenatal 
diagnosis of a SCA to be beneficial, because, according to them, this allows for early postnatal 
treatment and support.63 Therefore, they recommend to include the sex chromosomes in 
RAD. In their view, the possible parental decision to terminate a pregnancy because of a SCA 
identified is an adverse consequence, despite the fact that making a reproductive choice is 
exactly the reason why RAD is being offered in the first place. Following the line of reasoning 
of these experts, different abnormalities have to be included in RAD for opposite reasons: 
either to offer reproductive choice, or to allow for early postnatal treatment. As shown 
in Section 9.3.2, combining various aims in one test(moment) is problematic in principle, 
because they require a different attitude of the counsellor. A non-directive attitude should 
be adopted when testing is offered for reproductive decision-making, whereas a directive 
attitude may be justified if the foetus can be expected to grow into a future child, if that 
future child will have a great interest in early postnatal treatment and if prenatal detection 
of the disorder is of paramount importance for that early postnatal treatment. In general, 
though, it is not evident that the possible benefit of early postnatal clinical care justifies 
prenatal testing. 
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Regarding the possible benefit of early treatment, it is important to notice that symptoms of 
incidental prenatal SCAs can vary significantly and may show only a mild clinical phenotype 
only or no symptoms at all64 (See also: Chapter 2). A similar pattern can be seen in case 
of CNVs (See: Chapter 5). Here I take SCAs as an example. Against this background, the 
suggestion by Pieters (2012) to dismiss prospective parents’ moral right not to know about 
SCAs65 is far from evident. To justify depriving prospective parents of their right not to 
know firstly requires that the advantage of specific knowledge for the future child is great 
and beyond doubt. And even if the postnatal advantage for the future child would be 
obvious, the question still remains if this requires the identification of the SCA prenatally. 
Does prenatal identification allow prenatal treatment as well? To my knowledge, prenatal 
treatment of a SCAs is not possible yet, despite ongoing research in the field of foetal 
therapy for trisomies.66 This means that overruling the right not to know of pregnant women 
during the pregnancy, cannot be justified. Would, in the absence of prenatal treatment, 
neonatal testing be advisable or even needed then? Again, this would only be so if neonatal 
or early childhood treatment would obviously benefit the child. Unless proven otherwise, 
treatment, if necessary, may be early enough when the child, adolescent or adult actually 
shows symptoms of a SCA. 
A more general issue is that, even if there is a medical advantage to prenatal identification 
and postnatal early treatment in some cases, the question remains whether this (supposed) 
therapeutic advantage outweighs the possible drawbacks of not respecting prospective 
parents’ right not to know in the context of RAD. Prenatal diagnosis of a SCA may cause 
“stigmatisation, damage the child’s self esteem, and/or distort the family’s perception of the 
child”.65 Postponement of testing for SCA until symptoms become apparent, would at least 
have the advantage of not causing this possible negative impact. Instead, the person may live 
his or her life happily, healthy and unwittingly of this SCA. Moreover, one has to differentiate 
between the situation that a pregnant women is already having invasive testing, and the 
situation that she is not. In the latter case, the miscarriage risk of an invasive diagnostic test 
has to be accounted for as well. 
If the benefit of prenatal diagnosis of SCAs or, for that matter, of any other aberration, for 
the future child would clearly outweigh the possible drawbacks, then pregnant women 
should perhaps be persuaded to consent to being tested prenatally. A replacement of the 
aim of reproductive choice by a therapeutic purpose for the future child means that the 
choice-paradigm no longer applies, and that, for example, a non-directive attitude of the 
clinician is no longer required. On the contrary, a directive attitude may be more appropriate 
given the interests of the future child. 
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9.5 Standard broad test offer - microarrays 
The third development to be discussed is the increasing prenatal use of a broad, genome-
wide test for various indications in the prenatal setting. In this thesis I focused on microarray 
testing, that is increasingly being applied as a first or second-tier diagnostic tool. Compared 
to karytoyping, microarrays can detect more abnormalities, can generate results faster (in 
only a few days) and can be automated - which makes it less amenable for mistakes.67-69 
However, compared to karyotyping, microarrays identify more copy number variants of 
unknown clinical significance (VOUS), which is evaluated differently. Some want to avoid 
these findings because they complicate counselling and reproductive decision-making, 
whereas others do not want to miss out on possible clinically relevant variants among 
the VOUS. These opinions are reflected in the choice for applying either a directed or an 
undirected array, respectively. Earlier I have proposed to use this designation, because the 
terms ‘targeted microarray’ and ‘genome-wide microarray’ blur the ethical discussion (See: 
Section 5.3): both types of microarrays search the whole genome for CNVs, while the scope 
of neither of these arrays is specifically targeted to the initial diagnostic indication in the 
sense that RAD is adjusted to the scope of the prior risk-assessment for trisomies 21, 18 
and 13. Therefore, I have re-named the two kinds of microarrays as follows: a directed array 
focuses on regions throughout the genome known to be associated with clinically relevant 
abnormalities in order to identify all known CNVs; an undirected array searches the entire 
genome for both known and unknown CNVs. The term targeted I reserved for tests whose 
scope is attuned to the diagnostic question. If and insofar as a directed array is applied 
to clarify ultrasound abnormalities that are in themselves indefinable, it can be said to be 
targeted. An undirected array, however, can never be targeted. 
In this Section I want to examine more closely if and how the prenatal implementation of 
microarrays does or does not comply with the choice-paradigm for prenatal screening. More 
specifically I will address the ambiguous character of microarrays, the feasibility of adequate 
informed consent, and the overall proportionality of applying microarrays prenatally. If, in 
the future, whole exome/genome sequencing and analysis will be introduced in prenatal 
screening strategies this will raise similar issues, albeit to an even larger extent. 
9.5.1	 Moral	ambiguity	of	microarrays:	suitability	and	equal	access	
Testing by microarray is usually performed to clarify foetal ultrasound abnormalities 
and is thus meant to have a diagnostic aim. In Chapter 5 I have argued that this general 
representation does not adequately describe what actually happens in this situation, 
because both a directed and an undirected microarray actually screen the whole genome for 
CNVs either known to be (directed) or possibly being (undirected) clinically relevant. Thus, 
microarrays have an ambiguous character. Microarrays are performed for their increased 
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yield (around 6 % more findings than karyotyping in case of ultrasound aberrations), but it 
is not clear what % of this overall extra yield answers the diagnostic question or has to be 
labelled as ‘unexpected’ or ‘unsought for’ findings. This suggests that not the quality of the 
results, but the quantity of the results possibly gained by screening the whole genome is the 
main reason to apply a microarray. Ultrasound abnormalities are then a mere occasion to 
start this genome-wide search for CNVs. If a screening test is used for a diagnostic purpose, 
this does not necessarily change that purpose into screening as well. However, a choice 
for an undifferentiated test that results in identifying as much abnormalities as possible, 
irrespective of their relatedness to the diagnostic question, raises the question whether 
such a broad test is necessary and in line with the criteria of proportionality and subsidiarity: 
in short whether it constitutes a ‘suitable test’ for a diagnostic setting. To better fit those two 
criteria as well as the diagnostic aim of the test, the design of the microarray may have to be 
differentiated per type of (ultrasound) indication. 
The use of a wider screening test (microarray) for a diagnostic purpose also raises the 
question of equal access, because it challenges the justification of offering microarray 
testing to pregnant women with ultrasound abnormalities whose ‘increased risk’ is not 
necessarily related to the possible abnormalities found, and not offering it to other women 
who can also benefit from it. Some commentators state that reserving prenatal microarray 
testing for the group with ultrasound abnormalities only would “not be the optimal 
strategy”70, and propose to offer pregnant women with an increased risk for trisomies 21, 
18 and 13 microarray-based testing as well.71 It has also been proposed to consider offering 
microarrays to a	priori low-risk groups, since the detection rate of > 1:100 in this group is still 
above the procedure-related miscarriage risk.68,72 Moreover, empirical studies, including my 
own, show that pregnant women themselves may want to have additional testing beyond 
that of the traditional scope.73-75 These women would benefit from broader testing in the 
sense that their reproductive options would be increased: testing by microarray significantly 
adds to the finding of abnormalities in low-risk pregnancies as well, namely > 1-1,7:100.71,76 
If the finding of all clinically relevant findings is favoured, the question arises, why only an 
extra yield of 6% (in case of ultrasound anomalies) would justify applying this test, whereas 
a surplus of around 1,5% would not. After all, the general aim of prenatal screening is 
defined as offering opportunity for autonomous reproductive choice. Would the interest 
in such a choice be less in case of the 1,5% than in case of the 6%? If offering directed 
and undirected microarray testing de	facto results in screening, and if this is evaluated as 
being justified and proportional, then the principle of justice necessitates a reconsideration 
for the current policy of admittance to this test. Of course, financial costs are a point of 
consideration in a state-funded testing program. Testing by microarray is for now more 
expensive than karyotyping or RAD68 and only offered to a subgroup of pregnant women. 
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But costs of the test are expected to drop in the near future77, and the benefit of higher 
detection and increased reproductive choice for more women, eventually with alternative 
funding options, has to be accounted for. As for proportionality, important questions are 
whether the benefits of an increased yield outweigh the burdens of possibly inducing more 
unclarity to more women. Moreover, would a general offer of microarray based testing still 
fit in with a choice paradigm or rather represent important elements from the prevention 
paradigm of screening, such as optimising the detection of any affected pregnancies as a 
token of success? This depends, among other things, on the question whether, and if so, 
how the challenges with regard to requirements of adequate information, counselling, and 
informed consent can be solved. The borderline between a justified or an unjustified test 
offer in this particular screening context may turn out to be hard to define. 
In the discussion about RAD or karyotyping I have proposed to offer an individualised choice 
between these two test to pregnant women or the couple (See: Chapter 2). In the context 
of microarrays this may be an option too with regard to a choice between a targeted and a 
directed array. In cases where the indication allows for appropriate follow-up testing by a 
targeted array (namely to explain unclear karyotype results or major ultrasound findings), 
opting for a directed array would in fact no longer be diagnosis but come down to screening. 
Prospective parents should be made aware of this, if an individualised choice between 
a targeted and a directed array is being offered. In Chapter 5 it has been explained that 
whereas a directed microarray can be justified as a suitable test for prenatal screening 
purposes, this is unlikely for an undirected one. 
9.5.2		 Providing	adequate	information	for	microarray	testing
Bernardt et al. found that pregnant women experience microarray testing as “too good to 
pass up.”79 This corresponds with results from my own empirical study that potential users 
feared anticipated decision regret if they would not accept broad testing (See: Chapter 7). 
These findings give reason to closely monitor possible intrinsic pressure emanating from the 
test-offer itself, and to guard that the uptake is well-considered. Adequate information and 
voluntariness are essential aspects in the choice paradigm (See: Section 9.2.3), and the more 
these requirements are challenged, the more the choice paradigm is challenged too. This 
means that adequate information provision, including information about potential adverse 
consequences of broad testing, are essential to justify the prenatal offer of microarray based 
testing in the screening strategy.
In the Chapters 5 and 6, I have discussed the intrinsic difficulty of achieving adequate 
informed consent for microarray based testing and have mentioned attempts to determine 
categories of findings that may be useful for achieving general consent in the prenatal 
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context. To achieve a kind of general consent various solutions have been proposed in the 
context of genetics and genomics research and direct-to-consumer personal testing, varying 
from offering "packages"80 to "a menu of options"81. These proposals have in common that 
they cluster similar disorders and mutations and distinguish between heterogeneous ones, 
in order to make up a convenient arrangement of options where participants and consumers 
can choose from. For this purpose several types of disorders have been defined.82,83 I think 
that the image of "menus of disorders or mutation panels"84 can also be useful in the context 
of prenatal testing by microarrays. Test providers do in practice already select what findings 
they do and do not want to generate. To adequately inform pregnant women about these 
possible outcomes and to allow them to choose what results to receive or not, providers 
will have to explicate their own pre-selection on a surveyable menu of options offered to 
pregnant women. 
Does this mean that if equal access, adequate provision of information and voluntariness 
are guaranteed, that offering microarrays is morally sound? Not necessarily. I have proposed 
to not include VOUS in a microarray if these are merely included for the sake of research and 
can be precluded, because they do not contribute to well-considered decision making (See: 
Chapter 5). Be that as it may, other reasons also necessitate to scrutinise and limit the scope 
of the actual test offer beforehand, namely conflicting interests and competing reasons for 
testing.
9.5.3	 Looking	ahead	-	broad	to	what	extent?	Microarrays	and	beyond	
Apart from congenital disorders, a prenatal microarray may also generate, albeit infrequently, 
information about late(r)-onset disease if caused by a major deletion or duplication, 
and variants of unknown clinical significance - the VOUS. If, in the future, whole genome 
and whole exome sequencing (WGS/WES) and analysis (WGA/WEA) will be introduced 
prenatally, it will occur more frequently that, amongst other things, (predispositions for) 
late(r)-onset diseases, susceptibilities for complex diseases, and unknown abnormalities 
will be discovered.82,85 Such findings are generally referred to as ‘unexpected findings’85-87, 
which are in fact misnomers because these findings are known to be found if no measures 
are taken against it. In Chapter 8, it has been shown that genome-wide testing in different 
contexts raise similar ethical questions when such categories of findings are generated. 
Here, I will more particularly address the ethical issues raised if (in the future) WGS/WES 
and WGA/WEA are applied in the prenatal setting. 
In Chapter 6 I have discussed the difficulties related to untreatable, severe late-onset diseases, 
such as Huntington disease and hereditary Alzheimer disease, and proposed conditional 
access to these findings in order to preserve the future child’s right not to know.88,89 Would 
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the same procedure be needed for mutations for conditions that are less penetrant, less 
devastating or amenable to treatment? This primarily depends on the interpretation of 
the future child’s right not to know. Determining factors may for example be the degree 
of probability that the condition will indeed develop, the degree of burdens associated, 
how drastic and burdening possible prevention or treatment will be and at what age this 
should be started. Knowledge can be beneficial, if prevention strategies can be applied and 
the disease will either not develop or be milder in its consequences. But information can 
also be harmful, if certain knowledge does not lead to any health gain but does instead 
lead to, for example, parental confusion and anxiousness, adverse psycho-social effects on 
the parent-child relationship and/or stigmatisation of the child.85,90 In this situation a future 
child’s welfare may be at stake, because the information affects the parents and the future 
child in a way that may be harmful to that future child.91 As a provisional rule, I would 
propose to not risk infringing a future child’s autonomy, if there is no overriding interest for 
either the prospective parents or the future child in generating certain genetic information 
about the foetus. Even more restrictively interpreted: if there is no reproductive interest for 
prospective parents in knowing this information. After all, the foetus is tested as part of a 
prenatal screening strategy that aims to facilitate reproductive decision-making and not to 
gain maximal information about the foetus. 
Another disputable category is the foetus’ carrier status for an autosomal recessive disease 
or X-linked disease, that is mostly generated as an ‘unsought for’ finding. Although this 
foetus/future child will not be affected by this disease, prospective parents possibly have an 
interest in this knowledge to establish or exclude their own carrier status which is relevant 
for a possible next pregnancy in which the foetus may be affected with the actual disease. 
Despite the fact that this did not constitute the primary reason for wanting a prenatal 
test, it may be an important reason for wanting to be informed about these findings. This 
subject has already been much discussed in the neonatal context.92 Of course, it is relevant 
and important information. But if it could be avoided, would it not be more appropriate 
that these prospective parents get themselves tested instead of gaining this information 
trough testing their foetus? Another complication of genome-wide (in fact of all genetic) 
testing is that information generated about the foetus or person actually tested, may also 
have important implications for the (prospective) parents and other relatives. In case of a 
prenatal microarray parental samples are often taken together with the foetal sample, to 
determine if specific foetal alterations are inherited or de novo, and thus to enable a better 
interpretation of the results found in the foetal sample.68,76 This practice leads to dissolving 
the object of testing too: who actually gets tested? The foetus or the family? This question is 
not new and there have been discussions as to whether genetic information belongs to the 
individual or the family, and whether there is a legal and/or moral duty for family members 
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and/or clinical professionals to distribute relevant genetic information throughout the 
family.93-95 Apart from that, a question in the prenatal context is whether a possible health 
benefit for prospective parents and/or other relatives is a justified reason for wanting to be 
informed about certain findings generated by testing the foetus. Again, I would suggest that 
if information will not be used for reproductive decision-making regarding this pregnancy, it 
would be more appropriate to have the parents and/or relatives themselves tested, and to 
exclude, if possible, such information from prenatal testing arrays. Certainly so, if the future 
child may have an interest in not knowing that information.
Inclusion of the categories mentioned in a broad prenatal test leads to various ethical 
complications. One way to avoid these difficulties is to design the test in such a way that 
unwanted findings about late-onset diseases, susceptibilities and VOUS are not –or at least 
as little as possible– generated, or to ‘filter out’ these findings in the analysing phase.85 This 
solution seems to be preferable to the alternatives that such outcomes are generated and 
known in the laboratory but not passed on to the physician, or that the physician is informed 
about these findings but withholds these from the prospective parents. Both alternatives 
may bring the professionals in a situation where they see themselves confronted with 
conflicting interests and the responsibility of either providing or withholding possible relevant 
information. The option of filtering out specific information in the design or analysis avoids 
these problems, although it still not answers the question who is to determine the exact 
range of such a design or filter. Leaving this to professionals may be at odds with the ideal of 
reproductive autonomy in the sense that women are enabled to decide for themselves what 
information they find important. As proposed by several commentators, including myself, 
information about late(r)-onset should, however, only be included if prospective parents 
have indicated their intention to use that information for terminating the pregnancy in case 
of a positive result.88,89,96 If not, the future child’s right not to know is already violated before 
its birth. 
Whether and if so, to what extent, information about susceptibilities for complex diseases 
and for other than reproductive purposes should be made available has to be evaluated on 
the basis of the aim and proportionality of prenatal screening strategies. As argued above, I 
would suggest to, in principle, not include information that will not be used for the intended 
reproductive decision-making, unless there is an overriding medical advantage for the 
future child to be tested prenatally for certain conditions. In the latter case, however, the 
aim of testing is completely different and a shift of paradigm will take place (See: Section 
9.3.3). Given the increasing application of microarrays and the pending introduction of WGS 
and WES in the prenatal context, it has to be decided upon urgently what scope or design of 
broad tests is favourable from an ethical point of view.
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9.5.4	 Proportionality:	the	balance	between	benefits	and	burdens
I have discussed various implications of applying microarrays in the prenatal screening 
strategy and shown that it involves both benefits and burdens. The question whether 
offering microarrays is proportional has to be evaluated in relation to its purpose: to what 
degree does it contribute to reproductive autonomous decision-making, and what are the 
personal, societal and financial costs to achieve that?
With respect to potential participants of screening, the advantage of microarray techniques 
is that these can detect more clinically relevant abnormalities and that the turnaround time 
is faster than in case of conventional karyotyping. Disadvantages are that microarrays may 
cause more anxiety, complicate pre- and post-test counselling and make decision-making 
more difficult due to more, heterogeneous and more unclear outcomes. A major challenge 
is to ensure adequate informed consent and pre-test counselling, in order to prevent that 
the possible follow-up of an ultrasound scan by microarray testing may result in falling into 
a so-called ‘screening trap’.97 If the mentioned burdens and challenges of microarrays can 
be decreased by offering an alternative test that generates less troubling outcomes while 
still achieving the goal of offering opportunity for meaningful reproductive decision making 
in this context, such an alternative has to be favoured. Proportionality is closely related to 
subsidiarity that requires to choose the alternative, in this case the test, that has the least 
far-reaching and troubling side effects while still reaching its aim. From that perspective, 
it is necessary to investigate the viability of modifying microarrays in such a way that they 
are the most suitable and proportional test for the purpose they serve. A well-adapted 
microarray can best prevent a blurring of the lines between prenatal and postnatal testing, 
between clinic and research, and between various purposes of prenatal microarray testing. 
The "rapid assay"78 that has been proposed by Shaffer et al. may serve as an example of an 
alternative to RAD, karyotyping and microarrays. This assay includes, beside the common 
aneuploidies of chromosomes 21, 18, 13, X and Y, selected loci meeting the following 
criteria: “the selected syndromes are relatively common among chromosomal disorders; 
the deletions are not detectable, or may be missed, by karyotype analysis; the syndromes 
result in a known, definable phenotype or outcome that is relatively severe; the syndrome 
does not usually present with abnormal ultrasound findings; and the deletion is the major 
mechanism giving rise to the syndrome.”78 This rapid assay can be seen as an in-between for 
karyotyping and microarrays and shows that it is possible to differentiate tests to a wished 
for scope. The evaluation of what diagnostic yield is suitable and outweighs the possible 
disadvantages for individual prospective parents in general is difficult to make because this 
very much depends on how they themselves evaluate and experience the various pros and 
cons. It may be an option to develop various tests-platforms that allow to differentiate per 
indication, purpose and desire, while observing the limits set by others’ (i.e. the future 
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child’s) interests and the overall aim of prenatal screening strategies. Thus an individualised 
choice between the differentiated tests can be offered. 
From a societal perspective, the provision of prenatal screening strategies should take into 
account the benefits and burdens it involves for other persons and society as a whole, 
including the requirements proportionality, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility.98,99 If the 
scope of microarray testing is not in line with the indication and reasons it is offered for, 
it may constitute a kind of ‘excessive diagnostics’ as some physicians in our empirical 
study characterised both microarray testing and conventional kayotyping, when offered to 
pregnant women at increased risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 only (See: Chapter 7). Insofar as 
the diagnostic yield of microarrays outranges the ultrasound abnormalities found, the same 
can be said about microarray testing in this context. 'Overdiagnosis' is a familiar problem in 
the context of screening and may lead to a waste of resources in health care.100,101 Financial 
cost-effectiveness is an important aspect in state-funded screening strategies, because 
society contributes to its financial costs. Microarray techniques themselves are (as yet) 
more expensive than conventional karyotyping, but cost-effectiveness is not determined 
by means of the costs of separate tests alone. An important part is also to explicate the 
(saved) incremental costs for live-born children having an abnormality that can be avoided 
by offering these different tests. To my knowledge, these net costs of both scenarios have 
not been studied yet while they are an inextricable part of the justification in publicly funded 
screening. These are also relevant for determining the cost-utility of prenatal screening99,102, 
albeit the merits of prenatal screening may be particularly difficult to quantify in generic 
measures as this economic technique requires. What exactly does constitute a ‘health gain’ 
in this context, given that the extent in which reproductive choices are facilitated should be 
taken as the measure of success in the choice-paradigm? A cost-utility analysis comparing 
prenatal screening strategies along with other types of screening or care will encounter 
even more difficulties than comparisons of other health-care services. Still this issue has to 
be addressed in view of the increasing possibilities for prenatal screening. 
Finally, Shuster (2007) has argued that microarray technologies will probably undermine 
the values of autonomy, fairness and non-discrimination103, because these broad testing 
techniques may increase discrimination and social pressure to bear a healthy child. Other 
commentators, however, argue that if only a few conditions are targeted, a possible 
discriminating effect is more likely to occur than if testing is directed toward a broad range 
of abnormalities: after all, “we’re all mutants”104 when taking into account the range of DNA 
differences between individuals.In that regard, a possible message of not being welcome in 
society could either hit us all or none of us. In both cases a discriminatory message would 
be absent, since it would not be targeted at a few groups of people only.105 On the other 
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hand, it is argued that a broad scope of prenatal screening will result in a general attitude 
of less acceptance of all abnormalities in children: they will increasingly be seen as having 
slipped through the prenatal screening net.103 This possible adverse consequence is regularly 
mentioned by several commentators and in the media. It was also mentioned as a threat by 
participants in several empirical studies, including my own.103,106 What consequences broad 
prenatal testing will have in practice remains to be monitored and especially to be guarded. 
It is imperative for the justifiability of any prenatal screening strategy that uptake is always 
the result of autonomous decision making, i.e. that the decision has come about without 
undue influence of society and/or professionals, and that adequate care is available for 
those who need it. The reverse of not offering broader testing out of fear for adverse social 
consequences is that prospective parents are withheld the opportunity for meaningful 
reproductive decision-making and avoidance of suffering. 
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Part III Reproductive autonomy in context
Introduction
In Part I, I have sketched the background of the normative framework for prenatal screening. 
The choice-paradigm was meant to obviate the main objection to the prevention-paradigm 
of prenatal screening, namely that screening was used as a societal instrument to prevent 
disease, just as in other screening programmes. Current prenatal screening programmes are 
based on the view that prenatal screening can be justified if the programme aims at providing 
prospective parents with what they themselves regard as meaningful reproductive options, 
and meets the requirements of, amongst other things, proportionality, non-directivity and 
informed consent. Prenatal screening has been developed in line with its background in 
public health and clinical genetics, which both focused on the possible identification of a 
few (severe) conditions only. Severity and prevalence were decisive factors for including 
disorders in the screening program. As a result, reproductive autonomy in this context was 
interpreted in a very narrow sense and meant that (a subgroup of) pregnant women were 
offered a standard test that they could either accept or decline.
In Part II we have seen that this picture has changed recently. New techniques for detecting 
the (likely) presence of either a small or a broad range of foetal abnormalities find their 
way into prenatal screening strategies, causing the scope of testing to be far from evident. 
Although new tests may be implemented for the sake of presumed ‘good clinical care’ and 
create new reproductive options for pregnant women, they do not always fit in with the aim 
and requirements of the normative framework. On the one hand, tests with a narrow scope 
(RAD, current NIPT), restrict reproductive decision-making to some specific abnormalities 
only. This means that reproductive choice for prospective parents is limited, irrespective 
of their own preferences. Is this an adequate way to interpret the concept of reproductive 
autonomy in this context? Why focus on Down’s syndrome and not include other conditions, 
for example fragile X-syndrome, that may to some extent have similar phenotypic 
consequences? Can narrow testing be justified, knowing that pregnant women may want to 
know about a broader range of conditions? And if one thinks there is a discriminating effect, 
would this not be stronger if testing focuses on a few abnormalities than if testing includes a 
broader range of aberrations? On the other hand, broad risk-assessment and diagnostic tests 
(ultrasound scans and microarray based tests, respectively) for a (genome-) wide range of 
abnormalities are provided as a standard to (specific groups of) pregnant women. Although 
a broad scope of testing may be welcomed by some, others may prefer testing to be limited 
to some serious and clear abnormalities only, in order to reduce the burden of decision-
making and choice. Since broad tests may lead to many heterogeneous and sometimes 
unclear findings, it is difficult –if not impossible– to obtain informed consent as traditionally 
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understood. Can broad testing then still be said to promote reproductive autonomy, or 
does it lead to an information overload and undermine reproductive autonomy instead? 
Moreover, the scope of microarrays often seems rather arbitrarily and not always tailored to 
the indication pregnant women present with. This leads to unequal access to testing as well. 
If, in principle, prenatal testing for both a narrow and a broad scope is feasible, who is then 
to decide what to test for and why? On what grounds, if at all, can a preconceived test 
offer be justified? What was meant by the aim of promoting reproductive autonomy, and 
do earlier interpretations of this concept still hold in the context of current and possible 
future technological developments? The offer of one standard test has been replaced by 
the alternative of an individualised choice in one specific situation: women at increased 
risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 are given the opportunity in a few North-West European 
countries to choose between RAD and karyotyping. By offering this option, women can 
choose less than the traditional test. But why should reproductive autonomy not equally 
require that pregnant women are enabled to choose more than what is traditionally 
provided for in screening strategies? In that scenario, women could be offered a choice 
between karyotyping and microarrays. Can or should tests be individualised in such a way 
that the scope is determined by what prospective parents themselves find relevant for their 
reproductive decision-making? 
In this final part III, I will briefly outline why, in my opinion, individualised choice may be a 
justifiable way to translate the notion of reproductive autonomy in the prenatal screening 
context. At the same time, I will suggest to further qualify reproductive autonomy in order to 
do justice to the aim and health care context of prenatal screening, to ensure the feasibility 
of autonomous choice and to guarantee the future child’s interests. I will round off with 
some concluding remarks. 
9.6 From a standard to an individualised test offer
The introduction of new techniques in prenatal screening strategies has led to a certain 
degree of arbitrariness in what abnormalities are included and to whom tests are offered. 
Moreover, the current cascade of tests does not always meet the preferences of women 
- and professionals themselves prefer to offer different tests too. An offer of RAD limits 
pregnant women’s autonomous choice and may not correspond with the trade off 
between benefits and burdens as evaluated by these women themselves (See: Chapter 2). 
A broad diagnostic test, like microarrays, may neither correspond with pregnant women’s 
preferences, nor suit the purpose of informed decision-making. I have argued earlier that 
the option of an individualised choice between RAD and karyotyping would be in line with 
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the general aim of offering opportunities for autonomous reproductive choice (See: Chapter 
2). Likewise, Ganesamoorthy et al. recently found with regard to microarrays that “the issue 
of balancing the use of the highest resolution arrays to maximise detection against the 
drawbacks of novel or uncertain findings may best be managed by giving parents the option 
of high-resolution or low-resolution, targeted, prenatal analysis.”107 I think this proposal 
also comes down to an offer of individualised choice (between an undirected and directed 
microarray, respectively), although this concept is not mentioned explicitly. Both situations 
have in common that they concern diagnostic tests –at least theoretically– offered to a 
preselected group of pregnant women. However, it has become clear in this thesis that 
current risk-assessment tests may lead to unequal access to diagnostic follow-up testing. 
Since the aim of facilitating reproductive autonomy is meant to hold for the whole prenatal 
strategy, this inequality is hard to justify. If we take seriously the classical account of the aim 
of prenatal screening, it seems that pregnant women themselves should also have a say in 
what disorders their foetus is to be tested for. Offering an individualised choice may meet 
this intention. That way, providers and pregnant women can be seen as partners who both 
contribute to the decision of what test best fits the individual situation and preferences. 
To some extent this may resemble a form of ‘personalised medicine’, conceptualised as 
designating care and tests tailored to the individual concerned.108 Applied to the prenatal 
testing cascade, this would mean that prenatal screening no longer has a system-based 
approach, taking some targeted abnormalities or techniques as the point of departure, but 
a more individual-driven approach, in which the choice of the individual pregnant woman 
(and her partner) are guiding instead. 
An individualised-choice scenario means replacing a ‘one size fits all’-view for a more pa-
tient-specific approach. I propose such a patient-specific, individualised approach to pre-
natal screening because it better meets a person’s wants and preferences, and in that re-
gard contributes to promoting autonomous reproductive choice. In this scenario, pregnant 
women are made aware that they can be confronted with two different paths of testing 
throughout the pregnancy: one directed at pregnancy management, the other aimed to-
wards generating information that may be relevant for reproductive decision-making in the 
sense of termination or continuation of the pregnancy. Regarding the latter path, the pre-
liminary question will be whether pregnant women want to be offered this type of testing 
at all. In case of a confirmative answer, the follow-up strategy will be to find out for what 
abnormalities they want their foetus to be tested in order to be allowed a reproductive 
choice. Can such an approach still be considered prenatal screening in the traditional sense 
of being a health care initiated test offer to (a specific group in) the population? I think it 
does, since the initiative to raising the issue of prenatal testing still rests with public health 
authorities or professionals. But the concept of individualised choice would mean a major 
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change in practice, insofar as women themselves are allowed to indicate what (scope of) 
test they prefer. This can be considered an inverse of the current testing cascade, insofar 
as the preferred diagnostic scope instead of a risk-assessment for pre-sorted abnormalities 
becomes leading for the decision of what test to offer. For that purpose, several test options 
with a varying scope have to be developed and to be made available. For now, an invasive 
test would be needed to generate a final diagnosis. In the future, one may think of offering 
NIPT-tests with an alternate scope.
9.7  Shaping reproductive autonomy in prenatal screening
Does the concept of an individualised choice mean that ‘anything goes’ and that prospective 
parents have to be offered whatever test they wish for? The answer is “no”. From an ethical 
perspective, several factors are relevant with regard to the question what interpretation of 
reproductive autonomy can be justified in this specific prenatal context. This interpretation 
subsequently co-determines the possible scope of an individualised choice. A first factor is 
that promoting opportunity for reproductive choice as	such can hardly be seen as a justified 
aim of a public health program. If the possibility for choice is provided by society, it seems 
that it should concern a serious health problem and not include trivial health related or 
non-health related features. Therefore, reproductive autonomy is limited to serious health 
related features beforehand. Second, the concept of individualised choice sounds great and 
seems to correspond fine with the aim of promoting reproductive autonomy in	theory. But 
giving pregnant women the opportunity to determine themselves what they want their 
foetus to be tested for, may in	practice undermine rather than promote their autonomy, 
because of the complexity of that choice. This renders another reason to limit the concept 
of reproductive autonomy in this context. Third, it has been shown that the future child’s 
right not to know may be violated if prenatal testing is offered without a proviso. Finally, 
the shifting aims of prenatal screening may necessitate a further restriction. Below, I will 
address in more detail these aspects on the interpretation of reproductive autonomy.
9.7.1	 The	qualified	nature	of	reproductive	autonomy	
The two traditions of clinical genetics and public health underlie the scope of prenatal 
screening and the interpretation of reproductive autonomy in this context. Clinical genetics 
focused primarily on serious heritable diseases, and the initial WHO-criteria for screening 
included that “the condition sought should be an important health problem”.5 In later 
interpretations the object of screening is described less specific: “The screening programme 
should respond to a recognised need.”9 If prenatal screening is funded publicly or collectively, 
as it indeed is in most Western countries, then it should be restricted in such a way that 
it does meet a state’s duty of care and can produce health gains or, in case of prenatal 
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screening, options to act on that are not only regarded as worthwhile by those concerned 
but also by most people in society.12 In the prenatal context it can of course be debated 
what exactly constitutes a worthwhile option, because this is to a great extent determined 
by the persons concerned. Still, the scope of prenatal screening is at least always connected 
with health-related features, because of its public health character. This rests on financial 
considerations too. The principle of distributive justice requires a "fair, equitable and 
appropriate distribution"7 of financial means. From that perspective, inclusion of more and 
marginal abnormalities may be hard to justify if this is more expensive than testing for a few 
severe abnormalities only. This reasoning has played an important part in the traditional and 
current limitation of prenatal test offers. Advancing technology may in the future allow for 
diagnostic testing for a wide and heterogeneous range of foetal abnormalities, for example 
by a broad NIPT. Although the test itself may be relatively cheap, the costs for counselling 
are likely to increase if adequate informed consent and autonomous decision-making are 
taken seriously. 
Restraint against broadening the scope of prenatal screening to minor abnormalities may 
also be influenced by the consideration that selective abortion is a possible consequence of 
this publicly initiated test offer. Abortion is a morally sensitive issue, because of the moral 
status of the foetus. The generally accepted gradualist view in Western countries is that the 
status of the embryo/foetus is initially relatively low, but increases with its development. 
This means that abortion is never a morally indifferent act, and that the interests put 
forward to justify abortion should be of sufficient importance. In this regard, selective 
abortion, because of the expected major burden of severe abnormalities is easier to justify 
than abortion because of milder conditions that would only marginally affect the parents’ 
and future child’s life. 
In short, the public health character of prenatal screening is likely to retain a limiting effect 
on the scope of testing and may justify confinement to serious health-related features only. 
Although it is notoriously difficult to find agreement on what constitutes a serious enough 
health problem for prenatal screening purposes, there is no getting away from this aspect in 
the discussion about the scope of prenatal screening.
9.7.2		 Restrict	and	adapt	choices	for	the	sake	of	autonomy	
In this thesis it has been mentioned several times that it is problematic to demarcate the scope 
of prenatal screening based on reasons of severity and prevalence of disorders. Severity is 
evaluated very differently, phenotypes may vary and prospective parents differ considerably 
in what risk they are willing to accept and what burden they are able or willing to bear. Does 
this mean that it is not professional societies that should define what conditions are serious 
enough to screen and abort for, but that this should be left to the actual pregnant woman 
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and her individual doctor, as Wertz and Knoppers have suggested a decade ago?34 This partly 
holds true, and constitutes a major reason to favour an individualised choice. But I also 
think that for organisational reasons and for the feasibility of an adequately informed and 
autonomous choice, some prior limitations to the scope of testing are inevitable. Otherwise, 
the choice would become too complex to make. The question of what autonomy in the 
prenatal context means has come up regularly: should the emphasis be on maximising the 
amount of information and reproductive options or on optimizing and easing the process 
of decision-making? In the preceding part I have shown that maximising information or 
options per se may counteract autonomous decision-making, while confining the domain of 
choice concerned may contribute to the aim of achieving autonomous reproductive choice.
One could object that constraining the scope of prenatal screening does always constitute 
a form of paternalism because it limits reproductive autonomy as such. To a certain extent 
it does indeed. But I suggest that it may be justified to act paternalistically and limit the 
scope of prenatal screening beforehand, in order to enable prospective parents to make an 
autonomous reproductive choice at all. 
In this context it is important to realise that the concept of autonomy as an ideal does 
not necessarily mean that more information leads to a more autonomous choice as well. 
Not only the amount of information, but also the quality of the decision-making process 
is relevant in this regard. Although it may be contra-intuitive, one may have to offer less 
information to enable more opportunity for choice. Phrased otherwise: decision-making 
may be enhanced by restraining information. 
The drawbacks of information overload and difficult decision-making have been mentioned 
regularly throughout this thesis. Persons may get overwhelmed and confused by the 
information and decisions they face, and this may impair their capacity to make an 
autonomous choice. This means that the options and choices offered should not exceed 
persons’ capacities. Dworkin (1988) was one of the first to argue that, from a moral point 
of view, more is not always preferable to less. However, he also indicates that “(a) decent 
respect for autonomy of individuals will lead us to be very wary of limiting choices even when 
it is in the rational self-interest of the individuals concerned.”6 Therefore, not any restriction 
of choice is to be welcomed. A justified and appropriate limitation of choices can in his view 
only be determined by giving due consideration to, amongst other things, the particular 
purpose, choices, persons, benefits and costs at hand.6 A similar picture has been drawn by 
Schwartz in his book ‘The paradox of choice. Why more is less’. He describes how people can 
get lost in the burden and amount of choices they are confronted with and concludes that 
“we should learn to view limits on the possibilities we face as liberating not constraining.”35 
Finally, the discourse of Sunstein and Thaler about so-called “libertarian paternalism" is 
informative in this regard.109 They claim that it is possible to influence behaviour, while also 
General discussion
173
Chapter 
9
respecting freedom of choice. In their view, persons are always influenced somehow by how 
the context and dilemmas are framed. In that sense, persons do not always make a well-
considered autonomous choice. Especially not, if it concerns a complicated and unfamiliar 
domain and the decision has to be made infrequently. I think that prenatal screening can 
be seen as one of these domains where most prospective parents are confronted with 
inherently complex and rare decision-making. Of course, persons can still make good choices 
if they receive adequate information, but “(s)o long as people are not choosing perfectly, 
it is at least possible that some policy could make them better off by improving their 
decisions.”109 Just to be clear, this notion of ‘improvement’ means setting the conditions for 
improving their own decisions. From this perspective, paternalism does not always have to 
involve unjustified pressure or coercion: it may as well determine policies that do not make 
individual choices impossible, but on the contrary enable and even promote autonomous 
decision-making. Applied to our prenatal screening case, this means that if providers and/or 
professionals are allowed to take part in deciding the scope of abnormalities to be included 
in a prenatal test, the ideal of reproductive autonomy per se need not be limited in an 
unjustified way. 
A challenge is still how to reach adequate informed consent if the test offer would include 
several test options where prospective parents are supposed to choose from. The need 
for categorising types of test-outcomes and reshaping the traditional interpretation of 
informed consent by a model of general consent has been mentioned as a possible solution 
(See: Chapters 5 and 6). The image of a menu of options has been mentioned in case of 
microarrays (See: Section 9.5.2) but may be just as useful in this context, when looking for 
ways to enable individualised choice: while the test providers select what’s on the menu, 
prospective parents are enabled to choose à la carte.
To ensure that prospective parents’ views and preferences are taken into account with 
regard to the scope of testing, the pre- and post-test counselling has to satisfy more than 
the requirements of adequate information and non-directiveness alone. As proposed in 
Chapter 7, the ‘interpretive model’ of the professional-patient relationship as introduced 
by Emanuel and Emanuel110 seems to comply best with what is needed in this situation. 
This model allows for a collaboration of the professional and the –in our case– pregnant 
woman to choose the test option that suits the woman’s situation and preferences best. 
To reach that, the professional helps the woman to clarify her own wants and values, and 
to reach the decision that best fits her. But, as we will see below, the professional is also 
obliged to complete the moral assessment by making clear that there may be other moral 
issues that need to be accounted for. In that regard, the woman’s own agenda alone is not 
indicative for the decision-making process. Ethical considerations that have a limiting effect 
on the available options may need to be discussed. From that perspective, considerations 
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put forward by the professional are not noncommittal. They may for example include 
information and explanation of why certain options cannot or can only conditionally be 
included in the test offer - for example to safeguard the future child’s interests and rights. 
The professional has a duty to provide this kind of information and considerations that the 
woman herself is either unaware of or prone to depreciate. In that regard, elements of the 
‘deliberative model’110 are included as well in this counselling situation. 
9.7.3	 Interests	of	the	future	child	
An important limiting factor for the interpretation of reproductive autonomy in the prenatal 
screening context is the interest of the future child. I have discussed earlier the problems 
that arise if late-onset diseases are included in the test offer (See: Chapters 5 and 6). If the 
predisposition for such a finding is found in the foetus and the pregnancy is continued, 
the future child’s right not to know would be violated. To avoid that, I have proposed (in 
Chapter 6 and in part II of this Chapter) to not include such findings in a prenatal test if 
prospective parents do not intend to abort in case of an adverse test result. However, if 
they want to use this information for their reproductive decision-making, conditional access 
may be given. This reasoning may apply to other findings as well. I have discussed the case 
of sex chromosomal aneuploidies (SCAs). As long as the consequences for the future child 
are unknown but possibly adverse (e.g. emotional harm or burden, negative influence on 
the parent-child relationship, stigmatisation), would it not be preferable to design the test 
in such a way that this information will not be generated? In the neonatal and postnatal 
context it is generally accepted that neonates and children are not tested for (late-onset) 
diseases that cannot be prevented or treated early in childhood. Similarly, reproductive 
autonomy as promoted in prenatal screening should not be at the cost of the informational 
privacy and integrity of the future child. 
9.7.4	 The	purport	of	reproductive	autonomy	
In policy documents and also in this thesis, reproductive choice is sometimes phrased 
in terms of ‘choosing to continue or terminate the pregnancy’. Currently, prospective 
parents often choose to terminate a pregnancy if the foetus turns out to be affected by 
an abnormality. Others want to be tested and informed to be able to prepare themselves 
for the birth of an affected child. Both options are generally understood as being part of 
prospective parents’ reproductive autonomy. According to a recent study by Verweij et al 
(2013), the introduction of NIPT is likely to “cause a shift in decision-making in which more 
women will choose prenatal screening to gain knowledge without the intention to terminate 
the pregnancy.”47 
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Reproductive autonomy presupposes that pregnant women are entitled to information 
about their foetus. Having this information at one’s disposal is a necessary condition to 
realise one’s reproductive autonomy. This does however not mean that pregnant women 
have a right to obtain such information per	 se: access to information is explicitly for the 
purpose of one’s reproductive autonomy. As reported in the preceding Section, access may 
be limited for reasons of the interest of the future child. Are there also other reasons to limit 
the provision of information about the foetus? What exactly is the purport of reproductive 
autonomy in this regard? It seems to be accepted that obtaining information for the sake 
of reassurance during pregnancy is part of one’s reproductive autonomy. The same goes for 
preparing oneself for the birth of an affected child. But is the wish to be informed for reasons 
of curiosity only, part of it too? In view of the ever broadening scope, and the possible 
increasing ease and safety of (future NIPT) prenatal testing, there is reason to contemplate 
what exactly should be understood as belonging to one’s reproductive autonomy. Would 
it be reasonable to favour a more narrow interpretation of the aim of prenatal screening, 
namely that the foetus is only to be tested and prospective parents are only to be informed 
insofar this is relevant for their reproductive decision to abort or not?
This question is also relevant from the perspective of proportionality and opportunity costs. 
Will there be a turning point in the scenario described by Verweij et al?47 If more women 
only want to be informed about possible health-related peculiarities of their foetus without 
considering termination of the pregnancy, how should this ‘gain of knowledge’ on the 
collective level be balanced against the health gains that can be reached by other types of 
screening or health-care services? Will it be proportional to continue the prenatal testing 
cascade, whatever the partition between continuation or termination of pregnancies will be? 
In view of the developments ahead, there is a need to discuss and examine more closely 
what can be justified by the aim of reproductive autonomy and what not. 
9.7.5	 A	compound	prenatal	test	offer
A specific complication with regard to the aim of prenatal screening is the fact that in 
practice tests are offered for two colliding reasons simultaneously. On the one hand, testing 
may aim to identify foetal abnormalities that are relevant for reproductive decision making 
— the kind of testing that has dominated the discussion in this thesis. On the other hand, 
testing may be offered to identify pregnancy related problems, either with the mother 
or the foetus, that need to be treated in order optimise pregnancy outcomes (pregnancy 
management). I have earlier referred to this situation of combining divergent aims in one 
test as a 'compound test offer' (See: Chapter 4). The first trimester combined test and NIPT-
testing are examples of tests that can indicate and are actually offered for both kinds of 
reasons.54,58,111 Although it may be practical and efficient to combine testing for these two 
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purposes in one test and one test-moment, from a moral point of view it is necessary to 
conceptually distinguish between these different purposes of testing. Professionals’ attitude 
can and should be different in these situations. Whereas non-directivity is a major value in 
the normative framework for prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities22, professionals 
may have a directive attitude in persuading women to consent in testing that benefits the 
pregnant woman, the foetus (and future child) or both. It seems that things become confusing 
if both kinds of tests, requiring a different attitude and leading to different test-outcomes 
and decision-making consequences, are offered simultaneously. To avoid any misconception 
in this regard, it seems morally preferable to carry out the conceptual distinction between 
the two purposes in practice as well: in pre-test counselling, in the actual test offer and in 
the post-test situation when informing testees about the test results.
The (ever more detailed) ultrasound scans, however, do not allow for a clear distinction 
between the two purposes and the two kinds of findings in practice. Whether it be NT-
measurement or the extended second trimester foetal ultrasound scan, both identify 
abnormalities and markers that indicate foetal aberrations and pregnancy complications 
simultaneously. If, in this situation, the woman has indicated that she does not want to know 
about foetal abnormalities, but wants to be tested for reasons of pregnancy management, 
it is impossible to respect her right not to know. The actual ultrasound scan and the 
interpretation of the image happen in the proximity of the pregnant woman. Professionals 
cannot help noticing abnormalities, and their (nonverbal) reactions may already reveal that 
they have discovered ‘something’. Moreover, the professional may be in a difficult situation 
if he or she detects an abnormality that requires adapted prenatal or perinatal care in the 
interest of the future child. In the future this may also include options for foetal therapy. 
The only solution then seems to inform the women beforehand about the fact that one aim 
(pregnancy management) does not come without the other (detecting foetal abnormalities 
relevant for reproductive decision making), and that in that sense testing by ultrasound scan 
is an ‘all or nothing’ deal. Insofar prenatal testing may clearly benefit the future child and 
does not imply a disproportionate burden to the woman herself, it cannot be considered a 
noncommittal test offer either. In that regard, shaping reproductive autonomy is not only 
about making choices, but may involve having duties as well. 
9.7.6	 Some	final	remarks	
With regard to prenatal testing in order to promote reproductive autonomy, an inclination 
to pursue maximising the yield of testing may run counter to the choice-paradigm. Ever 
broader testing may render adequate informed or generic consent infeasible, and thus 
cross the line between a justified and unjustified prenatal screening strategy. For that 
reason, reproductive autonomy should be qualified. I have outlined some of the qualifying 
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aspects. The list above may not be complete and there may be other factors that need to 
be accounted for when setting out the scope of reproductive autonomy in this particular 
context. Still, the factors mentioned may serve as elements to consider when contemplating 
how the normative framework for prenatal screening needs to be supplemented: the aim 
of prenatal screening needs to be specified, its relation with the medical model needs to be 
upheld, the traditional account of informed consent has to be adjusted, and the medical and 
informational interests of future children have to be accounted for. The screening practice is 
in need for some changes too: one standard test offer seems no longer appropriate, various 
test options that better accord with women’s preferences are to be developed, and the 
counselling of pregnant women to reach an individualised choice has to be adapted. In the 
near future, further ethical analysis and empirical research (for instance in the form of pilots 
exploring specific forms of ‘individualised choice’) are needed to study whether that way 
prenatal test strategies can better achieve what they aim for. 
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Chapter 1
Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities was introduced in the 1970s in most 
Western countries. At the time, this only concerned screening for neural tube defects 
and chromosomal abnormalities, especially Down’s syndrome. As initially screening for 
chromosomal abnormalities was only possible using costly and not entirely risk-free 
invasive tests, this screening was offered only to pregnant women of advanced maternal 
age (≥ 36-38 years), because of their a	priori increased risk of having a child with aneuploidy. 
Foetal material was obtained by means of amniocentesis (at 15-18 weeks of gestation) 
or chorionic villus sampling (at 10-14 weeks gestation). Both invasive procedures hold a 
small but significant risk of iatrogenic miscarriage. This risk was initially estimated to be 
about 1.0%, currently estimations are 0.3-0.5%. The development of methods for risk-
assessment resulted in a prenatal screening program for Down’s syndrome (and other 
chromosomal abnormalities) that was offered to all pregnant women and included a two-
step testing cascade: risk-assessment and invasive diagnostic testing for those at increased 
risk (≥ 1:200-250) for having a child with aneuploidy. From the 1990s onward, a second 
trimester foetal ultrasound scan was offered to all pregnant women to detect neural tube 
defects and other major congenital anomalies. Conventional karyotyping, identifying major 
numerical or structural chromosomal abnormalities that are visible by microscope, was the 
gold standard of diagnostic testing. The testing techniques and the scope of testing have 
remained rather constant for decades, and the screening strategy consisted of a limited 
set of standard test offers that pregnant women could either accept or decline. Recent 
technological developments have challenged the obviousness of these standards and are 
reason to deliberate upon what tests to offer, to whom to offer them and why. These are 
not only practical questions, but they bear moral relevance as well. In this thesis, I focus on 
three recent developments in prenatal screening: 1) a narrowing of the scope of testing, 2) 
a broadening of the scope of testing, and 3) an increase in the number and a diversification 
of the purpose of prenatal tests. Regarding the first development, the introduction of so-
called rapid aneuploidy detection (RAD) molecular techniques is relevant. These techniques 
enable faster, cheaper and targeted testing for a few selected abnormalities only. Generally 
they focus on trisomies 21, 18, 13 and sex chromosomal abnormalities. For now, non-
invasive prenatal testing (NIPT)1, enabling early, easy and safe testing on foetal DNA/RNA 
circulating in the blood of pregnant women, also focuses on the most common trisomies, 
but this may change in the future. A broadening of the scope is effectuated by microarray-
1 In the chapters 3, 4, and 6 the abbreviation NIPD (non-invasive prenatal diagnosis) is used, because 
these chapters consist of papers that were written and published some time ago. Recently, however, 
the terminology has internationally changed into NIPT (non-invasive prenatal testing). To be in keeping 
with this international usage, I also use this latter term in the chapters 1 and 9.
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based techniques that allow for detecting a much wider range of foetal defects than can be 
revealed by karyotyping. In the future, a broad NIPT may be feasible too. Finally, the number 
and moments of testing tend to be increased to ensure optimal identification of possible 
abnormalities. Moreover, a single test is increasingly being used for two purposes, namely 
prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities and pregnancy management. All in all, the scope 
of prenatal screening becomes increasingly indistinct. 
From the beginning, the aim of prenatal screening policies was much debated. Its initial 
preventive goal was criticized and soon replaced by a so-called ‘autonomy view’. Facilitating 
autonomous reproductive choice became the generally accepted aim of prenatal screening 
in Western countries, but current dynamics in prenatal screening challenges this account of 
reproductive autonomy. It is no longer clear what a standard test offer should include and 
the question arises what the notion of autonomous choice in the prenatal screening context 
exactly means. 
The main objective of this thesis is to map out the moral landscape of prenatal screening, 
more specifically to identify and systematically evaluate the moral pros and cons of the main 
developments in current prenatal screening strategies. This evaluation will be performed 
in relation to two paradigms of prenatal screening, namely prevention and choice. For this 
purpose theoretical and empirical methods are used. The ethical method used is the wide 
reflective equilibrium and the data generated by the empirical research are integrated in 
this ethical process of deliberation. 
The second goal is to explore whether the alternative of a so-called individualised choice, 
one that allows pregnant women to individually decide what information they wish to 
receive about their foetus, can replace the traditional standard test offer and can be an 
adequate translation of the notion of reproductive autonomy in this context. 
Chapter 2 
In this chapter, the ethical implications of offering a narrow diagnostic test (RAD) instead 
of conventional karyotyping to women at increased risk for trisomies 21, 18 and 13, are 
examined. RAD has some clear advantageous features: it is fast, relatively cheap and produces 
only clear test results. The latter may ease pre- and post-test counselling and decision-making 
and fast test results have short term psychological benefits over later results. The latter does 
however not lead to an overall psychological benefit. A drawback of RAD is that it may also 
miss clinically relevant abnormalities. Women have to be informed about this limitation of 
RAD and this diminishes the counselling advantages of the targeted scope of RAD. Moreover, 
the relevance of these missed abnormalities is evaluated differently between and among 
professionals and pregnant women. For these reasons, RAD is not evidently more in line 
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with the requirement of respect for autonomy than karyotyping. Whether the case for RAD 
is regarded as convincing seems to depend mainly on one’s implicit view of what prenatal 
screening is about. Those who think that prenatal screening is about testing for trisomy 
21 and a few other serious conditions may find the arguments for limiting the test offer to 
RAD convincing. The more so if the consistency in scope throughout the screening strategy, 
i.e. between the risk-assessment and diagnostic test, is taken into account. But others 
may find that there are good grounds to at least include a wider range of conditions in the 
diagnostic test offer. Since professionals and pregnant women have different views about 
this, the best approach may be to offer women a choice between RAD and karyotyping: a 
so-called individualised choice. This approach would at least have the benefit of being most 
in line with the general aim of prenatal screening: providing opportunities for autonomous 
reproductive choice. 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter the ethical implications of introducing non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) 
in prenatal screening strategies are explored. NIPD can be performed easily, safely and early 
in pregnancy. It is feared that these features will lead to an uninformed and thoughtless 
uptake and to normalisation of testing and selective abortion. However, pregnant women 
may clearly profit from the features of NIPD and there are ethically favourable consequences 
as well: absence of iatrogenic miscarriage, earlier reassurance, a longer period for decision-
making and the possibility of an early abortion, which may be physically and psychologically 
less burdening and ethically less problematic because of the lower moral status generally 
ascribed to the foetus in its earlier developmental stages. Moreover, since NIPD is 
conceptually easier than the current two-step procedure, informed consent may become 
easier to obtain. An increase in uptake and more selective abortions need not in itself be 
taken to signal a thoughtless acceptance of NIPD. 
The real moral challenge of NIPD testing seems to consist in the possibility of linking up 
this safe and early technique with new genomic technologies that allow broad (genome-
wide) prenatal diagnostic testing. In case of a broad NIPD, informed consent will become 
more difficult -if attainable at all- and this will challenge the notion of prenatal screening as 
serving reproductive autonomy. The debate about the ethical challenges of broad genetic 
testing is primarily conducted in the contexts of neonatal screening and invasive prenatal 
testing, but the same issues will present themselves even more forcefully should broad 
NIPD become possible. This also includes the issue of the ‘right not to know’ of the future 
child, in case NIPD includes later-onset diseases as well.
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Chapter 4
This chapter also regards NIPD, but then focuses on the question of what the introduction 
of a narrow NIPD for trisomies 21, 18 and 13 means for the screening strategy as a whole. 
If NIPD is going to replace current two-step testing, this means a loss of information as 
compared with current practice. More in general, a routine offer of NIPD for these trisomies 
requires decisions about its timing, and about the scope and strategy of the remaining 
testing cascade. Given the aim of prenatal screening, to facilitate autonomous reproductive 
decision-making, a decision is needed whether complementary (invasive) testing should be 
offered in order to maintain the current array of options for reproductive choice. However, 
an accumulation of tests may negatively impact upon the requirements of informed consent 
and proportionality. If additional testing needs to be offered, the general opinion that NIPD 
allows prenatal testing to become easier, safe and earlier in pregnancy, needs to be adjusted. 
Therefore, decisions regarding NIPD need to address choices regarding the whole prenatal 
screening strategy and require a proactive ethical evaluation to find out which approach is 
most in line with the normative framework for prenatal screening.
Chapter 5
In this chapter, the use of microarrays as a diagnostic tool in prenatal screening strategies 
will be evaluated from an ethical point of view. Genomic microarray analysis enables 
searching the genome at a higher resolution and with higher sensitivity than conventional 
karyotyping and can therefore indentify more clinically significant abnormalities. This is 
usually seen as a benefit, also in the prenatal context. As yet, no clear guidelines exist when 
microarrays should be applied prenatally, nor whether a targeted or genome-wide array 
has to be favoured. This lack of clarity has motivated the discussion about the character 
and application of microarrays in prenatal screening strategies. First, the general distinction 
between a targeted and a genome-wide microarray is scrutinised. This leads to distinguishing 
between a targeted, a directed and an undirected array, describing respectively a test 
that only seeks the aberrations indicated by the diagnostic question; a test that seeks all 
known and clear (benign or pathogenic) aberrations, and a test that seeks all (both clear 
and unclear) aberrations. From the perspective of medical ethics, it would seem that the 
indications women present with determine what can be seen as a ‘suitable diagnostic test’. 
If this indication is clear, diagnostic testing by a targeted microarray, focussing on associated 
copy number variants (CNVs), has to be preferred. If such an array is not and cannot be made 
available or if the indication is unclear, a broader microarray may be used. Then a directed 
microarray identifying known CNVs has to be favoured over an undirected microarray 
that generates variants of unclear significance (VOUS) as well. This choice is based on the 
evaluation of the emotional and decisional burdens of VOUS versus the benefit of possibly 
identifying yet unknown but possibly clinically relevant CNVs. It is suggested that including 
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VOUS serves a research purpose rather than directly contributing to the aim of autonomous 
reproductive decision making - although it may do so in the long run when proper studies 
have revealed their either benign or pathogenic character. 
Second, the question is whether, and if so how, adequate information about the 
heterogeneous findings possibly generated by (both directed and undirected) microarrays 
can be provided to pregnant women in order to obtain adequate informed consent. The 
model of generic consent may be helpful here. Furthermore, the 'interpretive model' of 
the professional-patient relationship is suggested for this situation. Finally, if microarrays or 
other future genome-wide testing techniques like whole genome/exome sequencing and 
analysis will also reveal information about a late(r)-onset disease, the future child’s right not 
to know may be violated. Suggestions of how to address this issue are provided. 
Chapter 6
This chapter presents an overview of technological developments discussed so far: 
RAD, foetal ultrasound scans, genome-wide molecular testing and NIPT. It shows how 
these advances in prenatal screening challenge the aim and requirements of prenatal 
screening. The application of RAD could result in an unjustified limitation of meaningful 
reproductive choice. To keep in line with the aim of prenatal screening it is suggested to 
offer pregnant women the choice between conventional karyotyping and RAD. Regarding 
broad, heterogeneous testing like foetal ultrasound scans and microarrays the aim to offer 
opportunity for reproductive choice is endangered too, albeit for the inability to provide 
information in the traditional way. Therefore, the feasibility of alternative models of 
informed consent are explored and the option to categorise the possible outcomes of testing 
beforehand is presented. It seems inevitable that filters have to be used to avoid findings 
that are unwanted, either by prospective parents themselves or to protect future children’s 
interests. The latter implies that the right of pregnant women to obtain information about 
their future child is not unlimited, nor unconditional. This still leaves open the question 
who should define the exact scope of testing and on what grounds. The overall tendency 
towards more, additional and ever-broader testing challenges the requirements of equal 
access and proportionality. The latter regards not only the assessment between the benefits 
(enabling reproductive choice) and the emotional and decisional burdens of test offers on 
the individual level. The societal impact of prenatal test offers, including the financial costs 
and gains and possible discriminatory effects, have to be addressed as well. This shows that 
the choices to be made in prenatal screening strategies are as much about ethics as they are 
about technology. 
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Chapter 7
In this chapter the main findings of the empirical research are described. This qualitative 
study investigated the views and preferences of professionals and potential users regarding 
four diagnostic test options for women at increased risk for common aneuploidies. These 
options included three standard test offers: RAD, conventional karyotyping or microarrays 
that represent a narrow, traditional and broad test respectively. Fourth was the option of 
individualised choice. Seven focus group sessions were conducted including various categories 
of participants (n=55): professionals engaged in prenatal testing and potential users of the 
tests (pregnant women and parents of young children). All these participants were invited 
to first individually evaluate the four options. After that, a semi-structured group interview 
was conducted. The data were analysed by the constant comparative method. Two major 
themes emerged in the focus groups, showing two levels of deliberation: classification of 
test features and reflection on the concepts of informed choice and autonomy. Participants 
first focused on the features of the test options, such as test outcomes, wait for results, costs 
and familiarity with particular tests. In general, they all identified similar test features and 
classified these as test-specific pros and cons. But when asked what option should be offered 
to pregnant women, they showed different preferences. Professionals, except the midwives, 
for the most part preferred option 1 (RAD), whereas the pregnant women, parents and 
midwives mainly chose option 4 (individualised choice). This difference was mainly influenced 
by their opinion on the second theme: the meaning and feasibility of informed choice and 
autonomy in the prenatal screening context. On a theoretical level, participants agreed that 
users should be enabled to make an informed choice about what test to apply. Thus they 
shared the ideal of an individualised choice. But when discussing the feasibility of such a 
choice, views differed. Whereas some considered it fairly impossible to provide women with 
adequate information and to ensure adequate counselling to enable an individual carefully 
thought-out choice, others were convinced that women’s reproductive options should not 
be constrained by others despite the possible informational and decisional problems. The 
latter group emphasised that, to reach the aim of individualised choice, counselling should 
not only ensure adequate information and non-directivity, but also support counselees in 
reflecting on their wants and values and in finding ways to realise these. 
The results of the empirical research confirm the finding in other studies that the question 
of what test option best complies with the aim of prenatal screening is answered differently 
by both professionals and users, and suggests that a ‘one-size fits-all’ approach fails to take 
into account the different views and preferences of prospective parents. Furthermore, 
estimated personal bearing capacity led some users to give a different answer with regard to 
what they would choose for themselves and to what choices should be offered to pregnant 
women in general. 
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Chapter 8
This chapter focuses on new genetic and genomic technologies (the ‘new genetics’) and the 
challenge they entail for the requirement of informed consent in three different contexts: 
newborn screening, prenatal screening and commercial direct-to-consumer (DTC) personal 
testing. Technologies such as whole genome/exome sequencing and microarray based 
analysis enable genome-wide testing for many and heterogeneous abnormalities and 
predispositions simultaneously. The advantage is that they increase the chance of identifying 
relevant disorders. However, they may also reveal so-called incidental and possibly unwanted 
findings. This may cause friction with the principle of respect for autonomy and demands a 
rethinking of traditional interpretation of the concept of informed consent. The discussion 
takes the existing ethical framework for responsible screening and clinical care as its point 
of departure. This means that the scope of a responsible test or screening offer has to be 
consistent with the purpose(s) of testing and with the principle of respect for autonomy for all 
stakeholders involved, including -in the prenatal scenario future- children. Informed consent 
is a prerequisite in all three contexts. The traditional interpretation of informed consent in 
the context of genetic testing is that the testee is offered extensive and non-directive pre-
test counselling to enable an informed, autonomous choice. In the light of the new genetics, 
however, informed consent requires a new approach. A renewed interpretation has to take 
into account the aim of testing, the possibility for individual differentiation and the feasibility 
of informed consent in the various contexts. The overall conclusion is that standardised 
approaches to the design of testing and screening offers are no longer appropriate, but need 
to be replaced by differentiated or individualised approaches that enable tailoring the tests 
to individual informational needs and preferences. The principle of respect for persons may 
be best served through differentiating and pre-structuring the testing or screening offer into 
a ‘menu of options’ from which testees may choose. By differentiating choice, autonomy 
can be preserved. 
Chapter 9
This final chapter is divided into three parts. In Part I, the normative framework for prenatal 
screening is extensively discussed. The objective of prenatal screening, initially understood 
in terms of prevention, has soon been specified as offering opportunity for autonomous 
reproductive decision-making. These different aims are related to two opposite paradigms 
of prenatal screening, prevention and choice, of which the latter currently dominates 
screening practice in Western countries. The two paradigms entail various features and 
influence the way prenatal screening programmes are presented and evaluated in practice. 
When confronting the generally shared aim to offer opportunity for reproductive choice 
with the introduction of new testing techniques, it becomes clear that the choice paradigm 
is challenged. Given the opposite developments of a narrowing and a broadening of the 
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scope of testing, it is necessary to reconsider what autonomous reproductive choice 
actually refers to in the prenatal screening context. The three basic principles that underlie 
the normative framework for prenatal screening are respect for persons, beneficence/
non-maleficence, and justice. But these principles are not unequivocal when asking what 
scope has to be preferred from an ethical point of view. Respect for autonomy, in a positive 
account, may dismiss the suggestion of limiting a person’s options but does not necessarily 
imply that a maximum amount of reproductive choices has to be preferred. More and 
broader tests may also undermine autonomy if prospective parents are overwhelmed by 
the amount and kind of possible test outcomes. It is difficult to determine whether offering 
more narrow or broader testing benefits participants most, since this very much depends on 
personal capabilities and preferences too. Finally, equal access and proportionality are both 
important requirements if prenatal screening is publicly funded. 
In Part II, the consequences of the three developments in prenatal screening are more 
deeply explored in relation to the two paradigms. If narrow tests (RAD, narrow NIPT) are 
offered as a standard, this means that not the users of the test, but the providers determine 
what constitutes important knowledge for prospective parents. This does not meet the 
principle of respect for persons insofar as autonomous reproductive choice is not being 
facilitated. Therefore, offering standard narrow tests can be deemed to unjustly limit 
possibly relevant knowledge and thus restrict autonomous reproductive choice. This does 
not mean that more reproductive options are always to be favoured, but the question what 
is beneficial and proportional in view of the adhered benefits and burdens, is difficult to 
solve on an abstract level and is in need of an individual evaluation too. The alternative 
of an individualised choice, that allows pregnant women to choose themselves what test 
best suits their personal situation and preferences, can solve the dilemma but is not easy 
to implement. The major pitfalls of this concept are information overload and emotional or 
decisional overcharge, and these drawbacks have to be prevented. Similar issues arise when 
broad and compound tests (microarrays, foetal ultrasound scans, future whole genome 
and whole exome sequencing and analysis) are offered in the prenatal screening cascade. 
Inclusion of specific categories of findings are a matter of concern in case of genome-wide 
testing. This regards late(r)-onset diseases, susceptibilities and VOUS. To avoid the ethical 
complications of such findings, the test may be designed in such a way that these findings will 
not be generated, or these findings may be ‘filtered out’ in the analysing phase. However, 
this solution still does not answer the question of who is to determine the exact range of 
such a design or filter. Another ethical problem is that the prenatal use of genome-wide 
techniques for a diagnostic aim leads in practice to screening the foetus for any genetic 
aberration, irrespective of the initial indication. This challenges the justification of using 
that technique as a ‘suitable test’ and raises the question of equal access: if any indication 
suffices, why would not every women be eligible for this kind of testing? 
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Part III discusses why individualised choice may be a justifiable way to translate the notion 
of reproductive autonomy in the prenatal screening context. If the classical account of the 
aim of prenatal screening is taken seriously, it seems that pregnant women themselves 
should also have a say in the range of conditions their foetus is tested for. This leads to a 
individual-driven approach in which the choice of individual pregnant women is guiding, 
instead of following a system-based approach that charges professionals with offering 
standard tests to particular groups of women. The concept of individualised choice does not 
mean that ‘anything goes’ and that prospective parents have to be offered whatever they 
ask for. Reproductive autonomy, and thus individualised choice, in the prenatal screening 
context is limited by three factors. First, if prenatal screening is funded publicly, it should 
be restricted in such a way that it meets a state’s duty of care and regards worthwhile 
options as understood by most people in society. Moreover, the scope of screening may 
be influenced by the consideration that selective abortion is a possible consequence 
of this publicly initiated test offer. Second, prenatal testing has to promote autonomous 
choice and should not undermine it due to information overload or complexity of choice. 
This calls for a surveyable menu of test options. Third, the future child’s right not to know 
has to be protected and this requires not including findings in the testing array that may 
violate this right. Providers have to make a pre-selection of test options that meets the 
qualified interpretation of reproductive autonomy. When offered this well-balanced menu, 
prospective parents can choose themselves what serves their personal situation, values and 
preferences best. 

Samenvatting

Samenvatting
199
Samenvatting
Hoofdstuk 1
Prenatale screening op foetale aandoeningen is in de meeste westerse landen in de 
jaren ‘70 van de vorige eeuw geïntroduceerd. Het ging toen uitsluitend om screening op 
neuralebuisdefecten en chromosoomafwijkingen, met name downsyndroom. Omdat voor 
screening op chromosoomafwijkingen toen nog alleen gebruik gemaakt kon worden van 
kostbare en niet geheel risicovrije invasieve testen, werd die screening aanvankelijk alleen 
aangeboden aan zwangere vrouwen van 38 jaar (later: 36 jaar) en ouder, vanwege hun a 
priori verhoogd risico op een kind met aneuploïdie (chromosomale afwijking veroorzaakt 
door een afwijkend aantal chromosomen). Hiervoor werd gebruik gemaakt van foetaal 
materiaal dat verkregen werd via een vruchtwaterpunctie (bij 15-18 weken zwangerschap) 
of een vlokkentest (bij 10-14 weken zwangerschap). Beide invasieve testen brengen een 
miskraamrisico met zich mee dat aanvankelijk werd geschat op ongeveer 1,0% (tegenwoordig 
gaat men uit van 0,3-0,5%). De ontwikkeling van niet-invasieve risicoschattende testen 
resulteerde vanaf de jaren ’80 in een prenataal screeningsprogramma voor alle zwangere 
vrouwen en bestond uit een traject met twee opeenvolgende testen: eerst werd een 
risicoschatting gedaan en alleen degenen met verhoogd risico (≥ 1:200-250) op het krijgen 
van een kind met aneuploïdie kregen de invasieve diagnostische testen aangeboden. Vanaf 
de jaren ’90 kwam het structureel echoscopisch onderzoek (SEO) naar neurale buisdefecten 
en andere ernstige aangeboren afwijkingen in zwang. Deze screeningsecho wordt meestal 
rond de 20e zwangerschapsweek gedaan. Conventionele karyotypering, waarmee alle 
microscopisch zichtbare chromosomale afwijkingen kunnen worden gevonden, gold als de 
‘gouden standaard’ van de prenatale diagnostiek. De reikwijdte van prenatale screening en 
de technieken die daarvoor werden ingezet zijn decennialang vrij constant gebleven. Dit 
betekende dat het screeningstraject bestond uit een beperkte set van standaardtesten, die 
zwangere vrouwen konden accepteren of afwijzen. 
Recente technologische ontwikkelingen hebben ertoe geleid dat het testaanbod niet langer 
vanzelfsprekend is en dit doet de vragen rijzen welke test moet worden aangeboden, 
aan wie en waarom. Dit zijn niet louter praktische vragen, ze zijn ook ethisch relevant. In 
dit proefschrift richt ik me op drie recente ontwikkelingen in prenatale screening: 1) een 
versmalling van de reikwijdte van het testen, 2) een verbreding van de reikwijdte van het 
testen, en 3) een toename van het aantal prenatale testen en een wisselend doel van die 
testen.
Wat betreft de eerste ontwikkeling, is de introductie van zogenoemde rapid	 aneuploidy	
detection (RAD) technieken relevant. Deze moleculaire technieken maken het mogelijk snel, 
goedkoop en gericht op een paar geselecteerde afwijkingen te testen. In het algemeen 
richten RAD-testen zich op trisomie 21 (downsyndroom), trisomie 18 (patausyndroom), 
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trisomie 13 (edwardssyndroom) en geslachtschromosomale afwijkingen. Voorlopig richt ook 
de zogenoemde ‘niet-invasieve prenatale test’ (NIPT) zich op de drie genoemde trisomieën. 
NIPT is een techniek die het mogelijk maakt om al vroeg in de zwangerschap testen uit te 
voeren op foetaal DNA/RNA dat in het bloed van de zwangere vrouw circuleert. Dit betekent 
dat NIPT in principe vroeg, veilig en makkelijk kan worden uitgevoerd.
Een verbreding van de reikwijdte van prenatale screening is te zien in de toepassing van 
zogenoemde ‘microarray’- technieken (mircroarrays). Deze kunnen een veel breder scala 
aan foetale afwijkingen ontdekken dan karyotypering. De verwachting is dat in de toekomst 
NIPT ook voor een brede reikwijdte kan worden aangeboden.
Tenslotte bestaat de tendens om gedurende de hele zwangerschap meer testen aan te 
bieden en zo alle mogelijke foetale afwijkingen te identificeren. Daarnaast wordt een en 
dezelfde test steeds vaker gebruikt voor twee doelen, namelijk voor prenatale screening op 
foetale afwijkingen en voor het vaststellen van zwangerschapscomplicaties. Al met al wordt 
de reikwijdte van prenatale screening dus steeds onduidelijker.
Vanaf het begin is er veel discussie geweest over het doel van prenatale screening. De 
aanvankelijke doelstelling, die gericht was op preventie en gezondheidswinst, werd fel 
bekritiseerd en al snel vervangen door het doel om reproductieve autonomie te faciliteren. 
Dit hield in dat prenatale screening zwangere vrouwen (en hun partners) in staat moest 
stellen om, middels het verschaffen van zinvolle handelingsopties, reproductieve keuzes te 
maken. In de westerse landen is dit laatste nog steeds het algemeen aanvaarde doel van 
prenatale screening, dat ook in beleidsdocumenten terug te vinden is. Echter, de huidige 
dynamiek in prenatale screening stelt deze reproductieve autonomie opnieuw ter discussie. 
Nu niet meer duidelijk wat een standaard testaanbod moet omvatten, rijst de vraag wat het 
begrip ‘autonome reproductieve keuze’ in de prenatale screening context precies betekent.
Het primaire doel van dit proefschrift is om de morele vragen rond prenatale screening 
in kaart te brengen, meer specifiek om de morele voor- en nadelen van de belangrijkste 
ontwikkelingen in de hedendaagse praktijk van prenatale screening te identificeren en 
te evalueren. In deze evaluatie zullen twee paradigma’s van prenatale screening worden 
betrokken, namelijk die van preventie en van autonome keuze. Hiertoe worden theoretische 
en empirische methoden gebruikt. De gehanteerde ethische methode is het wide	reflective	
equilibrium. Dit is een redeneermethode waarin wordt gestreefd naar coherentie tussen 
verschillende opvattingen, intuïties, algemene ethische principes, oordelen en (praktijk-)
ervaringen. De data uit het empirisch onderzoek worden in deze methode geïntegreerd.
Het tweede doel is om te onderzoeken of het alternatief van een zogenoemde 
geïndividualiseerde keuze (individualised	 choice), dat inhoudt dat zwangere vrouwen 
individueel kunnen bepalen welke informatie ze over hun foetus willen ontvangen, het 
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traditionele standaard testaanbod kan vervangen en een adequate operationalisering van 
het begrip reproductieve autonomie in deze context kan zijn.
Hoofdstuk 2
In dit hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht wat de ethische implicaties zijn van het aanbieden van 
een smalle diagnostische test (RAD) in plaats van karyotypering aan vrouwen met een 
verhoogd risico op trisomie 21, 18 of 13. RAD heeft een aantal evidente voordelen: het is 
snel, relatief goedkoop en genereert duidelijke testresultaten. Dit laatste kan de pre- en 
posttest counseling en besluitvorming vergemakkelijken. Snelle testresultaten leveren op 
de korte termijn een psychologisch en emotioneel voordeel op, maar op de lange termijn 
lijkt het voor het emotionele welbevinden van vrouwen niet uit te maken of ze een paar 
dagen of een paar weken op de testuitslag hebben moeten wachten. Een nadeel van RAD 
is dat het klinisch relevante afwijkingen kan missen. Ervan uitgaande dat vrouwen vooraf 
moeten worden geïnformeerd over de beperkte reikwijdte van RAD is het niet evident dat 
de informatieverstrekking omtrent RAD eenvoudiger is. Een ander belangrijk punt is dat de 
relevantie van de afwijkingen die door RAD gemist worden door professionals en zwangere 
vrouwen verschillend wordt beoordeeld. Tegen de achtergrond van deze voor- en nadelen 
kan niet zonder meer gezegd worden dat een aanbod van RAD meer in overeenstemming 
is met het beginsel van respect voor personen dan een aanbod van karyotypering. Of 
een pleidooi voor RAD overtuigend wordt gevonden, lijkt voornamelijk af te hangen van 
iemands visie op de reikwijdte van prenatale screening als zodanig. Degenen die vinden 
dat prenatale screening vooral gaat over testen voor trisomie 21 en een paar andere 
ernstige aandoeningen, vinden de argumenten voor het beperken van het testaanbod 
tot RAD waarschijnlijk overtuigend. Dit geldt des te meer als men vindt dat de reikwijdte 
van het testaanbod gedurende het hele screeningstraject gelijk moet zijn. Een dergelijke 
‘screeningslogica’ betekent dat de risicoschattende test en de diagnostische test op 
dezelfde aandoeningen gericht moeten zijn. Anderen kunnen evenwel vinden dat er goede 
gronden zijn om een breder scala aan afwijkingen in de diagnostische test op te nemen, 
temeer daar een invasieve test het risico op een miskraam met zich meebrengt. Breder 
testen leidt tot een gunstiger detectie-miskraam ratio. Omdat professionals en zwangere 
vrouwen ook onderling over deze kwesties van mening verschillen, is een alternatief om 
zwangere vrouwen zelf te laten kiezen tussen RAD en karyotypering. Dit komt neer op een 
zogenoemde geïndividualiseerde keuze. Het geven van deze keuze zou tenminste beter dan 
een standaardaanbod aansluiten bij het algemene doel van prenatale screening: het bieden 
van mogelijkheden voor autonome reproductieve keuze.
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Hoofdstuk 3
In dit hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht wat de ethische implicaties zijn van het invoeren van niet-
invasieve prenatale diagnostiek (NIPD)1 in prenatale screening scenario’s. Er wordt hier vanuit 
gegaan dat NIPD een 100% betrouwbare diagnostische test is. De belangrijkste voordelen 
van NIPD zijn dat deze veilig is om te doen, dat wil zeggen dat er geen miskraamrisico aan 
verbonden is, dat deze vroeg in de zwangerschap en op tamelijk eenvoudige wijze kan 
worden uitgevoerd - er is namelijk slechts een klein beetje bloed van de zwangere vrouw voor 
nodig. De vrees bestaat dat deze eigenschappen van NIPD ertoe zullen leiden dat zwangere 
vrouwen ondoordacht en zonder adequate voorafgaande informatie deze test zullen laten 
doen en dat het in het algemeen zal leiden tot een normalisatie van het ondergaan van 
zowel prenatale testen als selectieve abortus.
Echter, zwangere vrouwen profiteren ook van de eigenschappen van NIPD en deze hebben 
bovendien ethische voordelen. Ten eerste is het iatrogene miskraamrisico afwezig. Ten 
tweede kan vroege NIPD een eerdere geruststelling betekenen, of een langere termijn voor 
de besluitvorming over afbreken of voortzetten van de zwangerschap. Voorts maakt NIPD 
een vroege abortus mogelijk die zowel fysiek als psychologisch minder belastend is. Ook 
ethisch gezien is een vroege abortus minder problematisch vanwege de veronderstelde 
lagere morele status van de foetus eerder in de zwangerschap. Ten derde, omdat NIPD 
conceptueel eenvoudiger is dan de huidige getrapte procedure van eerst een risico-schatting 
en daarna invasieve diagnostiek, kan geïnformeerde toestemming (informed	consent) ook 
makkelijker worden. Als dit al tot een toename van het aantal testen en het aantal selectieve 
abortussen leidt, hoeft dit op zichzelf niet te duiden op een achteloze aanvaarding van NIPD: 
evenzeer kan dit een uiting zijn van een toename van autonome reproductieve keuzes.
Indringender morele vragen rond NIPD lijken vooral te ontstaan als het mogelijk wordt deze 
veilige en vroege test te koppelen aan nieuwe technieken die (genoom-)brede prenatale 
diagnostiek mogelijk maken. Bij een brede NIPD zal het moeilijker worden te voldoen aan 
de eis van informed consent en dit zal ook het doel van prenatale screening, reproductieve 
autonomie, op de proef stellen. Het debat over de ethische vragen rond brede genetische 
testen wordt voornamelijk gevoerd in de context van neonatale screening en invasieve 
prenatale testen. Dezelfde vragen zullen zich nog nadrukkelijker voordoen als een brede 
NIPD mogelijk wordt. In geval NIPD ook later in het leven optredende (late-onset) ziektes 
bestrijkt, kan daarbij bovendien de kwestie van het ‘recht op niet-weten’ van het toekomstige 
kind aan de orde zijn.
1 In de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 6 wordt de afkorting NIPD (niet-invasieve prenatale diagnositiek) gebruikt, 
omdat deze hoofdstukken bestaan uit artikelen die enige tijd geleden geschreven en gepubliceerd 
zijn. Recent is de term internationaal gewijzigd in NIPT (niet-invasieve prenatale test). Om bij deze 
internationale terminogie aan te sluiten, gebruik ik deze laatste term in de hoofdstukken 1 en 9.
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Hoofdstuk 4
Dit hoofdstuk gaat ook over NIPD, maar betreft dan de vraag wat de introductie van een smalle 
NIPD, gericht op trisomie 21, 18 en 13, voor de prenatale screening als geheel betekent. Als 
NIPD het huidige testtraject voor deze trisomieën gaat vervangen, betekent dit dat een deel 
van de informatie die met de huidige opzet gegenereerd wordt, niet meer verkregen zal 
worden. Meer in het algemeen vereist een routine aanbod van NIPD voor de trisomieën 
een beslissing over de timing, over de reikwijdte en over eventuele aanvullende testen in 
het screeningstraject. Gezien het doel van prenatale screening, autonome reproductieve 
besluitvorming faciliteren, is een beslissing nodig of aanvullende (invasieve) testen moeten 
worden aangeboden, zodat het huidige scala aan reproductieve opties gehandhaafd blijft. 
Echter, een opeenstapeling van testen kan negatief uitwerken voor de eisen van informed 
consent en proportionaliteit. Als aanvullende testen moeten worden aangeboden, zou dit 
de voordelen van NIPD (veilig, vroeg, gemakkelijk) grotendeels teniet doen. Beslissingen 
over de invoering van NIPD vereisen daarom ook keuzes ten aanzien van het hele prenatale 
screeningstraject. Een proactieve ethische evaluatie is nodig om te beoordelen welke 
aanpak het beste strookt met het normatieve kader voor prenatale screening.
Hoofdstuk 5
In dit hoofdstuk zal de implementatie van microarrays als diagnostisch middel in het prenatale 
screeningstraject worden geëvalueerd vanuit ethisch gezichtspunt. Microarrays doorzoeken 
het genoom met een hogere resolutie en een hogere gevoeligheid dan karyotypering 
doet. Daardoor kunnen meer klinisch significante afwijkingen gevonden worden. Meestal 
wordt dit als een voordeel gezien, ook in de prenatale context. Vooralsnog bestaan er geen 
eenduidige richtlijnen wanneer microarrays prenataal moet worden ingezet, noch of deze 
gericht of genoombreed moeten zijn. Over het karakter en de toepassing van microarrays in 
de prenatale context kan het volgende worden gezegd. Om te beginnen wordt het algemeen 
gehanteerde onderscheid tussen een gerichte en genoombrede microarray onder de loep 
genomen. Dit leidt er toe dat we drie verschillende soorten microarrays onderscheiden: 1) 
een test die enkel beoogt de diagnostische vraag te beantwoorden en de reikwijdte daartoe 
beperkt (een targeted	microarray); 2) een test die alle bekende (benigne en pathogene) 
afwijkingen opspoort (een directed	microarray), 3) een test die er naar streeft alle (zowel 
duidelijke als onduidelijke) aberraties aan het licht te brengen (een undirected microarray). 
Vanuit medisch-ethisch perspectief lijkt het logisch dat de indicatie van zwangere vrouwen 
medebepalend is voor wat als een geschikte diagnostische test kan gelden. Als de indicatie 
helder is, verdient het aanbeveling de diagnostische test toe te spitsen op de variaties in 
het genoom die met deze indicatie geassocieerd zijn. Als de indicatie minder helder is, zoals 
vaak wanneer bij het SEO afwijkingen worden gevonden, kan een bredere -een directed- 
microarray worden gebruikt. Deze verdient de voorkeur boven een undirected microarray, 
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omdat de laatste ook variaties in het genoom detecteert waarvan de betekenis onduidelijk 
is. Deze aanbevelingen zijn gebaseerd op de afweging van de emotionele last die het 
kennisnemen van en de besluitvorming op basis van onduidelijke variaties veroorzaken, 
versus het voordeel dat een directed test enkel bekende variaties aan het licht brengt. 
Waarschijnlijk ligt aan de keuze voor een undirected microarray mede een onderzoeksmotief 
ten grondslag: immers, op die manier kunnen thans nog onbekende variaties door follow-up 
monitoring toch gerelateerd worden aan een bepaald genotype - en daardoor als benigne 
of pathogeen worden gecategoriseerd. Dit onderzoeksdoel dient echter niet de doelstelling 
van autonome reproductieve besluitvorming in het concrete geval, hoewel het op de langere 
termijn natuurlijk wel kan bijdragen aan kennis over de betekenis van bepaalde variaties in 
het genoom.
Ten tweede is de vraag of, en zo ja hoe, voorafgaand aan de test adequate informatie 
aan zwangere vrouwen kan worden verstrekt, aangezien zowel directed als undirected 
microarrays heterogene bevindingen kunnen genereren. Categorisering van eventuele 
bevindingen geeft mogelijk een antwoord op dit probleem. Tevens wordt voorgesteld in 
deze situatie het 'interpretive model' van de art-patiënt relatie toe te passen. 
Tenslotte, als microarrays of andere genoom-brede testtechnieken zoals whole	 genome/
exome	sequencing en analyse ook informatie over late(r)-onset ziektes kunnen onthullen, 
dan kan het recht-op-niet-weten van het toekomstige kind worden geschonden. Er worden 
enkele suggesties gegeven hoe dit (zoveel mogelijk) kan worden voorkómen. 
Hoofdstuk 6
Dit hoofdstuk geeft een overzicht van de tot nog toe genoemde technologische 
ontwikkelingen: RAD, het SEO, microarrays en NIPD en laat zien hoe deze ontwikkelingen het 
doel van en de voorwaarden voor prenatale screening onder druk zetten. Het toepassen van 
RAD kan leiden tot een ongerechtvaardigde beperking van zinvolle reproductieve keuzes. 
In lijn met het doel van prenatale screening wordt voorgesteld om zwangere vrouwen de 
keuze te bieden tussen karyotypering en RAD. Ten aanzien van brede, heterogene testen, 
zoals het SEO en microarrays, wordt het doel van de reproductieve keuze ook op de proef 
gesteld, omdat het onmogelijk is om informatie tot op detailniveau te verstrekken. Dit 
werd wel beoogd in de traditionele opvatting van informed consent. Het is daarom nodig 
alternatieve modellen van informed consent te onderzoeken. Een optie is om de mogelijke 
uitkomsten van prenatale testen te categoriseren en informatie op dit categorie-niveau te 
verstrekken. Daarnaast lijkt het onvermijdelijk om filters te gebruiken, die ervoor kunnen 
zorgen dat ongewenste bevindingen vermeden of niet bekend worden. Dit draagt ertoe bij 
om de belangen van hetzij aspirant-ouders zelf, hetzij toekomstige kinderen te waarborgen. 
We komen tot de conclusie dat het recht van zwangere vrouwen op informatie over hun 
toekomstig kind niet onbeperkt, noch onvoorwaardelijk is. Wie de precieze omvang van 
breder testen moet definiëren en op welke gronden, is vooralsnog niet duidelijk. 
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De algemene tendens naar meer, aanvullende en steeds bredere testen heeft ook zijn 
weerslag op de voorwaarden van gelijke toegang en proportionaliteit. Dat laatste betreft 
niet alleen de afweging tussen de voordelen (waaronder reproductieve keuze) en nadelen 
(emotionele last van vereiste besluitvorming) van het testaanbod op individueel niveau. De 
maatschappelijke impact van het prenatale testaanbod, waaronder de financiële baten en 
lasten en mogelijke discriminerende effecten, moeten ook worden verdisconteerd. Dit alles 
laan zien dat de keuzes die ten aanzien van prenatale screening moeten worden gemaakt, 
niet alleen over technologie, maar ook over ethiek gaan. 
Hoofdstuk 7
In dit hoofdstuk worden de belangrijkste resultaten van het empirisch onderzoek 
weergegeven. In deze kwalitatieve studie zijn de opvattingen en voorkeuren van professionals 
en potentiële gebruikers ten aanzien van vier diagnostische testmogelijkheden onderzocht. 
Concreet ging het daarbij om de volgende opties: 1) een standaard smal testaanbod (RAD), 2) 
een standaard traditioneel testaanbod (karyotypering) of 3) een standaard breed testaanbod 
(microarrays). De vierde optie was die van een geïndividualiseerde keuze. Er werden zeven 
focusgroepen gehouden, met verschillende categorieën deelnemers (n = 55): professionals 
die zich bezighouden met prenatale testen en potentiële gebruikers van prenatale testen, 
te weten zwangere vrouwen en ouders van jonge kinderen (0-3 jaar). Aan deze deelnemers 
werd gevraagd om eerst individueel alle voor- en nadelen van de vier testopties te evalueren 
en hun voorkeur te bepalen. Daarna werd een semi-gestructureerd groepsinterview 
gehouden. De data werden geanalyseerd volgende de constant	 comparative	method. In 
de focusgroepen kwamen twee centrale thema’s naar boven, die op twee verschillende 
niveaus lagen: 1) een classificatie van testkenmerken en 2) een reflectie op de concepten 
van geïnformeerde keuze en autonomie. Deelnemers waren in eerste instantie gericht op het 
benoemen van de kenmerken van de testopties, zoals het soort testresultaten, de termijn 
tot de testuitslag en de financiële kosten. In het algemeen benoemden de deelnemers 
soortgelijke kenmerken bij iedere testoptie en classificeerden deze als testspecifieke voor- 
of nadelen. Maar toen hun gevraagd werd welke optie aan zwangere vrouwen zou moeten 
worden aangeboden, bleek dat ze verschillende voorkeuren hadden. Professionals, behalve 
de verloskundigen, kozen overwegend voor optie 1 (RAD), terwijl de zwangeren, ouders en 
verloskundigen vooral optie 4 (geïndividualiseerde keuze) kozen. Dit verschil werd vooral 
beïnvloed door hun mening over het tweede thema: de betekenis en de haalbaarheid van 
geïnformeerde keuze en autonomie in de prenatale screening context. Op een theoretisch 
niveau waren deelnemers het erover eens dat testgebruikers (zwangere vrouwen en hun 
partners) in staat moesten worden gesteld om een weloverwogen keuze te maken ten 
aanzien van het soort test dat ze wilden ondergaan. Het ideaal van een geïndividualiseerde 
keuze werd dus gedeeld. Maar over de haalbaarheid van een dergelijke keuze waren de 
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meningen verdeeld. Sommigen achten het onmogelijk om zwangere vrouwen van adequate 
informatie te voorzien en om vrouwen zodanig te begeleiden dat zij een individuele en goed 
doordachte keuze konden maken. Anderen waren ervan overtuigd dat de reproductieve 
mogelijkheden van vrouwen niet door anderen beperkt mochten worden en dat alles in 
het werk moest worden gesteld om de vereiste informatie en ondersteuning te geven. 
Deze laatste groep benadrukte tevens dat, om het doel van geïndividualiseerde keuze te 
realiseren, betrokkenen ook ondersteund moesten worden in hun denkproces over hun 
waarden en wensen en hoe deze het best gerealiseerd konden worden. 
Tot slot leidde de inschatting van de persoonlijke draagkracht ertoe dat sommige potentiële 
gebruikers voor zichzelf een andere testoptie kozen, dan zij voor zwangere vrouwen in het 
algemeen hadden gedaan. Daarmee werd het belang van het zélf kunnen kiezen nog eens 
onderstreept. 
De resultaten van het empirisch onderzoek bevestigen de bevindingen in andere studies die 
laten zien dat het antwoord op de vraag welke testoptie het beste voldoet aan het doel van 
prenatale screening door professionals en gebruikers verschillend wordt beantwoord. Dit 
duidt erop dat een ‘one	size	fits	all’ benadering ten onrechte geen rekening houdt met de 
verschillende standpunten en voorkeuren van toekomstige ouders. 
Hoofdstuk 8
Dit hoofdstuk richt zich op de inzet van nieuwe genetische technologieën (de ‘new	
genetics’) in drie verschillende contexten: neonatale screening, prenatale screening en 
commerciële direct-to-consumer (DTC) persoonlijke testen. Technologieën zoals whole	
genome/exome	 exome	 sequencing en microarrays kunnen genoombreed testen op vele 
en heterogene afwijkingen en predisposities tegelijk. Het voordeel hiervan is dat ze de 
kans op het identificeren van de mogelijke aandoeningen verhogen. Echter, ze kunnen 
ook zogenoemde incidentele en mogelijk ongewenste bevindingen genereren. Dit is in 
tegenspraak met het beginsel van respect voor autonomie en is reden om de traditionele 
interpretatie van het concept informed consent te heroverwegen. In de discussie wordt het 
bestaande ethisch kader voor verantwoorde screening en klinische zorg als uitgangspunt 
genomen. Dit betekent dat de reikwijdte van een verantwoord test- of screeningsaanbod in 
overeenstemming moet zijn met de doelstelling(en) van het testen en met het beginsel van 
respect voor personen, waaronder (in het prenatale scenario ook toekomstige) kinderen. 
Informed consent is een vereiste in alle drie contexten. De traditionele interpretatie van 
informed consent in de context van genetisch testen luidt dat de te testen persoon een 
uitgebreide en niet-directieve pre-test counseling moet krijgen om een weloverwogen, 
autonome keuze mogelijk te maken. In het licht van de new	genetics, vereist het concept van 
informed consent een nieuwe aanpak. Deze nieuwe interpretatie dient rekening te houden 
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met het doel van testen, de mogelijkheid van individuele differentiatie en de haalbaarheid 
van informed consent in de verschillende contexten. De algemene conclusie is dat een 
standaardaanbod van testen en screening niet langer voldoet, maar moet worden vervangen 
door een gedifferentieerde of geïndividualiseerde benadering, die een betere afstemming 
van de testen op individuele behoeften en voorkeuren mogelijk maakt. Het beginsel van 
respect voor personen kan het best worden gediend door het test- of screeningsaanbod 
te differentiëren en voor te structureren en dit aan te bieden als een ‘menu met opties’ 
waaruit betrokkenen kunnen kiezen. 
Hoofdstuk 9
Dit laatste hoofdstuk is verdeeld in drie delen. In Deel I wordt het normatieve kader voor 
prenatale screening besproken. Het doel van prenatale screening, aanvankelijk begrepen 
in termen van preventie en gezondheidswinst, is al snel gespecificeerd als het aanbieden 
van mogelijkheden voor autonome reproductieve besluitvorming. Deze doelstellingen zijn 
gerelateerd aan twee tegenovergestelde paradigma’s van prenatale screening, namelijk 
preventie en autonome keuze. Het laatste wordt in de meeste westerse landen als 
uitgangspunt genomen voor prenatale screening. De twee paradigma’s hebben verschillende 
kenmerken en beïnvloeden de manier waarop prenatale screening programma’s in de 
praktijk worden gepresenteerd en geëvalueerd. Als de introductie van nieuwe prenatale 
testtechnieken wordt bekeken in het licht van het algemeen onderschreven doel, namelijk 
het faciliteren van reproductieve keuze, dan wordt duidelijk dat het keuze-paradigma 
niet langer vanzelfsprekend is. Gezien de tegengestelde ontwikkelingen van enerzijds een 
versmalling en anderzijds een verbreding van de reikwijdte van prenatale testen, is het 
nodig om opnieuw te bezien wat autonome reproductieve keuze in de context van prenatale 
screening eigenlijk betekent. 
Er liggen drie fundamentele principes aan het normatieve kader van prenatale screening 
ten grondslag. Dit zijn 1) respect voor personen, 2) goed doen / niet-schaden, en 3) 
rechtvaardigheid. Maar deze principes zijn niet eenduidig als het gaat om de vraag welke 
testopties de voorkeur hebben vanuit een ethisch gezichtspunt. Respect voor personen/
autonomie kan betekenen dat de (reproductieve keuze-) mogelijkheden van een persoon 
niet mogen worden beperkt, maar dit betekent niet noodzakelijkerwijs dat een maximale 
hoeveelheid aan reproductieve keuzes de voorkeur verdient. Meer en bredere tests kunnen 
ook afbreuk doen aan autonomie, namelijk als toekomstige ouders overweldigd worden 
door de hoeveelheid en het soort mogelijke testresultaten. Het is moeilijk om te bepalen 
of het aanbieden van smallere of bredere testen voor deelnemers het beste uitpakt, omdat 
dit ook sterk afhankelijk is van persoonlijke capaciteiten en voorkeuren. Tot slot zijn gelijke 
toegang en proportionaliteit belangrijke voorwaarden als prenatale screening collectief 
gefinancierd wordt.
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In Deel II worden de gevolgen van de drie ontwikkelingen in prenatale screening vanuit de 
twee paradigma’s nader onderzocht. Als standaard een smalle test (RAD, smalle NIPT) wordt 
aangeboden, betekent dit dat de aanbieders en niet de aanstaande ouders zelf bepalen 
wat belangrijke informatie voor hen is. In zoverre autonome reproductieve keuze hiermee 
niet gefaciliteerd wordt, voldoet deze benadering niet aan het beginsel van respect voor 
personen. Een standaard aanbod met alleen een smalle test kan de mogelijk relevante 
informatie en dus autonome reproductieve keuze ten onrechte te beperken. Dit betekent niet 
dat het bieden van meer reproductieve opties altijd de voorkeur heeft. De vraag wat nuttig 
en proportioneel is, gelet op de voor- en nadelen van de verschillende testopties, is moeilijk 
op een abstract niveau te bepalen en vergt in essentie ook een individuele beoordeling. Het 
alternatief van een geïndividualiseerde keuze, die het zwangere vrouwen mogelijk maakt 
zelf te kiezen welke testen het beste bij hun persoonlijke situatie en voorkeuren passen, zou 
dit dilemma kunnen oplossen. Maar de uitvoering van dit alternatief is niet gemakkelijk. 
De belangrijkste valkuilen van dit concept zijn een teveel aan informatie (information	
overload) en een emotionele en/of cognitieve overbelasting vanwege de te maken keuze. 
Het is zaak deze nadelen te voorkomen. Vergelijkbare problemen ontstaan wanneer brede 
en heterogene testen (microarrays, SEO, toekomstige whole	 genome/exome	 sequencing 
en analyse) worden aangeboden in het prenatale screeningstraject. Een bijzonder punt 
van zorg is het includeren van specifieke categorieën (mogelijke) bevindingen in genoom-
brede testen: dit betreft late(r)-onset ziekten, predisposities en variaties waarvan de 
klinische betekenis onduidelijk is. Om de ethische complicaties van dergelijke bevindingen 
te voorkomen, kan de test zodanig worden ontworpen dat deze bevindingen niet worden 
gegenereerd, of kunnen deze in de analyse-fase ‘uitgefilterd’ worden. Deze oplossing biedt 
echter nog geen antwoord op de vraag wie de exacte reikwijdte van een dergelijk ontwerp 
of filter bepaalt. Een ander ethisch probleem is dat het gebruik van prenatale genoombrede 
technieken voor diagnostische doeleinden in de praktijk leidt tot het screenen van de 
foetus op elke mogelijke genetische afwijking, onafhankelijk van de aanvankelijke indicatie 
waarmee de zwangere vrouw zich meldt. Hierdoor kan worden betwijfeld of het gebruik van 
een zodanige techniek als een ‘geschikte test’ te rechtvaardigen is. Ook wordt het recht op 
gelijke toegang mogelijk geschonden: als iedere indicatie volstaat, waarom zou dan niet elke 
zwangere vrouw in aanmerking komen voor dit soort testen?
Deel III laat zien waarom het alternatief van een geïndividualiseerde keuze een goede 
operationalisering van reproductieve autonomie in de prenatale screening context kan 
zijn. Het betekent dat zwangere vrouwen ook zelf zeggenschap hebben in de reikwijdte van 
aandoeningen waarvoor hun foetus getest wordt. Als dit uitgangspunt wordt doorgevoerd, 
dan zal dat leiden tot een individuele benadering waarbij de vraag of wens van de individuele 
zwangere vrouw leidend is, in plaats van een systeembenadering waarin de aanbieder 
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of professional bepaalt welke test aan welke groep zwangere vrouwen standaard wordt 
aangeboden. Het concept van geïndividualiseerde keuze betekent niet dat alles mag en dat 
aanstaande ouders alles moeten krijgen wat ze vragen. Reproductieve autonomie en dus 
een geïndividualiseerde keuze in de prenatale screening context worden beperkt door drie 
factoren. Ten eerste, als prenatale screening publiek gefinancierd wordt, moet het aanbod 
zodanig worden beperkt dat dit voldoet aan de zorgplicht van de staat en valt onder datgene 
wat de meeste mensen in de samenleving als waardevolle opties beschouwen. Bovendien 
wordt de reikwijdte van de screening beïnvloed door de overweging dat selectieve abortus 
een mogelijk gevolg is van dit publiek geïnitieerde testaanbod. Ten tweede, prenatale testen 
worden aangeboden om autonome reproductieve keuze te bevorderen en niet om deze te 
ondermijnen door bijvoorbeeld een overdaad aan informatie of door de complexiteit van 
de keuze. Dit vereist een overzichtelijk aanbod van testopties. Ten derde, het recht op niet-
weten van het toekomstige kind moet beschermd worden, hetgeen vereist dat de testen 
geen bevindingen (kunnen) genereren die met dit recht in strijd zijn. Dit alles betekent 
dat aanbieders bij het opstellen van een ‘menu met testopties’ slechts die mogelijkheden 
includeren die voldoen aan de gekwalificeerde interpretatie van reproductieve autonomie. 
Als aanstaande ouders een dergelijk uitgebalanceerd testaanbod krijgen, kunnen ze 
uiteindelijk zelf kiezen wat het beste aansluit bij hun persoonlijke situatie, waarden en 
voorkeuren.
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